2016 (12) TMI 583 - AT - Central Excise

Pre-deposit - compliance of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act,1944 - interpretation of statutes - Held that - I find that the wordings employed in Section 35F are as clear as daylight. In clause (iii) it is unambiguously prescribed that any person aggrieved by a decision or order referred to Clause (b) of sub- Section (1) of Sec. 35B of Central Excise Act, unless deposits 10% of the duty/penalty or duty and penalty, as the case may be, the appeal shall not be entertained. I do not find any reason to read the said provision in any other manner, so as to come to the conclusion that the Appellant is required to deposit 2.5% and not 10% as prescribed under the said provision, in view of the settled principle of statutory interpretation - I do not find substance in the argument that the amount paid under Clause (i) of Sec. 35F which was paid at the time of filing Appeal before the first Appellate Authority can be adjusted against the amount of deposit required to be made under clause (iii) while filing the Appeal before this forum - appeal dismissed - decided against appellant.

Summary

Issues involved: Interpretation of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, 1944 regarding the deposit required for filing an appeal.

Analysis:
The appeal in question was filed against an order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Customs, and Service Tax (Appeals) -VADODARA-II. The issue at hand revolved around the interpretation of Section 35F of the Central Excise Act, specifically clause (iii), which mandates the deposit of 10% of the duty/penalty or duty and penalty before filing an appeal. The appellant argued that since they had already deposited 7.5% at the first appellate stage, they should only be required to deposit the remaining 2.5% and not the full 10% as mentioned in the provision. On the contrary, the Revenue representative contended that such an interpretation would require inserting words not present in the provision. The key contention was whether the appellant could adjust the amount paid at the first appellate stage against the total deposit required under clause (iii) of Section 35F.

Upon a thorough examination of the statutory provision, the presiding Member found the language to be clear and unambiguous. It was noted that clause (iii) explicitly states that the appellant must deposit 10% of the duty/penalty or duty and penalty to entertain the appeal. The Member emphasized the principle of statutory interpretation, citing a judgment that highlighted the importance of adhering to the literal meaning of taxing statutes. The judgment underscored that in tax matters, the courts should not add words that are not present in the statute and must strictly construe the provisions without resorting to equitable considerations. Consequently, the Member rejected the argument that the amount paid under clause (i) of Section 35F at the first appellate stage could be adjusted against the deposit required under clause (iii) for filing the appeal before the higher forum.

In conclusion, the appeal was not entertained as the Member upheld the strict interpretation of Section 35F, requiring the appellant to comply with the statutory mandate of depositing 10% of the duty/penalty or duty and penalty as a prerequisite for filing the appeal. The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to the literal language of taxing statutes and refraining from implying or reading into the provisions beyond their explicit terms.