1993 (2) TMI 98 - SC - Income Tax

Whether the discretion exercised by the Division Bench in refusing to entertain the earlier writ petition for non-availing of alternate remedy and dismissing it, could be said to be an unwarranted exercise of discretion? Held that - When a judge of single judge Bench of a High Court is required to entertain a second writ petition of a person on a matter, he cannot, as a matter of course, entertain such petition, if an earlier writ petition of the same person on the same matter had been dismissed already by another single judge Bench or a Division Bench of the same High Court, even if such dismissal was on the ground of laches or on the ground of non-availing of alternate remedy. The second writ petition cannot be so entertained not because the learned single judge has no jurisdiction to entertain same, but because entertaining of such a second writ petition would render the order of the same court dismissing the earlier writ petition redundant and nugatory, although not reviewed by it in exercise of the recognised power. This reason which supports the first ground urged in support of the appeal, to wit, that the learned single judge ought not have entertained a second writ petition in respect of the order of compulsory retirement of the respondent, when a Division Bench of the same court had refused to entertain a writ petition of the same respondent filed respecting the same subject-matter for non-availing of the alternate remedy before the forum of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, is also a valid reason. Appeal allowed.

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of entertaining a second writ petition after the first was dismissed for non-exhaustion of alternative remedy.
2. Discretionary power of the High Court to entertain a second writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
3. Validity of the Government's power to compulsorily retire the respondent under F.R. 56.
4. Impact of pending departmental disciplinary enquiry on the compulsory retirement under F.R. 56.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Validity of Entertaining a Second Writ Petition:
The primary issue revolves around whether the High Court could entertain a second writ petition after the first was dismissed due to the non-exhaustion of an alternative statutory remedy. The Division Bench of the High Court had dismissed the respondent's first writ petition on the ground that he had not approached the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, a statutory forum created for such grievances. This dismissal was based on the well-settled legal position that High Courts should not entertain writ petitions when an adequate and efficacious alternative remedy is available. The Supreme Court emphasized that the U.P. Public Services Tribunal, composed of judicial and administrative members, provides a comprehensive and specialized forum for redressal of employment-related grievances, thus making the Division Bench's exercise of discretion to dismiss the first writ petition warranted and not arbitrary.

2. Discretionary Power of the High Court:
The second issue pertains to the discretionary power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a second writ petition after the first was dismissed for non-exhaustion of an alternative remedy. The Supreme Court noted that while the High Court does possess discretionary power to entertain subsequent writ petitions, this power should not be exercised in a manner that undermines the judicial discipline and finality of earlier decisions. The learned single judge's decision to entertain the second writ petition was found to be in contravention of the established judicial practice that discourages bypassing earlier orders of dismissal by the same court, especially when such orders were not reviewed or appealed.

3. Validity of Government's Power to Compulsorily Retire:
The third issue addressed whether the Government lost its power to compulsorily retire the respondent under F.R. 56 after he issued a notice seeking voluntary retirement. The Supreme Court found the view of the learned single judge, that the issuance of a notice for voluntary retirement inhibited the Government's power to compulsorily retire the respondent, to be untenable. The legal framework under F.R. 56 allows the Government to exercise its discretion in matters of compulsory retirement irrespective of the employee's request for voluntary retirement.

4. Impact of Pending Departmental Disciplinary Enquiry:
The fourth issue was whether the pending departmental disciplinary enquiry against the respondent inhibited the Government from compulsorily retiring him under F.R. 56. The Supreme Court found the learned single judge's view, that the pending enquiry inhibited the Government's power to compulsorily retire the respondent, to be incorrect. The rules under F.R. 56 do not preclude the Government from exercising its power of compulsory retirement even if a disciplinary enquiry is pending.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the learned single judge, and dismissed the second writ petition. The judgment emphasized that the respondent still retains the right to approach the U.P. Public Services Tribunal for necessary relief, if entitled under the law. The decision underscored the importance of adhering to established judicial practices and the necessity of utilizing specialized statutory forums for redressal of grievances before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution.

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