1980 (5) TMI 121 - HC - Indian Laws

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Legality of excess realisations by sugar manufacturers under interim court orders.
2. Application of the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, to recover excess realisations.
3. Jurisdiction of the court to enforce recovery of excess realisations post-withdrawal of petitions.
4. Applicability of Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code to proceedings under Article 226.
5. Interpretation of "set aside" in the context of interim orders ceasing to be operative.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Legality of Excess Realisations:

The respondents, who are sugar manufacturers, challenged the controlled sugar price fixed by the Central Government at Rs.124.59 per quintal for the year 1972-73, through Special Civil Applications. They obtained interim orders allowing them to sell levy sugar at Rs.150 per quintal, higher than the controlled price. Subsequently, they withdrew their petitions, rendering the interim orders inoperative. The court addressed the issue of how to deal with the "excess realisations" made during the period when the interim orders were effective. The Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, was enacted to direct such excess realisations into a fund.

2. Application of the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976:

The Act mandates that producers credit excess realisations to the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund. Section 3(3) of the Act obligates producers to deposit the excess amounts realised before the Act's commencement, along with interest. The court found that the respondents were liable to deposit the excess realisations made during the interim order period, from 31st July 1972 to 12th March 1973, into the Fund, as per the Act's provisions.

3. Jurisdiction of the Court:

The petitioners argued that the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction to deprive the respondents of the undue advantage gained under the interim orders. The court agreed, emphasizing its inherent jurisdiction to undo wrongs done under interim orders, even if the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, was not in place. The court cited Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, which grants inherent powers to administer justice and work out the rights of parties.

4. Applicability of Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code:

The respondents contended that the current proceedings were not maintainable under Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, which does not apply to Article 226 proceedings. The court rejected this argument, stating that its power to enforce interim orders and rectify wrongs does not depend on Section 141 or 151, but on its inherent jurisdiction.

5. Interpretation of "Set Aside":

The respondents argued that the interim orders were not "set aside" but merely ceased to be operative upon withdrawal of the petitions, thus not constituting "excess realisations." The court disagreed, interpreting "set aside" to include situations where interim orders become inoperative due to withdrawal, thereby categorizing the amounts realized under such orders as excess realisations.

Conclusion:

The court directed the respondents to credit the excess amounts, along with interest, to the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund within three months, failing which the orders would be executed as court decrees. The petitions were allowed, with no order as to costs.