1931 (8) TMI 5 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Ownership and possession of the disputed land.
2. Right to realize rent from subtenants.
3. Validity of prior litigation and its impact on current claims.
4. Applicability of Section 99, Act 3 of 1926, to events occurring before its enactment.
5. Jurisdiction of civil courts versus revenue courts.
6. Interpretation of Section 99, Act 3 of 1926, and its retrospective effect.
7. Limitation period for filing suits under the new Tenancy Act.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Ownership and Possession of the Disputed Land:
The plaintiffs claimed ownership and possession of 4 bighas and 12 biswas out of a fixed rate tenancy comprising 6 bighas 17 biswas and 15 dhurs. They asserted that they were the owners of three-fourths of the tenancy, while the defendants owned the remaining one-fourth. The plaintiffs argued that they were not joint tenants but owned separate shares and that the defendants were acting as trespassers by interfering with their collection of rent.

2. Right to Realize Rent from Subtenants:
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled to realize rent from the subtenants, and an injunction to restrain defendants 1 and 2 from obstructing this right. The subtenants (defendants 3 to 8) had paid rent to the present defendants, leading to disputes over rightful collection.

3. Validity of Prior Litigation and Its Impact on Current Claims:
The plaintiffs referenced previous litigation, including Suit No. 194 of 1912 and a revenue court case, which they claimed had established their ownership. The defendants, however, argued that the plaintiffs' rights had ceased due to an ejectment suit in 1912. The court examined the history of litigation, including a mortgage suit brought by Bishunath (plaintiffs' predecessor) and subsequent actions by the defendants' father as zamindar.

4. Applicability of Section 99, Act 3 of 1926, to Events Occurring Before Its Enactment:
The court considered whether Section 99 of the Tenancy Act, 1926, applied to ejectments or obstructions to possession occurring before 7th September 1926. It was held by two judges in Abdul Halkim v. Mukarram Ali that Section 99 applied only to dispossessions occurring after this date. The court noted that Section 99 deals with procedure and does not affect vested rights, raising the question of its applicability to prior events.

5. Jurisdiction of Civil Courts versus Revenue Courts:
The court analyzed whether the suit was cognizable by the civil court or should be presented to the revenue court. It was determined that the jurisdiction must be assessed based on the allegations in the plaint. If the court finds the facts alleged by the plaintiff to be true, it will proceed with the trial; otherwise, it will dismiss the suit or return the plaint for presentation to the proper court.

6. Interpretation of Section 99, Act 3 of 1926, and Its Retrospective Effect:
The court interpreted the decision in Ananti v. Chhannu, concluding that the issue of jurisdiction must be determined by the allegations in the plaint. The court must decide whether the defendant is "claiming as a landholder, tenant, etc." and whether there is reasonable substance in that claim. The court emphasized that the question must be a real one and not merely a litigious allegation.

7. Limitation Period for Filing Suits under the New Tenancy Act:
The court discussed the limitation period for suits under Section 99, noting that the new Act did not curtail the period of limitation or fix the forum. It was highlighted that the legislature intended disputes relating to agricultural lands to be settled promptly in revenue courts. The court acknowledged the potential hardship caused by the retrospective application of the Act but emphasized the need to respect vested rights.

Separate Judgments:
- Sulaiman, Ag. C.J.: Emphasized that Section 99 and Section 121 of the Tenancy Act, 1926, deal with substantive rights and are not merely procedural. He argued that the Act should not apply retrospectively to events before its enactment, as it would cause undue hardship.
- Mukerji, J.: Agreed that Section 99 does not apply retrospectively and highlighted the importance of respecting vested rights. He noted that the suit was cognizable by the civil court based on the allegations in the plaint.
- Boys, J.: Supported the view that Sections 99 and 121 deal with substantive rights and should not apply to events before the Act's commencement. He emphasized the need to avoid retrospective application that would bar suits already time-barred under the new Act.
- King, J.: Agreed with the non-retrospective application of Section 99 and emphasized the importance of respecting vested rights. He noted that the civil court had jurisdiction to try the suit.
- Bajpai, J.: Concurred with the majority but emphasized that the law of limitation is generally procedural and retrospective. He acknowledged the potential hardship but supported the majority's decision to avoid retrospective application in this case.