9911796707
|
Home
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2. Determination of the appellant as a protected workman. 3. Alleged bias of the Station Manager and violation of natural justice. 4. Claim of victimization. 5. Effective date of dismissal in light of the defective domestic inquiry. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act: The Labour Court upheld the validity of the application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, even though it was made after the order of dismissal had been passed. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, referencing the Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Limited, Saharanpur v. Govind case, which established that the three actions mentioned in the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) - dismissal or discharge, payment of wages, and making an application for approval - must be simultaneous and part of the same transaction. In this case, the order of dismissal was passed on May 28, 1960, communicated on May 30, 1960, with wages offered and the application under Section 33(2)(b) made the same day. The Supreme Court agreed that the application was properly made as part of the same transaction. 2. Determination of the appellant as a protected workman: The Labour Court found that the appellant was not a protected workman. The Supreme Court concurred, noting that the recognition of a protected workman requires positive action from the employer, which was not evident in this case. The mere mention of the appellant as a joint secretary of the union in a letter from the union's Vice-President was insufficient. The company had pointed out legal defects in the letter, and no further evidence of recognition was provided. Thus, the Labour Court's finding that the appellant was not a protected workman was upheld. 3. Alleged bias of the Station Manager and violation of natural justice: The appellant contended that the Station Manager was biased due to previous evidence given by the appellant in a customs case. The Labour Court acknowledged the potential bias but proceeded to evaluate the evidence independently. The Supreme Court supported this approach, citing that even if there was a violation of natural justice, the Labour Court could assess the propriety of the dismissal based on the evidence presented before it. This principle was reinforced by referencing the Phulbari Tea Estate case, which allowed tribunals to examine the justification of a dismissal despite defects in the domestic inquiry. 4. Claim of victimization: The appellant claimed victimization due to the delay in issuing the charge-sheet. The Labour Court rejected this claim, explaining that the delay was because the Station Manager became aware of the mistakes only shortly before issuing the charge-sheet. The Supreme Court agreed, emphasizing that the appellant's admission of the mistakes negated the claim of victimization. The finding of the Labour Court on this factual matter was deemed conclusive. 5. Effective date of dismissal in light of the defective domestic inquiry: The appellant argued that due to the defective inquiry, the dismissal should be effective from the date of the Labour Court's award. The Supreme Court rejected this, differentiating the present case from the Sasa Musa Sugar Works case. In the current case, an inquiry was held and a dismissal order was passed, albeit with a defect. The Labour Court's approval of the dismissal, even after its independent evaluation of the evidence, would relate back to the original date of dismissal. Thus, the dismissal was effective from May 28, 1960, the date the employer initially ordered the dismissal. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the appellant's contentions. The Labour Court's decisions on the validity of the application under Section 33(2)(b), the non-recognition of the appellant as a protected workman, the handling of the alleged bias and natural justice violation, the rejection of the victimization claim, and the effective date of dismissal were all upheld. No order for costs was made.
|
