2020 (1) TMI 1650 - SC - Indian Laws

Juvenile Justice - Interpretation of statute - scope of heinous offence - Whether an offence prescribing a maximum sentence of more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum sentence or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years can be considered to be a heinous offence within the meaning of Section 2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act 2015? HELD THAT - From the scheme of Section 14 15 and 19 it is clear that the Legislature felt that before the juvenile is tried as an adult a very detailed study must be done and the procedure laid down has to be followed. Even if a child commits a heinous crime he is not automatically to be tried as an adult. This also clearly indicates that the meaning of the words heinous offence cannot be expanded by removing the word minimum from the definition - the word minimum cannot be treated as surplusage yet we are duty bound to decide as to how the children who have committed an offence falling within the 4th category should be dealt with. The appeal disposed off by answering the question set out in the first part of the judgment in the negative and hold that an offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to be an heinous offence. However the Act does not deal with the 4th category of offences viz. offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years imprisonment but no minimum sentence or minimum sentence of less than 7 years is provided shall be treated as serious offences within the meaning of the Act and dealt with accordingly till the Parliament takes the call on the matter. Application disposed off.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Interpretation of "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
2. Categorization of offences with no minimum sentence but a maximum sentence of more than 7 years.
3. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation of the Juvenile Justice Act.
4. Application of Article 142 of the Constitution to fill legislative gaps.
5. Disclosure of the identity of a child in conflict with law.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Interpretation of "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015:
The court examined whether an offence prescribing a maximum sentence of more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years, can be considered a "heinous offence" under Section 2(33) of the Act. The court concluded that an offence which does not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated as a heinous offence.

2. Categorization of offences with no minimum sentence but a maximum sentence of more than 7 years:
The court noted that the Act of 2015 categorizes offences into petty, serious, and heinous, but does not account for a fourth category where the maximum sentence exceeds 7 years but no minimum sentence is prescribed. The court decided that such offences should be treated as "serious offences" until the legislature addresses this gap.

3. Legislative intent and statutory interpretation of the Juvenile Justice Act:
The court discussed the principles of statutory interpretation, emphasizing that the language of the statute should be adhered to unless it leads to absurdity. The court refused to remove the word "minimum" from the definition of heinous offences, as it would be beyond judicial interpretation to alter clear legislative language.

4. Application of Article 142 of the Constitution to fill legislative gaps:
Recognizing the legislative gap, the court exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to direct that offences in the fourth category be treated as serious offences. This interim measure will remain in place until the legislature addresses the issue.

5. Disclosure of the identity of a child in conflict with law:
The court noted that the identity of the child in conflict with law was disclosed in the impugned judgment, which is against the provisions of Section 74 of the Act of 2015. The court directed the High Court to remove the name of the child from the judgment.

Conclusion:
The appeal was disposed of by holding that offences without a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be considered heinous offences. The court directed that offences with a maximum sentence of more than 7 years but no minimum sentence be treated as serious offences until legislative action is taken. The court also emphasized the need for confidentiality regarding the identity of children in conflict with law and directed the High Court to amend the impugned judgment accordingly. Copies of the judgment were to be sent to relevant government authorities to prompt legislative or executive action on the matter.