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Issues:
a) Whether the Board can take possession of the plots in the possession of its lessees, without having recourse to a civil suit for possession or to an eviction proceeding under the provisions of the Karnataka Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. b) Whether the validity of the action of the Board, in regard to termination of lease and resumption, relating to a contract can be considered in a writ proceeding. c) Whether the delay on the part of the petitioners in approaching this Court disentitles the petitioners to any relief. Analysis: Re: Point (a): The Board contends that the provisions of the Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (KIAD Act), particularly Section 14(f)(ii), empower it to take possession from lessees without recourse to eviction proceedings. However, a detailed examination of the KIAD Act reveals no provision allowing the Board to take possession without legal proceedings. Section 25 of the KIAD Act specifically provides for the application of the Public Premises Act to premises leased by the Board, indicating that eviction must follow due legal process. The law in India does not recognize a lessor's right to extra-judicial re-entry unless specifically provided by law. The absence of such a provision in the KIAD Act means the Board must resort to legal proceedings for eviction. The Supreme Court's precedent in cases like Midnapur Zamindary Co. Ltd. v. Naresh Narayan Roy and State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmananda Prasad Singh supports this interpretation, emphasizing that forcible dispossession is prohibited and possession must be resumed in a manner known to law. Re: Point (b): The validity of the Board's action in terminating the lease and resuming possession involves disputed questions of fact that cannot be effectively resolved in a writ proceeding under Article 226. The Supreme Court in Express Newspapers v. Union of India and State of U.P. v. Maharaja Dharmananda Prasad Singh has held that issues related to breach of covenants under a lease and the validity of lease termination are matters for regular civil proceedings. The Karnataka High Court in KIADB v. Sohanlal Sisodia reiterated that rights arising from contractual obligations should be adjudicated in civil courts, not through writ petitions. However, actions by the Board that involve dispossessing a lessee without legal proceedings can be challenged under Article 226 as they are arbitrary, high-handed, and violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Re: Point (c): The petitioners delayed approaching the Court, filing their petitions on 2-1-1996 and 20-1-1996, long after the Board took possession on 25-7-1995. During this period, the Board re-allotted the plots to a third party, who took possession and entered into a lease-cum-sale agreement. The Supreme Court in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Air Port Authority of India has emphasized that delay and laches can disentitle a party to relief, especially when third-party rights have intervened. Given the petitioners' inaction and the subsequent allotment to the fourth respondent, the Court found that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief despite the Board's illegal action in taking possession without legal proceedings. Conclusion: The petitions are dismissed due to the delay in approaching the Court and the subsequent creation of third-party rights. However, the Board made a goodwill offer to allot alternative plots to the petitioners at the same rate as the resumed plots, provided they approach the Board within 45 days.
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