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2024 (8) TMI 1387 - HC - GSTAppeal dismissed on the ground that they had been filed beyond limitation - Applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in relation to the period of limitation - HELD THAT - In the case of Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors. 2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT , the Hon ble Supreme Court considered the applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act to the provisions of Section 35 of the Central Excise Act. Section 35 of the Central Excise Act provided for an appeal to be filed, before the Commissioner (Appeals), within 60 days from the date of communication, of the decision against which the appeal is being filed. The proviso to Section 35 permitted the Commissioner (Appeals), if he was satisfied that sufficient cause is made out, to permit filing of an appeal within a further period of 30 days beyond the statutory provisions of the Limitation Act. It was held that, the affected party cannot invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Though Section 29 (2) requires an express exclusion to be found in the special or local law, the Hon ble Supreme Court, in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. 2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT had held that where the language of the legislation, excluded the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, by necessary implication, any benefit under the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be claimed. In view of this ratio, it is not necessary that there should be an express exclusion of the provisions of section 4 to 24 of the limitation Act. Where a special or local law, by express statement excludes all or any of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, they cannot be applied to any proceedings under such special or local law. Where such exclusion is to deduced, by way of necessary implication, each provision would have to be considered separately and exclusion of one provision would not result in exclusion of the other provisions of section 4 to 24 of the limitation Act. In the present case, Section 107, which provides for an appeal against orders passed under the APGST Act, stipulates that (A) an appeal, under Section 107 (1), by a dealer against any order of an adjudicating authority, can be filed within three months from the date on which the order is communicated; (B) an appeal, under Section 107 (2), by an authority under the Act, against any order of an adjudicating authority, can be filed within six months from the date on which the order of the Chief Commissioner directing the filing of such an appeal is received by the said authority. The Hon ble Supreme Court, while considering similar provisions, in Union of India v. Popular Construction Co and Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors. 2007 (12) TMI 11 - SUPREME COURT had held that the restriction of the additional period, for which delay may be condoned, in the special statute, effectively excluded Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Since the period of limitation available, under Section 107 of the APGST Act, cannot be extended beyond the period stipulated therein, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would stand excluded - The appellate authority under Section 107 of the APGST Act would not have any power to condone the delay in filing an appeal, under Section 107 of the APGST Act, beyond the period of 30 days set out in Section 107 (4) of the APGST Act. Petition dismissed.
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellate authority under Section 107 of the APGST Act has the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond the additional period of one month. 2. Applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 in relation to the period of limitation set out in special or local laws. Detailed Analysis: Issue 1: Power to Condon Delay Beyond One Month Under Section 107 of the APGST Act In all these writ petitions, the petitioners challenged the dismissal of their appeals by the appellate authorities under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Service Tax Act. These appeals were dismissed as they were filed beyond the period of limitation and the additional period of one month for which the appellate authority is empowered to condone under Section 107 (4). The petitioners argued that Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 permits the appellate authority to condone the delay beyond the period provided under Section 107 (2) or (3). However, the court concluded that the appellate authority under Section 107 of the APGST Act does not have the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period of 30 days set out in Section 107 (4). Issue 2: Applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 The court examined the applicability of Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which states that the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply to any special or local law unless they are expressly excluded. The court reviewed several judgments including Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. vs. Madan Lal Das & Sons, and Singh Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, which discussed the implied exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court noted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that where the language of the legislation excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act by necessary implication, any benefit under the provisions of the Limitation Act cannot be claimed. The court further analyzed the language of Section 107 of the APGST Act, which provides for an appeal to be filed within three months or six months, and the appellate authority may condone a delay of one month beyond these periods. The court concluded that the restriction of the additional period for which delay may be condoned effectively excluded Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Conclusion: The court held that the appellate authority under Section 107 of the APGST Act does not have the power to condone the delay in filing an appeal beyond the period of 30 days set out in Section 107 (4). Consequently, the writ petitions were dismissed, and there was no order as to costs. The court appreciated the assistance extended by the learned counsels and closed any pending miscellaneous applications.
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