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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the election petition was presented within the prescribed period of limitation. 2. Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. 3. Whether the erroneous advice of counsel constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the election petition was presented within the prescribed period of limitation: The petitioner contested that the starting point of limitation should be the date of publication in the Official Gazette as per Section 67 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The court, however, clarified that the relevant date is the date of the declaration by the Returning Officer, as per Section 67A. The petition was filed on April 17, 1967, while the declaration was made on February 23, 1967. Therefore, the petition was due by April 10, 1967, making it barred by limitation. 2. Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to election petitions under the Representation of the People Act, 1951: The court examined whether Sections 29(2) and 5 of the Limitation Act could be applied to election petitions. It was argued that Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act mandates dismissal of petitions not complying with Section 81, implying a strict adherence to the prescribed period. However, the court found that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act could be invoked, as the special law (Representation of the People Act) prescribes a different period of limitation. The court concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay, could apply to election petitions, as these petitions are considered applications under the Limitation Act. 3. Whether the erroneous advice of counsel constitutes "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act: The petitioner claimed that the delay was due to the erroneous advice of his counsel, who advised filing the petition on April 17, 1967. The court referred to the principles established by the Judicial Committee and other precedents, which state that mistaken advice by a legal practitioner may constitute "sufficient cause" if the advice was given by a skilled person exercising reasonable care. However, the court noted the absence of an affidavit from the lawyer and insufficient details about the advice process. Moreover, the petitioner, being a legal practitioner himself, should have been aware of the relevant provisions. Therefore, the court did not find "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. Conclusion: The court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and held that the election petition was barred by limitation. Consequently, the election petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs.
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