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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the procedure for trial laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation is discriminatory and offends Article 14 of the Constitution. 2. Whether the continuation of the trial after the Constitution came into force is valid. 3. Whether the Special Tribunal Regulation violates Article 21 of the Constitution by not providing a procedure established by law. 4. Whether the discriminatory provisions of the Regulation can be severed from the rest of the Regulation. Detailed Analysis: 1. Discriminatory Nature of the Special Tribunal Regulation (Article 14): The primary contention was that the procedure laid down in the Special Tribunal Regulation deviated significantly from the ordinary law, thereby abridging the rights of the accused and depriving them of benefits under the general law. The appellant argued that the Regulation was discriminatory as it did not classify offences based on nature or area, leaving unfettered discretion to the Military Governor to refer any case to the Special Tribunal without any guiding principle. This was claimed to be in violation of Article 14, which guarantees equality before the law. The court noted that the Regulation allowed the Special Tribunal to adopt a summary procedure, eliminate committal proceedings, and record only a memorandum of evidence, among other deviations from ordinary law. However, it was highlighted that in the present case, the warrant procedure was followed, and evidence was recorded in full. The court held that the mere possibility of discriminatory application was not sufficient to invalidate the Regulation; actual discrimination had to be shown. 2. Continuation of Trial Post-Constitution: The appellant argued that the continuation of the trial after January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force, was invalid as the Special Tribunal Regulation conflicted with Articles 14 and 21. The court examined whether the discriminatory provisions of the Regulation were applied after the Constitution came into effect. It was held that if the trial continued without applying the discriminatory provisions, the conviction could stand. However, if discriminatory provisions were applied, the conviction would be invalid. The court found that the trial procedure followed post-Constitution was substantially the same as the ordinary law, and no discriminatory provisions were applied. Therefore, the trial was not vitiated, and the resulting conviction and sentence were upheld. 3. Violation of Article 21: The appellant contended that the trial was not conducted in accordance with the procedure established by law, as required by Article 21. It was argued that the Military Governor had no authority to refer individual cases to the Special Tribunal. The court rejected this argument, stating that Section 3 of the Regulation empowered the Military Governor to direct the Special Tribunal to try any offence, including individual cases. 4. Severability of Discriminatory Provisions: The court considered whether the discriminatory provisions of the Regulation could be severed from the rest of the Regulation. It was held that if the discriminatory provisions could be eliminated while still securing a fair trial under the ordinary law, the trial could continue. In this case, since the discriminatory provisions were not applied, the trial was valid. Conclusion: The court dismissed the petition under Article 32, holding that the trial conducted by the Special Tribunal was not discriminatory and did not violate Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The appeal was to be heard on its merits in the usual course. The judgments in the connected appeals were also governed by this decision.
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