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Issues Involved:
1. Whether a stranger or third party to an agreement can be added as a party in a suit for specific performance. 2. Whether the amendment of the plaint to include a declaration that a consent decree is null and void is permissible. 3. Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation. Summary: Issue 1: Addition of a Stranger or Third Party to the Suit for Specific Performance The Supreme Court addressed whether a stranger or third party to an agreement could be added as a party in a suit for specific performance. The appellant, who had acquired an independent right in the suit property by way of a separate decree, was not a party to the agreement between the respondent and M/s Modern Development Corporation. The Court held that the appellant, being a third party to the agreement, could not be added as a party in the suit for specific performance. This was supported by the provisions of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, which entitles only parties to the contract to seek specific performance. The Court cited the decision in Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal and Ors., which held that a third party or stranger to the contract could not be added in a suit for specific performance. Issue 2: Amendment of the Plaint to Include Declaration Against Consent Decree The Court examined whether the amendment of the plaint to include a declaration that the consent decree was null and void was permissible. The respondent had sought to amend the plaint to declare the consent decree obtained by the appellant as not binding and null and void. The Court found that allowing such an amendment would completely change the nature and character of the suit from one for specific performance to one for declaration of title and possession. This was not permissible in law, as it would convert the suit into one of a different character. The Court referenced the decision in Anil Kumar Singh v. Shivnath Mishra, which held that a third party to the contract could not be impleaded in a suit for specific performance. Issue 3: Limitation The Court also considered whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation. The learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court had dismissed the Chamber Summons filed by the respondent on the ground of limitation, holding that the relief claimed by way of amendment of the plaint for setting aside the consent decree had its origin in the Agreement dated 1.10.1973 and had not been challenged earlier despite knowledge. The Court agreed with this view, noting that the respondent had knowledge of the earlier Agreement and the consent decree since at least 27.3.1984 but did not take steps to amend the plaint until 5.10.2000. Conclusion: The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Division Bench of the High Court, which had allowed the amendment of the plaint and the impleadment of the appellant. The Court allowed the appeal and directed that the respondent may file a separate suit to challenge the consent decree obtained by the appellant, invoking the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, for the period during which the respondent was pursuing his relief against the consent decree in his suit and the appeals arising therefrom. There was no order as to costs.
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