1964 (1) TMI 2 - SC - Customs

Statements made before the Customs Officer were valid, if signed by the appellants and their lawyer - Smuggled gold - Writ jurisdiction

Issues Involved:
1. Admissibility of statements made to Customs authorities.
2. Applicability of Sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act to statements made before the Collector of Customs.
3. Impact of Section 186 of the Sea Customs Act on subsequent criminal prosecution.
4. Satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Admissibility of Statements Made to Customs Authorities:
The appellants contended that the statements made to the Customs authorities were inadmissible as they were not properly proved. The argument was based on the fact that the lawyer who signed the statements was not produced to prove them. However, the Court held that the statements were signed by both the appellants and their lawyer. The appellants admitted in court that they signed the statements, although they claimed ignorance of the content. The courts did not believe this claim, and the Supreme Court agreed. Since the appellants admitted their signatures, the statements were considered properly proved without the need for the lawyer's testimony. Thus, the contention failed.

2. Applicability of Sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act:
The appellants argued that the statements made before the Collector of Customs were inadmissible under Sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Court referred to the precedent set in *State of Punjab v. Barkat Ram*, where it was held that customs officers are not police officers, making Section 25 inapplicable. Section 24, which deals with inducement, threat, or promise, was relevant. However, all courts found that the statements were not made due to any inducement, threat, or promise. Consequently, the statements were deemed admissible under Section 24.

3. Impact of Section 186 of the Sea Customs Act:
The appellants argued that after the award of confiscation and penalty under Section 167(8) of the Act, further criminal prosecution under Section 167(81) was barred by Section 186 of the Act. Section 186 states that the award of confiscation, penalty, or increased duty does not prevent punishment under any other law. The Court clarified that Section 186 is an enabling provision allowing prosecution under other laws despite penalties under the Act. It was not intended to bar prosecutions under the Act itself. The introduction of clause (81) in Section 167 allowed for prosecution even after penalties by Customs authorities. Thus, Section 186 did not bar the prosecution in this case.

4. Satisfaction of the Ingredients of Section 167(81):
The appellants contended that the prosecution failed to prove the intent to defraud the Government of duty or evade prohibition or restriction on the gold. The Court held that once it was established that the gold was smuggled, it implied that it was brought into the country without paying duty or violating prohibitions. Anyone dealing with such gold, knowing it to be smuggled, is presumed to have the intent to evade duty or prohibition. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 167(81) were satisfied.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no merit in the contentions regarding the admissibility of statements, the applicability of Sections 24 and 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, the impact of Section 186 of the Sea Customs Act, and the satisfaction of the ingredients of Section 167(81). The Court also saw no reason to interfere with the sentences imposed, despite the appellants' request for a reduction in their substantive imprisonment.

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