2017 (7) TMI 85 - HC - Customs

Penalty - misdeclaration of goods - the respondent while posted as Inspector at the Indira Gandhi International Airport, Delhi gave a false examination report in respect of Bill of Entry No. 724870 dated 21.12.1998 filed by M/s Intertrade Incorporated, Noida declaring the imported goods to be Plastic Buttons valued at ₹ 56,531/- whereas on verification the packet was found to be intact and in its original packing. Goods on examination were found to be cellular phones along with batteries and chargers valued at ₹ 74,80,000/-. whether the respondent once having been acquitted of the charges under the Customs Act, 1962 can then be proceeded against in a departmental enquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules on the same cause of action i.e. giving the false examination report allegedly entered by the respondent in respect to Bill of Entry No.724870 dated 21.12.1998 submitted by M/s Intertrade Incorporated, Noida? - Held that - there is no bar in initiating disciplinary proceedings if the charged officer is acquitted of criminal proceedings arising out of the same cause of action. The result of one proceeding does not have a bearing on the other proceedings. The CESTAT might have found that the respondent did not collude with the importer and hence was not liable of a penalty under the Customs Act, 1962 but that does not mean that he is not guilty of misconduct, maintaining absolute integrity and devotion to duty as per Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Whether the non-supply of the original Bill of Entry did in fact violate the principles of natural justice and cause prejudice to the respondent? - Held that - the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority did not find any prejudice to have been caused due to the non-supply of the original Bill of Entry. It is well settled law that the technical rules of evidence do not apply to a departmental enquiry and the doctrine of proof beyond reasonable doubt has no relevance in a departmental enquiry. All that is needed to establish misconduct is preponderance of probability and some material on record to prove the same. In disciplinary proceedings, a Disciplinary Authority has to see whether after going through the material on record and evidence, a reasonable and prudent man would come to the conclusion that the delinquent officer had indeed committed an act of misconduct. Preponderance of Probability is not burdened with the technicalities of the rules of evidence. If after going through the evidence the Disciplinary Authority finds the delinquent officer guilty of misconduct and the delinquent officer is not sufficiently able to rebut this finding, then the order of the Disciplinary Authority would be good in the eyes of law. The findings of the Disciplinary Authority were indeed based on evidence and material. No prejudice was shown because of the non-supply of the original Bill of Entry and circumstantial evidence found against the respondent was not rebutted by him. After applying the test of preponderance of probability to the present case we find that the Disciplinary Authority was correct in reaching the conclusion that the respondent was guilty of misconduct - Petition allowed - decided in favor of petitioner.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the respondent can be subjected to departmental enquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules after being acquitted of charges under the Customs Act, 1962.
2. Whether the non-supply of the original Bill of Entry violated principles of natural justice and caused prejudice to the respondent.
3. The scope of judicial review in departmental enquiries.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Departmental Enquiry Post-Acquittal:
The first issue addressed was whether the respondent, acquitted of charges under the Customs Act, 1962, could be subjected to a departmental enquiry under the CCS (CCA) Rules for the same cause of action. The court cited the Supreme Court's decisions in *South Bengal State Transport Corpn. v. Sapan Kumar Mitra* and *Samar Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P.*, emphasizing that acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude departmental proceedings. The standards of proof in criminal cases (beyond reasonable doubt) differ from those in departmental proceedings (preponderance of probabilities). The court concluded that disciplinary proceedings could be initiated irrespective of the criminal acquittal.

2. Non-Supply of Original Bill of Entry:
The second issue was whether the non-supply of the original Bill of Entry prejudiced the respondent. The Tribunal had set aside the penalty on the grounds that the non-supply of this document caused prejudice. However, the court found that the respondent failed to demonstrate how the non-supply of the Bill of Entry caused prejudice. The court noted that the respondent admitted the possibility of his password being misused but did not provide evidence to substantiate this claim. The Disciplinary Authority had determined that the circumstantial evidence (the respondent's login details and the timing of the entry) was sufficient to establish misconduct. The court emphasized that technical rules of evidence do not apply to departmental enquiries, and the standard of proof is based on the preponderance of probabilities.

3. Scope of Judicial Review:
The court reiterated the limited scope of judicial review in departmental enquiries, as established in *B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India*. Judicial review is not an appeal but a review of the decision-making process. The court's role is to ensure fair treatment and adherence to natural justice, not to re-evaluate the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the disciplinary authority. The court found that the disciplinary authority's findings were based on evidence and material on record, and there was no violation of natural justice.

Conclusion:
The court concluded that there was no bar to initiating disciplinary proceedings after criminal acquittal, and the non-supply of the original Bill of Entry did not cause prejudice to the respondent. The findings of the disciplinary authority were based on evidence, and the principles of natural justice were upheld. Consequently, the court allowed the writ petition, setting aside the Tribunal's order dated 08.10.2007, and upheld the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. No costs were awarded.