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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act (Act XVIII of 1949) is ultra vires of Article 19, Clause (1)(f) of the Constitution Act. 2. Applicability of the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act to the properties of a Marumakkathayam tarwad. 3. Interpretation and scope of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (XXVI of 1937) and its amendments. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Constitutionality of the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act, 1949: The primary issue was whether the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act (Act XVIII of 1949) contravenes Article 19, Clause (1)(f) of the Constitution. Defendants 9 and 10 argued that the Act was void due to its repugnance to this constitutional provision. However, the learned counsel for the defendants conceded that the Act could not be deemed unconstitutional if Section 2 of the Act was interpreted correctly. The court noted that the Act did not purport to repeal any statutes not mentioned therein, nor did it completely abolish custom and usage. Therefore, the Act was not unconstitutional. 2. Applicability to Marumakkathayam Tarwad Properties: The court examined whether the properties of a Marumakkathayam tarwad, particularly those of the third tavazhi to which Abdulla Kalpha belonged, would lapse to the second tavazhi upon his death or devolve upon his heirs according to the Muslim Shariat. The plaintiff claimed entitlement to the properties under the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act of 1949. The court clarified that the Act did not intend to abrogate the rights and incidents of a Mappilla Marumakkathayam tarwad. The properties of the tarwad were to be treated as a composite entity, and a junior member had no separate interest in the tarwad property that could devolve on his heirs upon death. 3. Interpretation and Scope of the Shariat Act: The court analyzed the scope of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (XXVI of 1937) and its amendments. The Act was intended to apply Muslim Personal Law to specific enumerated matters, such as intestate succession, special property of females, marriage, and guardianship, among others. However, it did not cover all matters relating to Muslims or totally abrogate custom and usage in matters not enumerated in Sections 2 and 3 of the Central Act and Section 2 of the Local Act. The court emphasized that the Shariat Act did not confer the right of partition on individual members of a tarwad when the tarwad consisted of Muslims. The Act's limited scope was further evidenced by its lack of applicability to matters like testate succession, which remained governed by customary law. The court referred to various enactments and judicial decisions to support its interpretation. It highlighted that the Shariat Act did not attempt to enlarge the property rights of Muslims dying intestate or convert limited interests into absolute estates. Therefore, the Act did not apply to tarwad properties that would survive to other members of the family unit rather than devolve on heirs as per intestate succession. The court also disagreed with the interpretation of Basheer Ahmed Sayeed, J., in Ayisumma v. Mayomooty Umma, which suggested that the Shariat Act abrogated the customary Marumakkathayam Law in all matters. The court clarified that the Shariat Act's scope was limited to the enumerated subjects and did not cover the entire field of property rights. Conclusion: The court concluded that the Madras Shariat (Amendment) Act of 1949 was not repugnant to Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Shariat Act, including the Madras amendment, did not abolish the rights and incidents of a Mappilla Marumakkathayam tarwad. The properties of the tarwad were to be treated as a composite entity, and a junior member had no separate interest that could devolve on his heirs upon death. The Shariat Act's scope was limited to the enumerated subjects and did not cover the entire field of property rights.
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