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Issues:
- Jurisdiction of the appellate authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. - Invocation of Section 14 of the Limitation Act by the appellate authority. Analysis: 1. The case involved an application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging an order of the appellate authority under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. The Petitioner-company, an industrial establishment, submitted its draft Standing Orders which were certified and sent to the parties. An appeal was filed by the Union of workers to the Labour Court, which was later disposed of in favor of the Union. The Petitioner then approached the High Court against the Labour Court's order, which was allowed on the grounds of jurisdiction. Subsequently, the Union filed an appeal to the appellate authority, seeking condonation of delay, which was objected to by the Petitioner on the basis of limitation. 2. The main issue for consideration was whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act could be invoked by the appellate authority to exclude the period during which the Union was prosecuting its appeal before the Labour Court and resisting the writ petition before the High Court. The appellate authority admitted the appeal by excluding this period as a bona fide prosecution before a wrong court. The Petitioner challenged this decision through a writ application. 3. The Court analyzed Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, which allows the exclusion of time during which an applicant has been prosecuting another civil proceeding in good faith in a court unable to entertain it. The Court clarified that the proceeding before the certifying officer under the Act was not a civil proceeding as it did not pertain to civil rights or infractions. The Court emphasized that the Labour Court, acting as the appellate authority, was not considered a 'court' for the purpose of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 4. Ultimately, the Court held that the appeal before the appellate authority was time-barred, and the authority had no power to admit it by invoking Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The petition was allowed, the impugned order was quashed, and no costs were awarded. Additionally, the Court observed the provisions of Section 10 of the Act regarding the modification of standing orders after the initial six-month period. 5. Justice D.M. Sen concurred with the judgment, agreeing with the analysis and decision rendered by the Chief Justice.
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