9911796707
|
Home
Issues:
Whether technical service fee secured by the assessee was income from priority industry for purposes of section 80-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Analysis: The judgment pertains to a case where the assessee, a domestic company engaged in the production of equipment for electricity generation, received technical fees under a collaboration agreement. The issue revolved around whether these fees qualified as income from a priority industry for claiming relief under section 80-I of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Income-tax Officer, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and the Tribunal had rejected the assessee's claim based on the argument that the income was not derived from the assessee's own manufacturing activities. The court analyzed the provisions of section 80-I of the Act applicable during the relevant assessment years. It noted that the assessee satisfied the criteria as a domestic company engaged in a business falling within the definition of a "priority industry." The authorities had denied the claim solely on the ground that the technical fees were not profits and gains attributable to a priority industry since they were not directly derived from the assessee's manufacturing operations. The court disagreed with the narrow interpretation adopted by the Tribunal and referred to a Supreme Court decision in Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax, emphasizing the broader import of the term "attributable to" over "derived from." It highlighted that the income in question was a result of the technical competence acquired by the assessee through its manufacturing business, leading to the collaboration agreement. Drawing parallels from a House of Lords decision in Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. Jeffrey, the court concluded that the income was indeed attributable to the priority industry, as it stemmed from the assessee's business activities and technical expertise. In light of the above analysis, the court held that the income derived from the technical collaboration agreement fell within the ambit of section 80-I of the Act. Consequently, it found the authorities erred in denying relief to the assessee under section 80-I. The court answered the referred question in the affirmative, ruling in favor of the assessee in each of the cases under consideration.
|
