2016 (11) TMI 1259 - HC - Indian Laws

Condonation of delay - Divisional Commissioner exercising his jurisdiction under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 authority to condone delay - Held that - In the facts of the present case, immediately after the order had been passed by the Registrar, the respondent preferred a Writ Petition which was dismissed on the ground of alternative remedy of preferring an appeal under Section 12-D(2) of the Act of 1860. After passing of such order, petitioner has immediately preferred an appeal, and delay has been condoned. Since the principles underlying Section 14 of the Limitation Act are attracted, as such, the period spent in pursuing a wrong remedy is liable to be condoned. In the present case, if principles of Section 14 are not applied, grave hardship would be otherwise caused to respondent Pilgrim s Mission. The respondent in this case was diligently pursuing remedy against the order of Registrar by filing a writ petition, and unless delay is condoned, it would not be possible to challenge the order. In the present case, Commissioner has condoned delay in filing of appeal, for which source of power can be traced to the principles contained under Section 14 of the Act of 1963. Although provisions of Section 14 ipso facto do not apply but its principles are clearly attracted. The Commissioner was thus right in condoning delay. No interference is thus warranted in exercise of writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the order of Commissioner dated 13.6.2016. Writ petition fails and is dismissed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Authority of the Divisional Commissioner to condone delay under the Societies Registration Act, 1860.
2. Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to quasi-judicial bodies.
3. Principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in condoning delays in quasi-judicial proceedings.

Analysis:

1. Authority of the Divisional Commissioner to condone delay under the Societies Registration Act, 1860:
The petitioner challenged the Divisional Commissioner’s authority to condone delay in filing an appeal under Section 12-D(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860, arguing that as the Commissioner does not act as a 'Court', the Limitation Act's provisions are not applicable. The court noted that Section 12-D of the Act provides for filing an appeal within one month but does not confer jurisdiction to condone delay. The court examined whether the Commissioner, acting as a quasi-judicial body, could apply the principles of the Limitation Act for condoning delays.

2. Applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963 to quasi-judicial bodies:
The court referenced the Supreme Court's decision in M.P. Steel Corporation Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, which clarified that the Limitation Act applies only to suits, appeals, and applications in 'courts' and not quasi-judicial bodies. The court distinguished between 'courts' and quasi-judicial bodies, concluding that the Commissioner under Section 12-D(2) does not function as a 'court' but as a quasi-judicial body. Therefore, the Limitation Act's provisions, including Sections 5 & 14, do not directly apply.

3. Principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in condoning delays in quasi-judicial proceedings:
Despite the Limitation Act not applying directly, the court held that the principles underlying Section 14, which allows for the exclusion of time spent pursuing a wrong remedy, could be applied to quasi-judicial bodies to advance justice. The court observed that the respondent had diligently pursued a writ petition, which was dismissed on the ground of an alternative remedy, and immediately filed an appeal thereafter. The court cited the Supreme Court's stance in M.P. Steel Corporation and Andhra Pradesh Power Corporation Committee cases, which supported applying the principles of Section 14 to exclude the time spent in bona fide proceedings before a wrong forum.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that the Commissioner was correct in condoning the delay based on the principles of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, despite the Act not applying directly. The writ petition was dismissed, affirming the Commissioner’s order to condone the delay.