1951 (9) TMI 59 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of Clause 12(4) of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
2. Validity of Clause 33(3) of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, under Article 14 of the Constitution.
3. Validity of Clause 30 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution.
4. Allegations of discriminatory practices by the Textile Commissioner in granting permissions and allotting yarn.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Clause 12(4) under Article 19(1)(f) and (g):
Clause 12(4) of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, prohibits the acquisition or installation of any loom to be worked by power. The petitioner argued that this clause infringes upon his fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution, which guarantee the right to acquire property and to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade, or business.

The Court noted that a total prohibition of the acquisition and installation of looms could be considered unreasonable and not a "reasonable restriction" within the meaning of Article 19(5) and (6). The Court referenced the Supreme Court decision in 'Chintamanrao v. State of Madhya Pradesh,' which held that a total prohibition on the manufacture of beedis during the agricultural season was unreasonable. The Court concluded that Clause 12(4) by itself is 'ultra vires' and void after the Constitution came into force.

2. Validity of Clause 33(3) under Article 14:
Clause 33(3) allows the Textile Commissioner to withdraw or relax any of the restrictions enacted in the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, including Clause 12(4). The petitioner argued that this clause is arbitrary and discriminatory, violating Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law.

The Court agreed, stating that Clause 33(3) confers wide and unrestricted power on the Textile Commissioner without any guiding principles or rules, making it inherently discriminatory. The Court cited 'Yick Wo v. Hopkins,' where a similar ordinance was struck down for conferring arbitrary power. The Court held that Clause 33(3) is void as it offends Article 14.

3. Validity of Clause 30 under Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) and (g):
Clause 30 empowers the Textile Commissioner to control the distribution of cloth and yarn. The petitioner contended that this clause is also arbitrary and discriminatory, violating Article 14 and Article 19(1)(f) and (g).

The Court noted that Clause 30 does not lay down any principles for the distribution of yarn, leaving room for arbitrary decisions. The Court referenced 'Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Co.,' where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a quota system because it was based on clear principles. The Court held that Clause 30 must be declared void for the same reasons as Clause 33(3).

4. Allegations of Discriminatory Practices:
The petitioner alleged that the Textile Commissioner had discriminated against him by refusing permission to install additional looms and by allotting less yarn compared to other mills. The petitioner provided instances of other mills receiving more favorable treatment.

The Court found that the allegations of discrimination were substantiated by the lack of any guiding principles for the Textile Commissioner's decisions. The Court directed the respondent to consider the petitioner's applications for additional looms and yarn allotment without discrimination and in accordance with general rules for fair and equitable distribution.

Conclusion:
The Court declared Clauses 12(4), 33(3), and 30 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order, 1948, void for being inconsistent with Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The Court also directed the respondent to reconsider the petitioner's applications for additional looms and yarn allotment without discrimination and in accordance with general rules for fair distribution.