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2023 (3) TMI 1453 - SC - Money LaunderingRelevant days to calculate Default Bail - Whether the date of remand is to be included or excluded, for considering a claim for default bail, when computing the 60/90 day period as contemplated in proviso (a) of Section 167 (2) of the CrPC? - HELD THAT - The purpose of the first proviso to Section 167(2) is to impress upon the police officers to expeditiously complete investigation within the prescribed period and prevent laxity. In default, the Magistrate shall release the accused on bail. This is subject to the restriction imposed in Section 436-A, providing for the maximum period for which, an under-trial prisoner may be detained. Chapter XXXVI provides for limitation for taking cognizance in certain offences. Section 468 imposes a bar on taking cognizance of an offence specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation. Section 469 provides for commencement of period of limitation and it is to be noted that while setting out the date on which the period of limitation would have started, sub-section (2) states that in computing the period of limitation, the day from which such period is to be computed, shall be excluded. Barring the said provision contained in Section 468 and Section 436A, there is no limitation prescribed in completion of investigation and the investigation may continue except for the default-bail right which accrues to the accused on expiry of the 60th or 90th day, in terms of the first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167. Thus, the legislative intent providing for the 60/90 day statutory period- serves a twin purpose, firstly speedy trial of the accused which would transform him into a convict or his release on culmination of the trial and secondly, to assure speedy justice to the victim and to the society in general. The law of binding precedent provides that the rule of per incuriam is an exception to the doctrine of judicial precedent. Quite literally, it provides that when a judgment is passed in ignorance of a relevant precedent or any other binding authority, the same is said to be postulating incorrect law. It becomes pertinent to resolve the conflict arising from diverging opinions by taking recourse to the ratio decidendi of the earliest opinion. The 60/90 day limit is a statutory requirement which allows the State agencies to investigate serious offences beyond the 15-day police custody. In case the State fails to file chargesheet or supplementary request for remand within the stipulated 60/90 day period, a balance is needed between the rights of the individual and the restriction on those rights and prevent prolonged incarceration without legal support. The very instance, the statutory remand period ends, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused and same needs to be guarded - the right to default bail is not extinguished by the subsequent filing of the chargesheet, and the accused continues to have the right to default bail. The accused herein were remanded on 14.05.2020 and as such, the chargesheet ought to have been filed on or before 12.07.2020 (i.e. the sixtieth day). But the same was filed, only on 13.07.2020 which was the 61st day of their custody. Therefore, the right to default bail accrued to the accused persons on 13.07.2020 at 12 00 AM, midnight, onwards. On that very day, the accused filed their default bail applications at 8 53 AM. The ED filed the chargesheet, later in the day, at 11 15 AM. Thus, the default bail Applications were filed well before the chargesheet. In M. RAVINDRAN VERSUS THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DIRECTORATE OF REVENUE INTELLIGENCE 2020 (10) TMI 1105 - SUPREME COURT and BIKRAMJIT SINGH VERSUS THE STATE OF PUNJAB 2020 (10) TMI 1244 - SUPREME COURT , which followed the Constitution Bench in SANJAY DUTT VERSUS STATE THRU. C.B.I. BOMBAY 1994 (9) TMI 351 - SUPREME COURT it was rightly held that if the accused persons avail their indefeasible right to default bail before the chargesheet/final report is filed, then such right would not stand frustrated or extinguished by any such subsequent filing - It is declared that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period under Section 167 CrPC ought to be computed from the date when a Magistrate authorizes remand. If the first day of remand is excluded, the remand period, as noticed will extend beyond the permitted 60/90 days period resulting in unauthorized detention beyond the period envisaged under Section 167 CrPC. In cases where the chargesheet/final report is filed on or after the 61st/91st day, the accused in our considered opinion would be entitled to default bail. In other words, the very moment the stipulated 60/90 day remand period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused. The impugned order of the High Court granting default bail to the respondents by applying the proviso (a) (ii) of Section 167(2) CrPC is found to be in order - Appeal dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the date of remand is to be included or excluded for considering a claim for default bail when computing the 60/90 day period as per Section 167 (2) of the CrPC. Summary of Judgment: Core Issue: The core issue addressed is whether the date of remand should be included or excluded while computing the 60/90 day period for default bail under Section 167 (2) of the CrPC. The Court noted a divergence in judicial opinions, with some judgments favoring exclusion and others favoring inclusion of the date of remand. Prosecution's Argument: The prosecution relied on State of M.P. Vs. Rustam & Ors., Ravi Prakash Singh Vs. State of Bihar, and M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, which held that the date of remand should be excluded for computing the stipulated period for default bail. Accused's Argument: The accused relied on Chaganti Satyanarayan Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, CBI Vs. Anupam J Kulkarni, and State of Maharashtra Vs. Bharati Chandmal Varma, arguing that the date of remand should be included in the computation. Judicial Conundrum: Due to conflicting precedents, the Court needed to resolve the issue. The Court noted that the decision in Rustam ignored the earlier binding precedent in Chaganti, making it a per incuriam decision. Legislative Intent and Interpretation: The Court emphasized that the legislative intent behind Section 167 (2) CrPC is to ensure speedy investigation and prevent prolonged incarceration without legal authority. The Court held that the date of remand should be included in the 60/90 day period to protect the fundamental right to personal liberty. Application of General Clauses Act: The Court clarified that the General Clauses Act is inapplicable to Section 167 CrPC as there is no fixed 'from' and 'to' period for completion of the investigation. The period of detention by the Magistrate runs from the day of the remand order. Constitutional Considerations: The Court highlighted that any ambiguity in penal statutes should be resolved in favor of the accused, and the right to default bail is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court also noted that personal liberty and human dignity are central to constitutional law and must be upheld. Conclusion: The Court declared that the stipulated 60/90 day remand period under Section 167 CrPC should be computed from the date when the Magistrate authorizes remand. The impugned order of the High Court granting default bail to the respondents was upheld, as the chargesheet was filed on the 61st day, entitling the respondents to default bail. The Court emphasized that once the stipulated period expires, an indefeasible right to default bail accrues to the accused.
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