1957 (2) TMI 96 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Authority of a vakil (legal counsel) to enter into a compromise on behalf of a client without express authorisation.
2. Validity of the compromise agreement in the context of the vakil's authority.
3. Plaintiff's attempt to selectively challenge the compromise agreement.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Authority of a Vakil to Enter into a Compromise:

The primary issue in this case revolves around whether a vakil has the inherent authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of a client without express authorisation. The judgment discusses various precedents and authorities, highlighting that traditionally, a vakil in India has been considered to have implied authority to compromise a suit unless expressly restricted by the client. The court examined several cases to establish that the implied authority of a vakil is a well-recognized principle, especially when the vakil is acting in the best interest of the client. However, the judgment also notes that prudence dictates obtaining express consent or a special vakalatnama (power of attorney) to avoid disputes, given the divided judicial opinions and the absence of statutory backing.

2. Validity of the Compromise Agreement:

The court found that the compromise agreement in question was valid. The vakil had the authority to enter into the compromise as evidenced by the vakalat filed in O. S. No. 151 of 1950, which explicitly empowered the vakil to sign the compromise and withdraw the suit. Additionally, the vakil involved the plaintiff's father, who was overseeing her court affairs, in the compromise process, further validating the agreement. The court emphasized that the compromise was part of a larger transaction involving two suits, each forming the consideration for the other, and therefore, could not be partially set aside.

3. Plaintiff's Attempt to Selectively Challenge the Compromise:

The plaintiff sought to retain the benefits of the compromise in one suit (O. S. No. 180 of 1950) while challenging the dismissal of the other (O. S. No. 151 of 1950). The court held that such selective acceptance was not permissible. The principle of approbation and reprobation was applied, meaning the plaintiff could not accept the benefits of the compromise while rejecting its burdens. The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim lacked merit as she could not selectively challenge the compromise after having initially agreed to it.

In conclusion, the appeal was dismissed with costs, affirming the validity of the compromise agreement and the authority of the vakil to enter into it. The judgment underscores the importance of clear authorisation for legal representatives and the binding nature of compromise agreements when duly executed.