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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of the principle of lis pendens to the transfer of a larger interest in immovable property. 2. Validity of the charge created by a money decree. 3. Adverse possession and its impact on the rights of the mortgagor. 4. Applicability of the principle of lis pendens to court sales and involuntary alienations. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of the Principle of Lis Pendens to the Transfer of a Larger Interest in Immovable Property: The court examined whether a transfer of a larger interest in immovable property than possessed by the transferor would be affected by the principle of lis pendens. It was determined that Sohanlal, who purchased the mortgagee rights during the pendency of the suit, was a purchaser pendente lite. The court held that the transfer was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, as the suit for redemption of mortgage was filed on May 31, 1941, and the oral sale to Sohanlal occurred on November 19, 1945, with a sale-deed registered on April 6, 1950. Consequently, Sohanlal, and his successors, including Hiralal and Sayar Bai, were bound by the decree for redemption passed in the suit. 2. Validity of the Charge Created by a Money Decree: The appellant argued that an order by the Mahendra Sabha in 1936 created a charge on the property, which was a pre-existing right unaffected by the subsequent suit for redemption. The court rejected this argument, stating that the Mahendra Sabha's judgment only directed the money decree to be satisfied from Moolchand's property without creating a specific charge. The court further noted that any supposed charge was satisfied when the mortgagee rights were sold at a public auction in 1943. Therefore, no pre-existing rights were created by the decree that could affect the doctrine of lis pendens. 3. Adverse Possession and Its Impact on the Rights of the Mortgagor: The appellant contended that Hiralal, having purchased the entire property, became the full owner by adverse possession, as the mortgagor was aware of the sale. The court dismissed this argument, referencing the pending suit for redemption filed in 1941, which precluded the possibility of adverse possession beginning after Hiralal's purchase in 1957. The court emphasized that adverse possession could not be claimed as the suit for redemption was already in progress, thereby preventing the acquisition of rights by adverse possession against the mortgagor. 4. Applicability of the Principle of Lis Pendens to Court Sales and Involuntary Alienations: The court affirmed that the principle of lis pendens applies not only to private transfers but also to court sales and involuntary alienations. This was supported by precedents from the Privy Council and the Supreme Court, which held that any acquirer of property pendente lite is bound by the decree obtained in the pending proceedings. The court cited cases such as Radhamadhub Holdar v. Manohur Mookerji and Kedarnath Lal v. Sheonarain, reinforcing that the principle of lis pendens places a complete embargo on the transfer of immovable property involved in litigation, ensuring that any decree or order passed by the court is not circumvented by private dealings. Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, with the court ruling that the principle of lis pendens bound all parties involved, including the appellant, to the decree for redemption. The court also clarified that no pre-existing charge was created by the money decree, and adverse possession could not be claimed due to the pending suit for redemption. The principle of lis pendens was affirmed to apply to both private transfers and court sales, ensuring the integrity of the judicial process. The parties were left to bear their own costs of the appeal.
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