1992 (8) TMI 168 - HC - Customs

Summary

Issues Involved:

1. Whether the fabric imported by the petitioners falls within the category of goods described as "artificial fur cloth."
2. Interpretation of the item "artificial fur cloth" under the Import and Export Policy for April 1985 - March 1988.
3. The eligibility of the petitioners to import "artificial fur cloth" under the REP licence.
4. Determination of whether the goods imported by the petitioners are artificial fur cloth or velvet.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Whether the fabric imported by the petitioners falls within the category of goods described as "artificial fur cloth":

The primary issue in this batch of writ petitions is to determine if the fabric imported by the petitioners qualifies as "artificial fur cloth," which is permissible for import against REP licence under para 5 of Appendix 17 read with serial D. 2.2 (f) (vi) of the Import and Export Policy for April 1985 - March 1988. The petitioners imported fabrics described as 'artificial fur cloth' under the provisions of Appendix 17 of the Import and Export Policy, April 1985 - March 1988, using a REP licence transferred to them. The respondents did not clear these goods, asserting that the imported goods were velvet, not artificial fur cloth, and thus not allowed under a REP licence.

2. Interpretation of the item "artificial fur cloth" under the Import and Export Policy for April 1985 - March 1988:

The court examined the provisions of the Import and Export Policy 1985-1988, particularly Appendix 17, which lists materials allowed for import against each export product. Para 5 of Appendix 17 prohibits the import of items listed in Appendix 2, except if specifically described for import under column 4 of Appendix 17. Item (f)(vi) in column 4 allows the import of "Artificial fur cloth." The court needed to interpret whether the imported goods met this description.

3. The eligibility of the petitioners to import "artificial fur cloth" under the REP licence:

There was no dispute regarding the petitioners' eligibility to import "artificial fur cloth." The core issue was whether the imported goods were indeed artificial fur cloth. The petitioners argued that the goods were described as artificial fur cloth in the Bill of Entry and that similar goods had been cleared by the respondents in the past. The respondents, however, contended that the imported goods were velvet, supported by a report from the Chemical Examiner, Customs, which described the sample as a woven pile fabric with short acrylic piles, blended spun yarns of polyester and viscose.

4. Determination of whether the goods imported by the petitioners are artificial fur cloth or velvet:

The court analyzed various definitions from Fairchild's Dictionary of Textiles and the Encyclopaedia of Textiles to distinguish between artificial fur cloth and velvet. Artificial fur cloth, also known as fur-like fabrics or fake furs, is defined as fabrics made in imitation of various furs with a long pile. Velvet, on the other hand, is an all-cotton fabric with a short, dense pile. The court concluded that the fabric imported by the petitioners did not resemble artificial fur cloth but was instead velvet. The court also referenced the Brussels Technical Nomenclature (BTN) which describes artificial fur fabrics as deep pile or long pile fabrics imitating furskins.

The court observed that the fabric in question did not resemble fur cloth or imitate animal fur and thus could not be classified as artificial fur cloth. The court also dismissed the petitioners' reliance on a previous decision where velvet was considered as artificial fur cloth, stating that artificial fur cloth must resemble or imitate animal fur.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the fabric imported by the petitioners was not artificial fur cloth and upheld the respondents' decision to refuse clearance of the goods under the REP Licence. The petitions were dismissed, and the respondents were allowed to adjudicate the claims and realize lawful duties. The bank guarantees and bonds furnished by the petitioners were to remain in effect until adjudication was completed.