2020 (11) TMI 1088 - SC - Indian Laws

Fraud - Sale by forgery of documents and signatures - preponderance of probabilities - case of the plaintiff is that the defendants sought her signatures on blank papers in the year 1990 under the guise of preparation and processing of documents for the purpose of getting the estate left behind by their father mutated in their names. Whether the 1990 GPA and sale deeds dated 29.06.1990 and 03.07.1990 purported to have been executed by the plaintiff is a result of fraud and forgery or whether the same had been executed by the plaintiff herself? HELD THAT - The fact that the subject documents were executed by plaintiff and attested by Teja Singh has been established from record in the shape of evidence of PW4 as well as defendant No. 4. The signatures of Teja Singh were identified by DW2 who deposed that he was conversant with Urdu language and could identify the signature of Teja Singh which was in Urdu language. Further DW4 deposed that he used to pay land revenue to Teja Singh and received receipts from him. Moreover the handwriting expert (DW7) had also compared the admitted signatures of Teja Singh with those on the disputed documents and opined that it was signed by him while the expert produced by the plaintiff as PW10 had not examined the admitted signatures of Teja Singh. Therefore the signatures of Teja Singh stood proved as per the opinion of expert (DW7) and stood corroborated by DW2 and DW4 independent witnesses. The trial Court had justly placed the initial burden of proof upon the plaintiff as it was her case that the subject documents were forged or product of fraud and moreso because the documents bore her signature. The first appellate Court did not elaborate on that aspect. Even assuming that the burden had shifted upon the defendants the witness identifying signatures of the dead attesting witness was examined by the defendants. Therefore the documents stood proved and the burden was duly discharged by the defendants - The requirement regarding shifting of burden onto the defendants had been succinctly discussed in ANIL RISHI VERSUS GURBAKSH SINGH 2006 (5) TMI 515 - SUPREME COURT wherein this Court had held that for shifting the burden of proof it would require more than merely pleading that the relationship is a fiduciary one and it must be proved by producing tangible evidence. Emphasis was laid on the entries made in the PW4 scribe s register showing the 1990 GPA to have been executed prior to the sale deed and it was submitted that there is no logic in first giving GPA and then executing sale deed if the plaintiff was available to execute the aforesaid documents. However the same is of no avail to the plaintiff as the 1990 GPA was in respect of all her land holdings whereas the sale was made only in respect of land situate at Kalyanpur village - the primary reason for executing the 1990 GPA was that the plaintiff was not residing in Punjab at the relevant point of time and that she was old and weak and thus unable to look after her property situate at Punjab. The stress laid upon the fact that a woman was appointed in her place is therefore a matter of surmises and conjectures. The plaintiff s denial of being acquainted with the attesting witnesses is also a ruse and not genuine. For one of the attesting witnesses Teja Singh was a lamberdar of the village. A lamberdar s job is to collect revenue in respect of the lands and issue receipts and as a practice the lamberdar is called for attesting documents. Thus when the plaintiff admittedly used to visit village frequently her denial in knowing Teja Singh is farfetched. This is what two Courts had opined and being a possible view no interference by the High Court was warranted in that regard. Fraud in respect of sale deed dated 03.07.1990 - HELD THAT - The trial Court analysed the testimony of DW3 and noted that he had clearly stated the plaintiff was known to him personally. He had deposed that sale deed was executed by the plaintiff in his presence and the same was for a sum of Rs. 86, 000/ . It was further held that though the witness failed to identify the photographs of the plaintiff adverse inference cannot be drawn as the sale deed was executed in the year 1990 whereas the evidence was given in the year 2007. The sale deed of 03.07.1990 had been attested by Teja Singh Lamberdar and Anoop Singh (DW3). The attesting witness (DW3) was examined and he had deposed that the said sale deed was executed by the plaintiff in his presence as well as in presence of Teja Singh and defendant No. 3. He had denied presence of any other person. He stated that the sale consideration was paid at home directly and not in his presence. Indeed he had failed to identify plaintiff in photographs - In the present cases the disputed documents were executed in the year 1990 and the evidence of DW3 was recorded in the year 2007 after a passage of 17 long years. Thus the High Court erroneously doubted the evidence of DW3 merely because he could not identify photographs of plaintiff and because the defendant No. 4 and DW3 did not mention each other s presence at the time of execution. Since the defendant No. 4 has not signed the sale deed as a vendee his evidence cannot be discarded. In any case the weight of evidence of DW3 remains unassailable. Therefore the testimony of DW3 satisfies the requirements of the conditions required for a valid attestation - Since the attesting witness had proved the execution of the sale deeds the primary onus upon the plaintiff had not shifted unto the defendants. Further the plaintiff was obliged to rebut the positive evidence produced by the defendants regarding payment of consideration amount to the plaintiff; but also ought to have independently proved her case of non receipt of the consideration amount. The diverse grounds urged by the plaintiff in disputing the 1990 GPA and the sale deeds dated 29.06.1990 and 03.07.1990 are as observed hitherto unsubstantiated and untenable. The presumption in favour of a 30 year old document is therefore a rebuttable presumption. Nothing prevented the plaintiff to rebut the presumption by leading appropriate evidence in order to disprove the same. Since the plaintiff failed to do so the said document would be binding on the plaintiff. As a matter of fact the parties had acted upon the terms of the said document without any demur since 1963 and it was therefore not open to resile therefrom at this distance of time. Hence the trial Court was right in holding the 1963 GPA to be a genuine document. Time limitation - HELD THAT - For invoking Section 17 of the 1963 Act two ingredients have to be pleaded and duly proved. One is existence of a fraud and the other is discovery of such fraud. In the present case since the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of fraud there is no occasion for its discovery. Thus the plaintiff cannot be extended the benefit under the said provision - the trial Court was in error to hold that the person who has disclosed the information was not examined by the plaintiff when it had come on record through the testimony of Kultar Singh (DW2) that Rustam Singh expired before the suits came up for trial. If so the finding of the High Court that the testimony of Rustam Singh strengthened the case of plaintiff is ex facie erroneous and manifestly wrong. In as much as the said person was never examined before the Court in these proceedings. Further the trial Court and the first appellate Court had erroneously assumed the date of function in December 2001 in place of February 2001. It is settled that the standard of proof required in a civil dispute is preponderance of probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt. In the present cases though the discrepancies in the 1990 GPA are bound to create some doubt however in absence of any tangible evidence produced by the plaintiff to support the plea of fraud it does not take the matter further. Rather in this case the testimony of the attesting witness scribe and other independent witnesses plainly support the case of the defendants. That evidence dispels the doubt if any; and tilt the balance in favour of the defendants - As to the title of the subsequent purchasers since the 1990 GPA had been proved there is no reason to doubt their bonafides. The trial Court and the first appellate Court had appreciated the evidence properly and that view being a possible view the High Court ought not to have disturbed the same in the second appeal and that too on surmises and conjectures - Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Limitation
2. Fraud and Forgery of the 1990 GPA and Sale Deeds
3. Proof of Execution of Documents
4. Title of Subsequent Purchasers

Detailed Analysis:

1. Limitation:
The primary issue was whether the suits filed by the plaintiff were within the limitation period. The plaintiff claimed to have discovered the fraud in February 2001 during a family function. The trial Court and the first appellate Court found the suits barred by limitation, as the documents were executed in 1990 and should have been challenged within three years. The High Court, however, accepted the plaintiff's claim of discovering the fraud in 2001, thus considering the suits within the limitation period. The Supreme Court emphasized that for invoking Section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the existence of fraud and its discovery must be proved. Since the plaintiff failed to establish fraud, she could not benefit from this provision, rendering the suits barred by limitation.

2. Fraud and Forgery of the 1990 GPA and Sale Deeds:
The plaintiff alleged that the 1990 GPA and subsequent sale deeds were a result of fraud and forgery. The trial Court and the first appellate Court found that the plaintiff had signed the documents, and the burden of proving fraud was on her. The High Court, however, found discrepancies in the 1990 GPA, such as the address and the sequence of entries in the scribe's register, and concluded that the documents were fraudulent. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's allegations were unsubstantiated and that the evidence, including testimonies of attesting witnesses and handwriting experts, supported the defendants' case.

3. Proof of Execution of Documents:
The trial Court and the first appellate Court relied on the testimony of the scribe (PW4) and other witnesses to conclude that the 1990 GPA and sale deeds were executed by the plaintiff. The High Court rejected the scribe's testimony, noting his acquaintance with one of the defendants. The Supreme Court, however, emphasized the presumption of genuineness for registered documents and noted that the plaintiff failed to declare the scribe hostile or cross-examine him effectively. The Court also highlighted the requirement under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, for proving execution of documents, which the plaintiff failed to meet.

4. Title of Subsequent Purchasers:
The subsequent purchasers argued that they had verified the title deeds and the 1990 GPA before purchasing the property. The trial Court and the first appellate Court found their title valid, while the High Court questioned the genuineness of the 1990 GPA. The Supreme Court concluded that since the 1990 GPA was proved genuine, the subsequent purchasers' title was valid and their bonafides were not in doubt.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court held that the trial Court and the first appellate Court had properly appreciated the evidence and that their view was a possible view. The High Court's interference was deemed unwarranted, and its judgment was set aside. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court were restored, and the suits filed by the plaintiff were declared barred by limitation. The title of the subsequent purchasers was upheld.