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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the principles "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and "actus legis nemini est damnosus" to the time-limit prescribed in the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 2. Validity of the declaration under Section 6(1) made beyond the prescribed three-year period due to court-ordered stays. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of the Principles "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and "actus legis nemini est damnosus": The core issue is whether these principles, which state that an act of the court or law should not harm anyone, apply to the time-limit for making a declaration under Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The petitioners argued that the declaration made beyond three years from the notification under Section 4(1) was invalid, relying on a Division Bench decision in Lakshmi Venkatesan v. Special Tahsildar. The government contended that the principles should extend the time-limit during the period of the court-ordered stay. The Full Bench considered the legislative changes to Section 6 and the rationale behind fixing a time-limit. The amendment allowed multiple declarations under Section 6(1) but also introduced a three-year limit to protect landowners from prolonged uncertainty and outdated compensation rates. 2. Validity of the Declaration Under Section 6(1) Made Beyond the Prescribed Three-Year Period: The Full Bench reviewed past judgments, including those of Alagiriswami, J., and Ismail, J., which supported the exclusion of the period during which court proceedings stayed the acquisition process. The Division Bench in Lakshmi Venkatesan had disagreed, stating that the three-year period was absolute and not subject to exceptions for court-ordered delays. The Full Bench disagreed with the Division Bench, emphasizing the equitable principle that court actions should not prejudice any party. They cited the Supreme Court's decision in Director, Income Tax v. Pooran, which supported excluding periods of court-ordered stays when computing limitation periods. The judgment concluded that the principles "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and "actus legis nemini est damnosus" apply to the three-year limit in the first proviso to Section 6(1). The Full Bench held that the period during which the court stayed the proceedings should be excluded when calculating the three-year period. Conclusion: The Full Bench approved the views of Alagiriswami, J., and Ismail, J., and overruled the Division Bench decision in Lakshmi Venkatesan. They held that the principles "actus curiae neminem gravabit" and "actus legis nemini est damnosus" apply, and the period of court-ordered stay should be excluded from the three-year limit in the first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The writ petition was dismissed based on this interpretation.
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