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Issues:
Application under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act to refer points arising out of an appeal order. Interpretation of law regarding the burden of proof in establishing seized goods as smuggled. Scope of concurrent findings of facts in second appeal before the Tribunal. Analysis: The application before the Appellate Tribunal CEGAT, Bombay, under Section 130(1) of the Customs Act sought to refer points arising from an appeal order. The Collector of Customs required the Tribunal to refer specific points outlined in Annexure 'B' related to an appeal order. During the hearing, it was noted that the Department had relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in a similar case to argue that the initial burden of proof had been met through circumstantial evidence. The contention was whether the Tribunal could disturb concurrent findings of fact without evidence of perversity or contradiction. The Respondent argued that only questions of law, not facts, could be referred to the High Court and that the questions should arise directly from the Tribunal's order. It was emphasized that questions of law must be linked to the order served on the Collector. The Tribunal clarified that questions of law for reference should directly stem from the order under consideration, not any arbitrary legal question. Regarding the interpretation of law on the burden of proof in establishing seized goods as smuggled, it was observed that the seized goods were not subject to specific Customs Act provisions. The Department had to establish the goods were smuggled, but the authorities' conclusions were challenged as based on presumptions and not considering explanations or subsequent statements. The Tribunal found the authorities' approach flawed, especially in assuming the goods were not freely available in the market, which was incorrect during the relevant period. In discussing the scope of concurrent findings of facts in a second appeal, the Tribunal highlighted that unlike civil procedure, the Customs Act did not restrict appeals to questions of law only. While acknowledging the importance of not disturbing concurrent findings lightly, the Tribunal asserted its authority to intervene if findings were based on improper considerations, ignored crucial evidence, or misapplied the law. The Tribunal emphasized that it could not overturn findings solely because a different view was possible, but it had the power to intervene if necessary. After considering all aspects, the Tribunal found no merit in the application and subsequently rejected it. The judgment highlighted the importance of proper consideration of evidence, adherence to legal standards, and the Tribunal's authority to intervene in findings of fact if justified.
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