2017 (7) TMI 1459 - HC - Indian Laws

Rule of interpretation - principle of harmonious construction - Locus standi - whether individual parents have locus to approach the Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee (DFRC) under the provisions of the Maharashtra Educational Institutes (Regulation of Fees) Act? - HELD THAT - Sub-Section 1 of Section 10 provide that powers and functions of DFRC shall be to adjudicate the dispute between the school management and the PTA regarding fee to be charged by the school management from the students. However a particular sections of statute cannot be read in isolation. While considering the provisions of law the Court will have to take into consideration various provisions of the statute and apply the principle of harmonious construction. The other principal that require consideration is the first principal of interpretation. That is of plain and literal construction. Only when the effect cannot be given to the legislative intent a recourse to the other principals of statutory interpretation would be permissible. It is more than well settled that a right to appeal is a creature of a statute. There cannot be an inherent right to an appeal until the statute specifically provides for the same. If the legislature in its wisdom has not provided for right to appeal by individual parents before DFRC if we arrive at the interpretation urged by Respondent Parents by resorting to the pragmatic principle of interpretation we are of the view that we will be totally encroaching upon the legislative functions of the legislature. The learned counsel for the Respondents may be justified in contending that the legislative enactment which provides a right to appeal only to the management and not to the parents is discriminatory and in violation of Article 14 - while entertaining the Petition of the Petitioners raising basic issue as to the tenability of the appeal at the instance of individual parents it will not be permissible to consider challenge of the Respondents - the Respondent No. 1 has erred in entertaining the grievance on behalf of the individual parents. The dispute with regard to constitution of PTA or the Executive Committee is beyond the purview of the said enactment. If any of the parties are aggrieved with the constitution of PTA the same being an association such party would either have to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if the association is not registered or if it is registered under the provisions of the Maharashtra Public Trust Act then the competent authority under the said Act. We find that the direction issued in that regard by the Respondent No. 1 is also without jurisdiction. There are no hesitation in accepting the arguments of the Respondents - Parents that the said enactment has been enacted with the avowed object of prohibiting exploitation of the parents. However though it is held that the contention of the Respondents Parents is correct in that regard. In the exercise of powers under Article 226 the provisions of the statute cannot be surpassed. Petition allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether individual parents have locus to approach the Divisional Fee Regulatory Committee (DFRC) under the Maharashtra Educational Institutes (Regulation of Fees) Act.
2. Interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Maharashtra Educational Institutes (Regulation of Fees) Act and the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Regulation of Fee) Rules.
3. The jurisdiction and powers of the DFRC.
4. The constitution and role of the Parent-Teachers Association (PTA) and Executive Committee.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Locus of Individual Parents:
The core issue in the petition was whether individual parents have locus to approach the DFRC under the Maharashtra Educational Institutes (Regulation of Fees) Act. The court held that the Act does not provide for initiation of proceedings before the DFRC at the behest of individual parents. The jurisdiction of the DFRC can only be invoked by the management, and that too only when the difference between the proposed fee and the fee approved by the Executive Committee is more than 15%. The court emphasized that a tribunal of limited jurisdiction can only entertain proceedings if the statute under which it is created enables the party to approach it.

2. Interpretation of Relevant Provisions:
The court referred to various sections of the Act and Rules to interpret the scheme of the enactment. The Act aims to prevent the commercialization of education and profiteering by educational institutions. Section 3 prohibits schools from collecting fees in excess of the fees fixed under the Act. Section 4 mandates the formation of a Parent-Teachers Association (PTA) and an Executive Committee. Section 6 outlines the process for proposing and approving fees, and the role of the Executive Committee in this process. The court noted that the Act is a complete code in itself, providing a detailed procedure for fee determination and approval.

3. Jurisdiction and Powers of the DFRC:
The court held that the DFRC is a statutory tribunal with limited jurisdiction, created under the Act. It can only be approached by the management in specific circumstances outlined in the Act. The DFRC's powers include adjudicating disputes between the school management and the PTA regarding fees, but this does not extend to individual parents initiating proceedings. The court cited the principle from the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor, which states that when a statute requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all.

4. Constitution and Role of PTA and Executive Committee:
The court examined the provisions related to the PTA and the Executive Committee. Section 4 of the Act mandates the formation of the PTA and outlines its composition and functions. The Executive Committee, formed by drawing lots from willing parents, plays a crucial role in approving the proposed fees submitted by the school management. The court found that the DFRC's direction to reconstitute the PTA and the Executive Committee was beyond its jurisdiction, as the dispute regarding their constitution is not within the purview of the Act.

Conclusion:
The court allowed the writ petitions, quashing and setting aside the impugned orders. It held that individual parents do not have locus to approach the DFRC, and the DFRC's jurisdiction is limited to the specific provisions of the Act. The court emphasized that any lacunas in the enactment should be addressed by the legislature, not the judiciary.