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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to applications for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. Interpretation of Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a 'special law.' 3. Conflict of opinions among various High Courts regarding the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Issue-Wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act: The primary issue in this case was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the condonation of delay, applies to applications for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appellant filed the application for special leave to appeal after the prescribed period of 60 days, arguing that the delay should be condoned under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to such applications because Section 417(4) of the Code constitutes a 'special law' within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. 2. Interpretation of Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure: The Supreme Court examined whether Section 417(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which prescribes a 60-day limitation period for filing an application for special leave to appeal, is a 'special law.' The Court concluded that Section 417(4) is indeed a 'special law' because it specifically lays down a period of limitation for a particular class of cases, distinguishing it from the general law of limitation. The Court noted that the Limitation Act is a general law, while Section 417(4) is a special provision within the Code that mandates a strict 60-day limitation period for filing such applications. Therefore, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which allows for the extension of the limitation period, does not apply to applications under Section 417(3) of the Code. 3. Conflict of Opinions Among Various High Courts: The judgment acknowledged the conflicting opinions among different High Courts on this issue. The Allahabad High Court, in the case of Mohammad Ibrahim v. Gopi Lal, had initially held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to applications under Section 417(3) of the Code. However, this view was later overruled by a Full Bench of the same court in Rajjan Lal v. State, which held that the Code was not a special law and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was applicable. Similarly, the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh and Madras had also taken the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied to such applications. On the contrary, the Bombay High Court, in Anjanabai v. Yeshwantrao Daulatrao Dudhe, held that Section 417(4) of the Code was a 'special law' and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply. The Supreme Court agreed with the view taken by the Bombay High Court and held that the provisions of Section 417(4) are a 'special law' within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Consequently, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable to applications for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code. Conclusion: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Punjab High Court, concluding that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to applications for special leave to appeal under Section 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
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