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Issues Involved:
1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. 2. Nature of the water supply (domestic vs. non-domestic purposes). 3. Availability of an alternative specific and adequate legal remedy. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act: The primary issue was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to make an order directing the Corporation to restore the water supply to the market situated outside the limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The court emphasized that Section 45 of the Specific Relief Act confines the jurisdiction of the High Court to making orders within the local limits of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The court cited the case of P. K. Banerjee v. L. J. Simonds, which held that the High Court cannot order an act to be done outside its jurisdiction even if the person required to do the act is within the jurisdiction. This principle was reinforced by the Privy Council in Sree Meenakshi Mills, Limited v. Provincial Textile Commissioner, Madras, which ruled that an application under Section 45 is incompetent if the act to be performed is outside the High Court's jurisdiction. Consequently, the court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to order the Corporation to restore the water supply at Kalighat Market. 2. Nature of the Water Supply (Domestic vs. Non-domestic Purposes): Although Banerjee J. had determined that the water supplied to the market was for domestic purposes, the court found it unnecessary to decide this issue definitively for the appeal. The Corporation argued that the supply was for non-domestic purposes, justifying the increased charges and the subsequent disconnection for non-payment. The petitioner contended that the water was required for domestic purposes by the stall-holders. However, the court chose to dispose of the case on jurisdictional grounds and the availability of an alternative remedy, rather than resolving this factual dispute. 3. Availability of an Alternative Specific and Adequate Legal Remedy: The court examined whether the petitioner had another specific and adequate legal remedy, which would preclude the issuance of an order under Section 45. According to Section 45(d) of the Specific Relief Act, the court should only make an order if the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy. Banerjee J. had pointed out that the petitioner could have filed a suit for a mandatory injunction to compel the Corporation to restore the water connection, which would have been an equally effective remedy. The court agreed with this reasoning, stating that a specific legal remedy means a remedy that would provide the petitioner with the precise relief sought. The court cited various English authorities, which established that a mandamus should not be granted if there is an alternative remedy that is equally beneficial, effective, and convenient. The court concluded that the remedy by way of a suit was a specific legal remedy within the meaning of Section 45(d), and thus, the application under Section 45 should not be made. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed on the grounds that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to make the order sought and that the petitioner had an alternative specific and adequate legal remedy by way of a suit for a mandatory injunction. The court affirmed Banerjee J.'s decision, stating that the application was rightly dismissed.
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