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Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the notification issued under section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Denial of equal protection under article 14 of the Constitution. 3. Jurisdiction and procedural irregularities in the trial. Detailed Analysis: 1. Validity of the Notification Issued Under Section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The primary issue was whether the notification revoking jury trials for the "Burdwan Test Relief Fraud Cases" was within the powers conferred by section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The notification directed that these specific cases be tried by the Court of Sessions with the aid of assessors instead of by jury. The court held that section 269(1) allows the State Government to direct that the trial of all offences or any particular class of offences before any Court of Session shall be by jury, and it may revoke or alter such an order. However, the section does not empower the State Government to selectively revoke jury trials for specific cases or individuals while maintaining it for others accused of the same offences. The notification in question singled out the "Burdwan Test Relief Fraud Cases" and did not remove the offences from the list of those triable by jury, thus exceeding the powers conferred by section 269(1) and rendering the notification void and inoperative. 2. Denial of Equal Protection Under Article 14 of the Constitution: The appellant contended that the notification violated his right to equal protection under article 14 of the Constitution. The High Court had upheld the notification, reasoning that the classification was reasonable due to the complexity and volume of evidence in these cases, which would be difficult for jurors to manage. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that the classification must be based on substantial distinctions relevant to the object of the law. The mere volume of evidence and the potential difficulty for jurors to remember it did not justify the denial of jury trials. The court emphasized that such a basis was arbitrary, as similar complexities could arise in other cases involving the same offences, and assessors would not necessarily have a better memory than jurors. Consequently, the notification was deemed discriminatory and violative of article 14. 3. Jurisdiction and Procedural Irregularities in the Trial: The appellant argued that the trial was vitiated due to procedural irregularities, specifically the denial of a jury trial. The court noted that section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which deals with procedural irregularities, did not apply to this case as the notification itself was beyond the powers conferred by section 269(1) and contravened article 14. The court also rejected the argument that the defect in the trial was cured by the continuation of the trial after the Constitution came into force. The discriminatory nature of the notification persisted, and the trial process could not be converted from one with assessors to one by jury mid-proceeding. The court referenced previous decisions, including Syed Kasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad and Habeeb Mahomed v. The State of Hyderabad, to support the view that discriminatory procedures could not be rectified after the fact, and the trial must be condemned as bad. Conclusion: The Supreme Court concluded that the notification was invalid as it exceeded the powers granted by section 269(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and violated the appellant's right to equal protection under article 14 of the Constitution. The trial conducted with the aid of assessors was therefore deemed invalid. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the appellant's conviction, and directed his release.
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