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2021 (7) TMI 1467 - HC - Indian Laws
Refusal of pre-arrest bail - offence punishable under Sections 120-B/420/409 of the IPC read with Section 66 of the I.T. Act and Sections 4/5/6 of Prize Chits and Money Circulation (Banning) Act - HELD THAT - In the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna 2015 (8) TMI 724 - SUPREME COURT the Apex Court placing in the case of Niranjan Singh 1980 (3) TMI 258 - SUPREME COURT have held that the accused can also surrender in Court of Sessions or High Court and then seek bail under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. The petitioner in this case has not surrendered to the custody by remaining physically present and filing a memo with regard to surrender, his presence through V.C. from a remote location, but it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the case being taken up through video conferencing, the appearance of the accused through video conferencing may be considered as constructive custody of this Court under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. and his prayer for bail may be considered. Conclusion - The requirement of physical custody for bail applications under Section 439 is reaffirmed, emphasizing the need for physical presence and submission to the court's jurisdiction. The BLAPL stands dismissed being not maintainable.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The judgment primarily revolves around the following legal issues:
- Whether the petitioner can apply for bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. without being in physical custody.
- Whether the presence of the petitioner through video conferencing can be considered as "custody" for the purposes of Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.
- The applicability of precedents regarding the definition and requirements of "custody" in the context of bail applications.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Whether the petitioner can apply for bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. without being in physical custody.
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. allows the High Court or Court of Session to grant bail to a person "in custody." The precedents include the cases of Niranjan Singh v. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, which discuss the interpretation of "custody."
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court emphasized that "custody" implies physical control or presence of the accused in court, coupled with submission to the court's jurisdiction. The court referred to the precedent set in Niranjan Singh, which requires physical presence for a bail application under Section 439.
- Key evidence and findings: The petitioner was not physically present in court but participated via video conferencing. The court found that this did not meet the requirement of being "in custody" as defined by existing legal precedents.
- Application of law to facts: The court applied the definition of "custody" from Niranjan Singh to the facts, concluding that the petitioner was not in custody since he was not physically present or had not surrendered to the court's jurisdiction.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The petitioner argued that his presence via video conferencing should be considered as constructive custody. The court rejected this argument, relying on the established legal interpretation of "custody."
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the petitioner's application for bail under Section 439 was not maintainable due to the lack of physical custody.
Issue 2: Whether the presence of the petitioner through video conferencing can be considered as "custody" for the purposes of Section 439 of the Cr.P.C.
- Relevant legal framework and precedents: The court referred to the case of Sundeep Kumar Bafna, which allows for surrender in the Court of Sessions or High Court, but requires physical presence for the application of bail under Section 439.
- Court's interpretation and reasoning: The court held that video conferencing does not equate to physical custody as required by the law and precedents. The court emphasized the need for physical submission to the court's jurisdiction.
- Key evidence and findings: The petitioner's remote participation did not satisfy the legal requirement of being in custody.
- Application of law to facts: The court applied the precedent from Niranjan Singh, which requires physical presence, to determine that video conferencing does not fulfill the custody requirement.
- Treatment of competing arguments: The court considered the petitioner's argument for constructive custody but found it inconsistent with the established legal interpretation.
- Conclusions: The court concluded that the petitioner's presence via video conferencing does not constitute custody under Section 439, rendering the bail application not maintainable.
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
- Preserve verbatim quotes of crucial legal reasoning: "Custody, in the context of S. 439, is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the court."
- Core principles established: The requirement of physical custody for bail applications under Section 439 is reaffirmed, emphasizing the need for physical presence and submission to the court's jurisdiction.
- Final determinations on each issue: The court determined that the petitioner's application for bail was not maintainable due to the lack of physical custody, and video conferencing does not satisfy this requirement.