2019 (4) TMI 428 - AT - Central Excise

CENVAT Credit - hiring of capital goods - earth moving equipments used for mining of minerals at the mines - Held that - Both the authorities below have not considered the full definition of input service under Rule 2(l) during the relevant period which has resulted in the present proceedings. Further in view of the various decisions cited, the excavators, loaders and tippers used for providing taxable service of mining of minerals are capital goods as defined in Rule 2(l) of CCR 2004 and hiring of the said capital goods which is a taxable service, is eligible for CENVAT credit in terms of Rule 2(l)(B) of CCR, 2004 during the relevant period. Time Limitation - Held that - The SCN which was issued on 07/11/2014 was for the period from May 2011 to May 2012 and the Department has not brought any evidence on record to show that the appellant has suppressed any material fact with intent to evade payment of duty. Moreover, audit was conducted and report was made available on 07/05/2012 and all the transactions have been recorded in the books of accounts and are verified by the audit party - there cannot be any allegation of suppression with intent to evade payment of duty and therefore invocation of extended period of limitation is not sustainable in law. Appeal allowed - decided in favor of appellant.

Summary

Issues:
- Eligibility of CENVAT credit for hiring earth moving equipment
- Consideration of full definition of input service under Rule 2(l) of CCR
- Whether excavators, loaders, and tippers are capital goods
- Barred by limitation due to suppression of facts

Eligibility of CENVAT credit for hiring earth moving equipment:
The appeal challenged the rejection of the appellant's appeal by the Commissioner(Appeals) regarding the eligibility of CENVAT credit for hiring earth moving equipment used in mining operations. The audit party observed that the hiring of these equipments was not eligible for CENVAT credit, leading to a demand for reversal of credit. The appellant argued that the hiring of such equipment for mining operations was eligible for credit as per Rule 2(l)(B) of CCR, 2004. The Tribunal found that the authorities below did not consider the full definition of input service under Rule 2(l) during the relevant period, resulting in an erroneous denial of credit. The Tribunal also cited precedents to establish that hiring of capital goods for providing taxable services, such as mining of minerals, is eligible for CENVAT credit.

Consideration of full definition of input service under Rule 2(l) of CCR:
The appellant contended that the impugned order failed to consider the complete definition of input service under Rule 2(l) of CCR during the relevant period. The appellant argued that the exclusion of certain services from the definition was not properly accounted for in the decision. The Tribunal agreed with the appellant's argument, highlighting that the incomplete consideration of the input service definition led to inaccuracies in the decision-making process.

Whether excavators, loaders, and tippers are capital goods:
The issue of whether excavators, loaders, and tippers used for providing mining services qualify as capital goods was a key point of contention. The appellant asserted that these equipment fell under the definition of capital goods as per Rule 2(a)(A)(i) of the CCR and were used for providing taxable services, making them eligible for CENVAT credit. The Tribunal referenced legal precedents and established that these equipment were indeed capital goods and hiring them for taxable services warranted CENVAT credit.

Barred by limitation due to suppression of facts:
The appellant argued that the entire demand was barred by limitation as the show-cause notice was issued beyond the statutory period. The appellant maintained that there was no suppression of facts or mala fide intention to evade duty, as all transactions were duly recorded and verified by the audit party. The Tribunal concurred with the appellant, emphasizing that the Department failed to provide evidence of suppression, rendering the invocation of the extended period of limitation unsustainable.

In conclusion, the Tribunal held that the impugned order was not sustainable on merits or limitation grounds. The appeal was allowed in favor of the appellant, with the Tribunal setting aside the previous order and providing consequential relief.