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Issues:
1. Whether the acts of the respondent constituted an attempt to resume conjugal relations. 2. Whether the respondent's application for recording satisfaction of the decree was maintainable. Detailed Analysis: 1. The appellant contended that the respondent's actions did not legally constitute an attempt to resume conjugal relations and that the application filed by the respondent was not maintainable. The District Judge and the High Court found that the respondent had genuinely tried to reconcile with the husband, but he rejected her efforts. The High Court affirmed the Trial Court's decision that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights could be satisfied if the wife made reasonable attempts to resume conjugal relations, even if the husband obstructed it. The appellant did not raise the argument in the lower courts that the respondent's attempts were insufficient to satisfy the decree, and hence, it was not considered by the Supreme Court. 2. The appellant argued that the respondent could not maintain an application for recording satisfaction of the decree without an application for execution pending. The appellant relied on Order 21 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, which deals with the procedure for recording payment or adjustment of a decree. However, the Court clarified that while Rule 2 provides a specific procedure for adjustment of a decree by mutual consent, the broader Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code empowers the Court executing the decree to decide all questions related to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree. The Court emphasized that the expression "Court executing the decree" should not be narrowly interpreted to mean only a court acting at the decree-holder's instance. The Court cited previous cases where applications by judgment-debtors were held maintainable even without pending execution proceedings, reaffirming the broader scope of Section 47 over the specific procedure of Rule 2. 3. The Court referenced various precedents to support its interpretation of Section 47, emphasizing that questions related to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree can be raised by either the decree-holder or the judgment-debtor during execution proceedings. The Court rejected the argument that the absence of a proceeding by the decree-holder for execution would bar the judgment-debtor from making applications related to the decree. The Court concluded that the power conferred by Section 47 was not limited by a narrow interpretation of the term "Court executing the decree" and upheld the High Court's interpretation of Section 244 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, which allowed judgment-debtors to raise questions related to the decree's execution, discharge, or satisfaction. The appeal was dismissed with costs.
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