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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellant's notice to the Subordinate Judge constituted criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2. Whether the appellant's act falls within the protection of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 3. Whether the imposition of a sentence for contempt was justified under Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Whether the appellant's notice to the Subordinate Judge constituted criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: The appellant issued a notice to the Additional Subordinate Judge, alleging that the judge had created new facts without evidence, intentionally disordered existing evidence, maintained different standards, and side-tracked binding decisions, among other accusations. The High Court found these allegations to be scandalous and scurrilous, constituting a deliberate attempt to scandalize the judge and the court. The High Court concluded that the appellant's actions fell squarely within the definition of "criminal contempt" under Section 2(c) of the Act, which includes acts that scandalize or lower the authority of any court or interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding. The Supreme Court agreed with the High Court, noting that the appellant's notice imputed malice, partiality, and dishonesty to the Subordinate Judge, thereby constituting a deliberate attempt to scandalize the judge and lower the authority of the court. 2. Whether the appellant's act falls within the protection of Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: The appellant contended that his act fell within the exemption of Section 3, arguing that the suits had already been decided and the execution of the decree did not constitute a pending matter. Section 3(1) provides that a person shall not be guilty of contempt for publishing any matter that interferes with the course of justice in connection with any pending civil or criminal proceeding if they had no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was pending. The Supreme Court noted that Section 3 is an exception to certain categories of "criminal contempt" under Sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of Section 2(c), but not to Sub-clause (i). The Court held that the appellant's contempt primarily fell under Sub-clause (i), which covers acts that scandalize or lower the authority of the court. Therefore, the appellant's act did not fall within the protection of Section 3. 3. Whether the imposition of a sentence for contempt was justified under Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: The appellant argued that no sentence could be imposed on him under Section 13, which states that no court shall impose a sentence for contempt unless it is satisfied that the contempt substantially interferes with the due course of justice. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had addressed this contention, pointing out that the words "due course of justice" in Section 13 are broader than "due course of any judicial proceeding" or "administration of justice" in Section 2(c). The Court held that the appellant's contempt fell under both Sub-clause (i) and the broader scope of Sub-clause (iii), as it scandalized the judicial officer and interfered with the due course of justice. The Court agreed with the High Court that the appellant's contempt was serious and gross, with reckless imputations of malice and lack of good faith. The appellant showed no contrition or remorse, justifying the imposition of a sentence. Conclusion: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellant, finding that the appellant's notice constituted criminal contempt, did not fall within the protection of Section 3, and warranted a sentence under Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
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