1995 (1) TMI 81 - HC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Constitutional validity and enforceability of paragraph 4 of Notification No. 59/94.
2. Whether the petitioners are using the brand or trade name of another person.
3. Eligibility for exemption under Notification No. 175/86 as amended by Notification No. 1/93.

Summary:

1. Constitutional Validity and Enforceability of Paragraph 4 of Notification No. 59/94:
The court held that the provisions contained in paragraph 4 of Notification No. 59/94 are constitutionally valid and enforceable. This decision aligns with the judgment delivered in W.P. Nos. 8825 to 8832 of 1994, where it was determined that the amendment was made in public interest to prevent the fragmentation of big units to avail Small Scale Industries (SSI) exemptions, thereby ensuring legitimate growth of genuine SSIs.

2. Use of Brand or Trade Name of Another Person:
The court examined whether the petitioners could be said to be using the brand name `BELL` of another person. The petitioners argued that they had acquired the right to use the name `BELL` through long and uninterrupted use, and that their products were distinct and different. However, the court noted that the three units were located at the Bell Industrial Complex and were managed by different members of the same family, often using the brand name `BELL` in various forms (letters or emblem). The court concluded that the use of a common brand name by different units, even if the products were different, amounted to using the brand name of another person, thus disentitling them from claiming the exemption.

3. Eligibility for Exemption under Notification No. 175/86 as Amended by Notification No. 1/93:
The court emphasized that for the purposes of excise duty and the application of rates, the totality of clearances must be considered, not just the clearances of different products. The notification did not limit the user of the brand or trade name to similar or identical goods. Therefore, the petitioners' claims for exemption were rejected as they were using a common brand name, which disqualified them from the exemption under the amended notification.

Conclusion:
The court dismissed the writ petitions, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to the exemption due to the use of a common brand name `BELL`, which belonged to another person, thereby violating the conditions stipulated in paragraph 4 of Notification No. 59/94. The claims of the petitioners were found to be without merit, and the petitions were dismissed with no costs.