2007 (4) TMI 268 - HC - Customs

Summary

Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the order dated 14th November 1986 under the 1947 Act and its applicability to imports made in 1997 under the FTDR Act, 1992.
2. Jurisdiction under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act for confiscation of goods.
3. Whether the 1986 order constitutes "law" under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act.

Summary:

Issue 1: Validity of the 1986 Order and its Applicability under FTDR Act, 1992
- The petitioners challenged the applicability of the order dated 14th November 1986, issued under the Imports (Control) Order 1985 and the 1947 Act, to imports made in 1997 under the FTDR Act, 1992.
- The court noted that the 1947 Act was repealed by the FTDR Act, 1992, which did not contain similar provisions for prosecution or requiring a license for import.
- Section 20 of the FTDR Act saves orders made under the 1947 Act, but the court held that the 1986 order could not be enforced under the FTDR Act due to the absence of corresponding provisions making the import illegal or liable for confiscation.
- The court concluded that the action of the respondents was without jurisdiction and thus liable to be quashed.

Issue 2: Jurisdiction under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act
- The court examined whether the respondents had jurisdiction under Section 111(d) of the Customs Act to confiscate the goods.
- Section 111(d) allows confiscation of goods imported contrary to any prohibition imposed by or under the Customs Act or any other law for the time being in force.
- The court found that there was no prohibition on the import of the goods under the Customs Act or any other law in force at the time.
- The 1986 order was not considered "law" under the Customs Act, and thus, the goods could not be treated as prohibited goods.
- Consequently, the court held that the respondents did not have jurisdiction to pass the impugned order, making it illegal, null, and void.

Issue 3: Whether the 1986 Order Constitutes "Law" under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act
- The court analyzed whether the 1986 order could be considered "law" under Section 2(33) of the Customs Act, which defines "prohibited goods."
- The court referred to definitions in the General Clauses Act and concluded that "law" refers to plenary legislation or subordinate legislation, not to orders of judicial or quasi-judicial authorities.
- Therefore, the 1986 order did not qualify as "law" under Section 2(33), and the provisions of Section 111(d) of the Customs Act were not attracted.
- The court reiterated that the import of goods was not prohibited and that the respondents' order was without jurisdiction.

Conclusion:
- The court allowed the petitions, making the rule absolute in terms of prayer clause (a) in each petition.
- The impugned orders were quashed as being without jurisdiction, with no order as to costs.