2005 (10) TMI 107 - HC - Central Excise

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) has the power to condone delay beyond 60 days.
2. Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to proceedings under the Central Excise Act.
3. Whether the High Court can condone delay in filing an appeal under its writ jurisdiction.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Power to Condon Delay Beyond 60 Days:
The primary issue in this case was whether the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) could condone delays beyond the statutory limit of 60 days. The petitioner failed to submit proof of export within the prescribed 180 days and did not file appeals within the stipulated 30 days, leading to delays of 202 and 194 days. The Appellate Authority, lacking the power to condone such delays, refused to condone them. The petitioner contended that the absence of the words "but not thereafter" in Section 35 of the Central Excise Act implied that the Appellate Authority had the power to condone delays beyond 60 days. However, the court held that the Commissioner of Central Excise has no jurisdiction to condone delays beyond 60 days in filing an appeal, as established in the case of Navinon Limited v. Union of India.

2. Applicability of the Limitation Act:
The court examined whether the provisions of the Limitation Act applied to proceedings under the Central Excise Act. The petitioner argued that the Limitation Act should apply, citing the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. However, the court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Popular Construction Co., which concluded that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is absolute and unextendable by the court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Similarly, the Central Excise Act, being a self-contained code, provides specific periods of limitation for filing returns, appeals, and revisions, excluding the applicability of the Limitation Act. The court also cited the case of Gopal Sardar v. Karuna Sardar, which reinforced that special laws could exclude the application of the Limitation Act.

3. High Court's Power to Condon Delay under Writ Jurisdiction:
The petitioner alternatively argued that the High Court could condone the delay under its writ jurisdiction as per Article 226 of the Constitution. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Company, which stated that the High Court's power under Articles 226/227 is to enforce the rule of law and cannot be invoked to direct authorities to act contrary to the law. The court emphasized that the High Court should respect the legislative intention and only interfere in exceptional cases. The court concluded that condoning the delay in this case would result in inconsistent orders, which is not permissible in law. Therefore, the court found no justification to condone the delay under its writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
The court held that the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) does not have the power to condone delays beyond 60 days. The provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply to proceedings under the Central Excise Act, as it is a self-contained code. The High Court cannot condone delays under its writ jurisdiction if it would result in inconsistent orders. Consequently, the petition was dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.