2018 (3) TMI 1251 - HC - FEMA

Public authority excluded from the purview of Right to Information Act - Held that - Section 24(1) of the Act expressly excludes intelligence and security organizations specified in the Second Schedule of the Act from the purview of the Act. Admittedly, the Directorate of Enforcement is included in the Second Schedule to the Act and, thus, cannot be called upon to disclose information under the provisions of the Act. The only exception carved out from the exclusionary clause of Section 24(1) of the Act relates to information pertaining to allegations of corruption and human rights violation. Undisputedly, the information sought for by the petitioner cannot be categorized as such information.

Summary

Issues:
1. Exclusion of petitioner authority from the Right to Information Act, 2005.
2. Interpretation of Section 24(1) of the Act.
3. Validity of the impugned order by the Central Information Commission (CIC).
4. Applicability of exceptions under Section 24(1) regarding disclosure of information.

Analysis:

1. The petitioners challenged an order by the CIC directing them to provide information regarding a complaint made to the Enforcement Directorate. They contended that as a public authority, the Enforcement Directorate was excluded from the purview of the Right to Information Act, 2005, under Section 24(1) of the Act.

2. The respondent's complaint to the Enforcement Directorate led to an application seeking information under the Act, which was declined by the Directorate citing Section 24(1). The respondent's subsequent appeals were dismissed, leading to the CIC's decision that the information should be disclosed in the public interest.

3. The High Court analyzed Section 24(1) and noted that intelligence and security organizations listed in the Second Schedule are excluded from the Act. As the Directorate of Enforcement is included in the Second Schedule, it cannot be compelled to disclose information, except in cases of corruption or human rights violations, which did not apply in this situation.

4. Referring to a previous judgment, the Court affirmed that organizations listed in the Second Schedule are indeed exempt from the Act. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the impugned order was set aside, and the respondent was not barred from pursuing legal action against the relevant company.

This detailed analysis highlights the core issues of the judgment, emphasizing the interpretation of statutory provisions and the application of legal principles in determining the disclosure of information under the Right to Information Act.