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Issues:
1. Appeal against refusal to quash a proceeding pending before the Special Judge, Delhi. 2. Interpretation of provisions regarding tender of pardon and examination of approver as a witness. 3. Argument of discriminatory application of law under Article 14 of the Constitution. 4. Examination of the impact of Sub-section (2B) of Section 337 of the CrPC on the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. 5. Analysis of the procedures for examining the approver and the potential impact on the accused. Analysis: 1. The appeal before the Supreme Court challenged the order of the Delhi High Court that refused to quash a proceeding pending against the appellant before the Special Judge, Delhi. The appellant had applied for quashing the proceeding based on the lack of sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC and failure to examine a witness, Martin Joseph Fernandez, as required by the Code. The High Court upheld the Special Judge's decision, leading to the appeal. 2. The main contention raised by the appellant's counsel was related to the interpretation of the provisions regarding the tender of pardon and examination of the approver as a witness. The argument focused on whether the Special Judge had the authority to take cognizance of the offence without the accused being committed for trial, especially after a pardon had been tendered to a person during the investigation stage. The appellant argued that this provision could lead to discriminatory application of the law under Article 14 of the Constitution. 3. The appellant's counsel contended that allowing the Special Judge to take cognizance of the offence after a pardon had been accepted would deprive the accused of certain procedural safeguards, particularly the opportunity to have the evidence of the approver tested twice in different courts. The argument was based on the perceived disadvantage to the accused depending on whether the chargesheet was filed before a Magistrate or directly before the Special Judge, leaving the choice of forum to the prosecution. 4. The Supreme Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the CrPC, particularly Sub-section (2B) of Section 337, which mandated the Magistrate to send the case for trial to the Special Judge in certain specified offences after the approver had been examined. The Court concluded that the insertion of Sub-section (2B) in 1955 did not affect the jurisdiction of the Special Judge to take cognizance of an offence without the accused being committed for trial. The Court found no clear intention by the legislature to curb the Special Judge's powers under Section 8(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. 5. Ultimately, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the difference in procedures for examining the approver once or twice did not constitute a substantial and qualitative difference that would violate Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that the Special Judge would still need to apply established tests for appreciating the accomplice's evidence, regardless of whether the approver was examined once or twice. The Court cited precedent to support the notion that the availability of two procedures does not necessarily indicate a violation of Article 14.
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