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1980 (5) TMI 121

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..... of Rupees 124.59 p. per quintal was frozen and the respondents who are sugar manufacturers were allowed to sell 'levy' sugar at Rs.150/- per quintal. Obviously, therefore, under the force of an interim order made by this Court in each of those petitions, the respondents sold levy sugar at a price higher than the controlled price and recovered from the State Government, Union Government or their nominees more than what they were entitled to. Thereafter the respondents did not proceed with the petitions but they withdrew them. The interim order made by this Court, therefore, ceased to be operative in each of the Petitions. 3. The question which thereafter arose was this: How should the excess realisations made by the respondents be dealt with? Such situations arose in different parts of the country also. Therefore, Parliament passed the Levy-Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, under which the Central Government has constituted Levy-Sugar Price Equalisation Fund into which such excess realisations are directed to be paid. On behalf of the Central Government, Mr. Vakil has stated to us that the amounts recoverable from the present respondents excluding Khedut Sahkari Khan .....

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..... lost the cause. Every order made by a Court must ultimately abide by the final order which the Court makes in those proceedings. Since the petitions were withdrawn by the respondents, they stood dismissed. It therefore, means that the interim orders which were made therein not only came to be vacated but it also means that it the respondents had derived any monetary benefit only on account of the interim order of this Court, they must make it good to one who is entitled to claim it. Therefore, even though the Levy Sugar Price Equalisation Fund Act, 1976, holds the field, we are of the opinion that, even if that Act was not there, we would have exercised our inherent jurisdiction to undo the wrong which was done to the society by the interim order which we made and under which we stayed the implementation of the controlled price of levy sugar. Such an inherent power is indeed found in Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. So far as High Courts are concerned, even apart from Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, we have inherent jurisdiction to do all things which are necessary to be done for the purpose of administering justice and working out the rights of the parties. The a .....

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..... present petitioners either ought to have filed substantive suits to recover from the respondents excess realisations made by them under the force of the interim order of this Court or they ought to have filed substantive writ petitions. He has in that behalf invited out attention to Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides as follows: The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation: In this section, the expression proceedings includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Now, the Explanation to Section 141 was added in 1976. According to the learned Advocate General, since the Explanation expressly excludes petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution, it cannot be invoked for the purpose of instituting such miscellaneous proceedings to recover the excess realisations. It is no doubt true that Explanation to Section 141 was enacted for the first time in 1976 and that it was not in existence on the date when the present Civil Applications were filed. He has further argued .....

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..... rial Society Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1977 SC 2041, has held that subsections (4) and (5) of Section 3 do not apply to a case in which interim order made by a Court has already come to an end as a result of the termination of the final proceedings before the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 reads as follows: 3 (4). Where, by virtue of any interim order made by any Court, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, - (a) amounts representing the difference between the controlled price and price allowed by any Court by an order made in this behalf, have been, or are required to be, - (i) kept with the producer himself, or (ii) kept deposited with, or in the custody of, any Court, or (iii) kept deposited with, or in the custody of, any Government, bank, authority or other person; or (b) any amount in excess of the controlled price has been collected and kept by the producer under the cover of any guarantee given in pursuance of such order, it shall not be necessary to credit such amounts to the Fund so long as the Court which passed the interim order does not so direct . Sub-section (5) of Section 3 reads as follows: 3 (5). Where, in pursuance of an i .....

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..... (b) (ii) which we have referred to above. According to him, the interim order must have been set aside either by the Court which made it or by the appellate or revisional Court. According to him, in the instant case, the interim order was not set aside by this Court or by any one else. It merely ceased to be operative when the respondent withdrew their petitions. According to him therefore, unless the present petitioners show that the interim order was set aside by this Court or by the Supreme Court, what they realised under the force of that order cannot be said to be an excess realisation. We are not impressed by the argument raised by the learned Advocate General. An interim order can be said to have been 'set aside' when it is expressly set aside or by necessary implication when it ceases to be operative particularly in a case where the substantive petition has been withdrawn. The expression set aside used in Section 2 (b) (ii) means that the interim order has come to an end or has become inoperative. Therefore, what the respondents realised under the cover of the interim order of this Court was an excess realisation, The third and the last argument raised by the learn .....

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