2017 (9) TMI 1992 - HC - Indian Laws

Suit for specific performance of contract - owner of suit property by way of adverse possession, as alleged or not - entitlement for the relief of injunction or not - time limitation - valid transfer of title in favour of the plaintiff or not? - estoppel from filing the present suit against the defendants, on account of his own acts, deeds and acquiescence or not - whether suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction? HELD THAT - It is well settled by now that a finding of fact itself may give rise to a substantial question of law, inter alia, in the event the findings are based on no evidence and/or while arriving at the said findings, relevant admissible evidence has not been taken into consideration or inadmissible evidence has been taken into consideration or legal principles have not been applied in appreciating the evidence, or when the evidence has been misread - Hon'ble Apex Court in DR. RATHNA MURTHY VERSUS RAMAPPA 2010 (10) TMI 909 - SUPREME COURT , has specifically held that High Court can interfere with the findings of fact even in the second appeal, provided the findings recorded by Courts below are found to be perverse. It has further been held in the case supra that there is no absolute bar on the re-appreciation of evidence in those proceedings; however, such a course is permissible in exceptional circumstances. In the instant case, this Court, after having carefully perused the communications Ex. PW-1/L to Ex./PW-1/O issued by the vendor, has no hesitation to conclude that the vendor had repeatedly extended time for execution of sale deed and at no point of time he conveyed to the plaintiff with regard to his intention, if any, of not selling the property in terms of original agreement Ex. PW-1/A. Since, after expiry of time period specified in agreements Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/E, vendor himself had been requesting for extension of time coupled with the fact that the plaintiff had good relations with the vendor, there was no occasion, as such, for plaintiff to send communication specifically accepting therein the request for extension of time made by the vendor. Rather, it can safely be inferred from the communication sent by the vendor that requests, repeatedly made by him, were accepted and acted upon by the plaintiff. In the case at hand, as has been already concluded that stipulation of time, if any, in the agreements was to commence after redemption of property by vendor from the bank concerned and sale deed was fully dependant upon the redemption of property which was admittedly redeemed on 8.9.2001. There is no document, suggestive of the fact that communication, if any, was ever sent by the vendor-predecessor-in-interest of the defendants or thereafter by defendants intimating therein factum with regard to redemption of suit property to enable the plaintiff to do his part in terms of agreement in question - after having bestowed its thoughtful consideration to the pleadings, evidence vis- -vis impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, is of the view that both the Courts below erred in concluding that suit for specific performance having been filed by the plaintiff is/was barred by limitation. Thus, there is total mis-appreciation, misconstruction of evidence, be it ocular or documentary, adduced on record by respective parties and findings returned by the Courts below are erroneous and perverse, it sees valid reason to interfere in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the Courts below - appeal allowed.

Issues Involved:
1. Specific performance of agreement.
2. Ownership by adverse possession.
3. Relief of injunction.
4. Limitation period.
5. Suit maintainability.
6. Validity of transfer of title.
7. Estoppel.
8. Valuation for court fee and jurisdiction.

Analysis of Judgment:

1. Specific Performance of Agreement:
The plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance of a contract dated 18.12.1973 and 15.01.1975, claiming he paid part of the sale consideration and was ready and willing to perform his part. The defendants admitted the agreements but contended that the time for execution had expired, and the plaintiff was only entitled to a refund. The court found that the agreements were repeatedly extended by the vendor, and the plaintiff's readiness and willingness were demonstrated through communications and payments. The court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to specific performance as the time for execution was not strictly one year but dependent on the redemption of the property.

2. Ownership by Adverse Possession:
The plaintiff alternatively claimed ownership by adverse possession. The court noted that the plaintiff had possession as a tenant and later as part performance of the agreement, but did not delve deeply into this issue as the plaintiff's primary claim for specific performance was upheld.

3. Relief of Injunction:
The plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with his possession. Given the court's decision to grant specific performance, the relief of injunction was inherently addressed.

4. Limitation Period:
The defendants argued that the suit was barred by limitation, contending the plaintiff should have filed within three years of the agreement's expiry. The court held that the limitation period began from the date of redemption of the property, which was 8.9.2001. The suit filed in 2001 was within the limitation period, as the plaintiff acted promptly upon learning of the redemption.

5. Suit Maintainability:
The defendants challenged the suit's maintainability on various grounds, including the claim that the agreements had expired. The court found the suit maintainable, emphasizing that the plaintiff's readiness and willingness to perform his part and the vendor's repeated extensions validated the suit.

6. Validity of Transfer of Title:
The court addressed the issue of whether there was a valid transfer of title. It concluded that the agreements were valid, and the plaintiff had fulfilled his obligations, thereby entitling him to the transfer of title through specific performance.

7. Estoppel:
The defendants claimed estoppel, arguing the plaintiff's actions barred him from filing the suit. The court rejected this, noting the plaintiff's consistent efforts to fulfill the agreement and the vendor's extensions.

8. Valuation for Court Fee and Jurisdiction:
The defendants contended the suit was not properly valued for court fee and jurisdiction. The court did not find merit in this argument, implicitly affirming the valuation and jurisdiction as appropriate.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, and decreed the suit for specific performance in favor of the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part, and the agreements were extended by the vendor, making the suit timely and maintainable. The court also addressed the issue of possession, ruling that the plaintiff's possession was in part performance of the agreements, not as a tenant. The court directed the preparation of a decree for specific performance and disposed of related applications.

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