1993 (8) TMI 190 - AT - Central Excise

Summary

Issues:
1. Whether filing a refund claim with the Superintendent of Central Excise for onward presentation to the Assistant Collector, which is received after the prescribed time, is time-barred or not?
2. Whether there can be an estoppel against a statute requiring the refund claim to be filed directly with the Assistant Collector and not through the Superintendent of Central Excise?

Analysis:

Issue 1:
The Collector of Central Excise rejected a refund claim as time-barred because it was received by the Assistant Collector after the stipulated period. However, the Tribunal held that since the claim was filed with the Superintendent within the time limit and the delay in reaching the Assistant Collector was due to the Superintendent's failure, the rejection was unjustified. The Tribunal directed the Assistant Collector to consider the claim on its merits.

Issue 2:
The legal representative argued that as per Section 11B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, a refund claim must be filed directly with the Assistant Collector. Any deviation from this statutory provision could result in the claim being rejected as time-barred. The representative referred to a previous decision by the Tribunal, which supported this interpretation. However, the Tribunal noted that subsequent decisions contradicted this view, emphasizing that procedural irregularities should not jeopardize substantive rights unless they affect vested rights. The Tribunal cited various cases supporting its stance, including Roza Sugar Works v. Collector of Central Excise and Collector of Central Excise v. H.R. Sugar Factory, to justify its decision to reject the application for reference.

In conclusion, the Tribunal rejected the application seeking reference on the formulated issues, stating that the decision to reject the refund claim as time-barred was not in line with the statutory provisions. The Tribunal emphasized that subsequent case law developments supported its interpretation, and there was no valid reason to refer the issues to the High Court under Section 35G of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. The Tribunal also clarified that the statute only required "making an application" and did not specify "filing before," making the filing process a procedural matter.