Home
Forgot password New User/ Regiser ⇒ Register to get Live Demo
2023 (7) TMI 1564 - HC - Indian LawsForum shopping - Direction to preserve a sum of Rs.5 Crores in the form of an FDR in the name of SMC till the passing of the final award within two weeks of the order - Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 - scope and ambit of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 37(2) of the 1996 Act - violation of principles of natural justice. Scope and ambit of jurisdiction of this Court under Section 37(2) of the 1996 Act - HELD THAT - From a reading of the observations of the Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd. 1990 (4) TMI 280 - SUPREME COURT it is clear that an Appellate Court shall not interfere in exercise of discretion by the Court of first instance and substitute its views except where the discretion is exercised arbitrarily capriciously or where the decision impugned is perverse and Court has ignored the settled principles of law governing grant or refusal of interim orders. It is not open to re-assess the material and if the view taken by the Court below is a reasonable or a plausible view and all relevant material has been considered no interference is warranted solely on the ground that the Appellate Court may have taken a different view on the same set of facts and circumstances. In Ascot Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Connaught Plaza Restaurants Pvt. Ltd. 2018 (3) TMI 2053 - DELHI HIGH COURT this Court reiterated the above principles. In Bakshi Speedways v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation 2009 (8) TMI 1306 - DELHI HIGH COURT Court observed that the principles applicable to an appeal under Section 37(2)(b) of the 1996 Act ought to be the same as principles in an appeal against an order passed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC i.e. unless the discretion exercised by the Court against whose order the appeal is preferred is found to have been exercised perversely and contrary to law the Appellate Court ought not to interfere merely because the Appellate Court would have exercised its discretion otherwise. From a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments it is explicitly and luminously clear that while exercising power under Section 37(2)(b) the Court is required to maintain an extremely circumspect approach keeping in mind the object and purpose of the legislation and Section 5 of the 1996 Act which is a clear pointer to the legislative intent of keeping the Court s interference at the minimum. Once the scope of interference by this Court in an order passed by the learned Arbitrator under Section 17 of the 1996 Act is understood it is necessary to look at the scope of power of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 which to my mind is an issue no longer res integra. Section 17 of the 1996 Act has been specifically enacted by the legislature to provide to a party during the arbitral proceedings or after the award is made but before it is enforced a right of seeking preservation of the subject matter of the arbitration agreement and/or securing the amount in dispute in arbitration. Post the amendment of Section 17 of the 1996 Act it is in the same province as Section 9 of the Act as held by the Supreme Court in a recent decision in Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel (India) Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd. 2021 (9) TMI 731 - SUPREME COURT and bestows power on the Arbitral Tribunal to make orders of interim protection on a wider canvass. In the limited scope and confines of jurisdiction that the Court has over the interim order passed by the learned Arbitrator this Court does not find that the same warrants interference. Be it ingeminated that whether it is Section 9 or 17 of the 1996 Act the ultimate consideration applying the law laid down in Ajay Singh v. Kal Airways Private Limited and Others 2017 (7) TMI 1078 - DELHI HIGH COURT is doing complete and substantial justice between the parties. The impugned order has not resulted in grant of an order in the nature of mandatory injunction to pay any amount to SMC and nor has the learned Arbitrator directed a deposit. HHEC has only been directed to preserve the amount in the form of an FDR in the name of SMC for securing the amount being part of the subject matter of the arbitration proceedings. The learned Arbitrator has exercised a power statutorily conferred under Section 17(1)(ii)(b) and the order passed is a well-reasoned order balancing the equities between the parties. The impugned order is far from being perverse or in excess of jurisdiction and cannot be termed as a product of arbitrary exercise of discretion applying the parameters circumscribing the limited window of interference under Section 37(2) of the 1996 Act. Conclusion - The Arbitrator s order to preserve Rs.5 Crores was upheld as a valid exercise of discretion under Section 17 aimed at securing the subject matter of the dispute. Appeal dismissed.
1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDERED
The core legal questions considered in this judgment include:
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Preservation of Funds under Section 17 of the 1996 Act:
Jurisdiction under Section 37(2) of the 1996 Act:
Opportunity to Present Case and Natural Justice:
Limitation and Merits of Claims:
3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS
|