1969 (10) TMI 21 - HC - Income Tax

Notice issued by Income-tax Officer under section 148 of the Income-tax Act 1961 - assessee claim that he had bona fide belief that he is not liable to capital gains tax is not relevant - ITO was justified in invoking section 147 -

Issues Involved:

1. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.
2. Obligation of the assessee to disclose particulars in Part VII of the return.
3. Whether the failure to fill in Part VII constitutes non-disclosure of material facts.
4. The legal consequences of the assessee's belief regarding capital gains.
5. The relevance of subsequent disclosures made during assessment proceedings or under different statutes.

Issue-wise Detailed Analysis:

1. Jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961:

The court examined whether the conditions precedent to the exercise of power under section 147(a) were satisfied. It was established that a notice under section 147(a) could only be issued if there was a failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. The court concluded that the Income-tax Officer had prima facie reasons to issue the notice, as the respondent had failed to fill in Part VII of the return, which could be considered non-disclosure of material facts.

2. Obligation of the assessee to disclose particulars in Part VII of the return:

The court analyzed whether the petitioner was under any legal obligation to disclose the particulars specified in Part VII of the return. It was held that the particulars required by Part VII, such as details of capital gains, were material for the assessment of income-tax. The court referred to various cases, emphasizing that an incomplete return could lead to action under section 147(a) for failing to disclose all material facts.

3. Whether the failure to fill in Part VII constitutes non-disclosure of material facts:

The court rejected the respondent's plea that there was no legal obligation to fill in Part VII if the assessee believed no capital gain was involved. It was noted that the duty of the assessee was to disclose all primary facts, and the Income-tax Officer was responsible for making inferences from those facts. The court concluded that the failure to fill in Part VII could be prima facie evidence of non-disclosure of material facts, giving jurisdiction to the Income-tax Officer to issue the notice.

4. The legal consequences of the assessee's belief regarding capital gains:

The court dismissed the argument that the assessee's bona fide belief that no capital gain was involved exempted him from the obligation to fill in Part VII. It was emphasized that the non-disclosure need not be willful or deliberate to give jurisdiction to the officer under section 34. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Calcutta Discount Co. v. Income-tax Officer, which held that the duty of the assessee was to disclose all primary facts, and the officer's jurisdiction was based on prima facie grounds of non-disclosure.

5. The relevance of subsequent disclosures made during assessment proceedings or under different statutes:

The court addressed the respondent's plea that he had disclosed the particulars during the assessment proceeding or under the Wealth-tax Act. It was held that the jurisdiction of the Income-tax Officer to issue a notice under section 147 arose immediately after the omission to file the return or the failure to disclose all material facts therein. Subsequent disclosures did not negate the officer's jurisdiction. The court cited several cases, including Balchand v. Income-tax Officer Sagar and Kantamani Venkata Narayana and Sons v. First Addl. Income-tax Officer, to support this conclusion.

Conclusion:

The court concluded that the Income-tax Officer had jurisdiction to issue the impugned notice under section 147(a) of the Act. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the court below was set aside, discharging the rule. The court made no order as to costs and stayed the operation of the judgment for eight weeks.

← Previous Next →