1992 (5) TMI 18 - SC - Indian Laws

Whether Section 73A is comprehensive in its scope in so far as it throws a statutory bar preventing the authority from commencing any proceeding after the expiry of five years? Held that - The object of section 73A is unambiguous to bar the commencement of any proceeding for levy after the period of five years in the case of first assessment we do not think we can dilute the rigour of section 73A by introducing a construction not warranted in the situation. If it was the intention of Parliament to provide for exceptional cases making section 73A inapplicable to such cases nothing would have been easier than to have so expressed. The language under section 73A is imperative. It demands of no doubt that there cannot be two limitations (i) in a case where the assessee files a belated return and (ii) in a case where the applicant seeks a succession certificate. In such a case where the assessee as in the instant case seeks a certificate from the Controller all that the Controller has to say is that no such certificate could be issued in view of the statutory bar under section 73A. In this context section 56 will have to be given meaning And life. He who clings to the letter of the law clings to the dry bone ; that would be against the spirit of the Act. Appeal allowed.

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953.
2. Requirement of a certificate under Section 56(2) of the Estate Duty Act for granting a succession certificate.
3. Jurisdiction of civil courts in waiving the requirement under Section 56(2).

Detailed Analysis:

1. Applicability of Section 73A of the Estate Duty Act, 1953:
The primary issue revolves around whether Section 73A, which imposes a statutory bar on commencing proceedings for levy of estate duty after five years from the date of death, applies to cases where a succession certificate is sought. The appellant argued that Section 73A is comprehensive and prevents any proceedings, including those under Section 56, from being initiated after five years. The court concurred, stating, "This section throws a statutory bar and is comprehensive in nature. In so far as it says 'no proceeding under this Act' that means no proceeding whatever in relation to levy can ever be commenced after five years."

2. Requirement of a certificate under Section 56(2) of the Estate Duty Act for granting a succession certificate:
The appellant contended that requiring a certificate from the Controller under Section 56(2) after the expiry of five years would be impossible due to the statutory bar under Section 73A. The court noted, "To require in a case of this character the production of a certificate from the Controller would amount to the insistence upon an impossible compliance." The court emphasized that a harmonious construction between Sections 73A and 56 is necessary, and the statutory bar under Section 73A should not be lifted merely because of the requirements of Section 56.

3. Jurisdiction of civil courts in waiving the requirement under Section 56(2):
The court addressed whether civil courts have the jurisdiction to waive the requirement of producing a certificate under Section 56(2) when granting a succession certificate. It was held that civil courts do not possess such jurisdiction. The court referred to the Delhi High Court ruling in P. C. Saxena v. State [1976] 104 ITR 106, which stated, "the civil court did not possess any jurisdiction or discretion to waive the condition under section 56(2) of the Act which was precedent to the grant of representation or succession certificate."

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, holding that Section 73A imposes a comprehensive statutory bar on commencing any proceedings for levy of estate duty after five years from the date of death. The requirement under Section 56(2) for a certificate from the Controller cannot override this statutory bar. The appeal was allowed, and it was concluded that civil courts cannot waive the requirement under Section 56(2). The court emphasized the need for a harmonious construction of the Act's provisions to avoid impossible compliance and uphold the legislative intent.