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Issues Involved:
1. Applicability of Section 12, Limitation Act, to appeals under Section 202, Companies Act. 2. Applicability of Section 12, Limitation Act, to appeals under the Letters Patent. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Applicability of Section 12, Limitation Act, to Appeals under Section 202, Companies Act: The case arose from an appeal filed by the Punjab Co-operative Bank Ltd. against orders passed by a Single Bench of the High Court in the winding-up proceedings of the Punjab Cotton Press Co., Ltd. The appeal was filed under Clause 10, Letters Patent, read with Section 202, Companies Act. The primary question was whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act, which allows the exclusion of the "time requisite" for obtaining copies of judgments, applied to such appeals. The court noted that Section 202 of the Companies Act allows appeals from orders in winding-up proceedings in the same manner and under the same conditions as appeals from orders of the same Court in its ordinary jurisdiction. The limitation for such appeals is 20 days as per Article 151, Limitation Act, which is subject to Section 12. Section 12(2) states that in computing the period of limitation, the day of judgment and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment shall be excluded. The court referenced the Privy Council decision in J. N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar Firm, which clarified that the time requisite for obtaining copies should be excluded even if the rules do not require filing copies with the memorandum of appeal. The Full Bench decision in Jog Dhian v. Hussain, which held otherwise, was deemed incorrect. The court concluded that Section 12 applies, and the appellant is entitled to exclude the time taken to obtain copies, making the appeal within time. 2. Applicability of Section 12, Limitation Act, to Appeals under the Letters Patent: This issue involved determining whether Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to appeals under the Letters Patent, where both the forum and the right of appeal are provided by the Letters Patent. The court identified two classes of cases: (a) appeals from judgments passed in the exercise of the High Court's extraordinary original civil jurisdiction, and (b) appeals from judgments passed in the High Court's appellate jurisdiction. For class (a) cases, the court held that Article 151, Limitation Act, applies, and thus Section 12 applies, allowing the exclusion of the time requisite for obtaining copies. For class (b) cases, the court addressed the contention that the Letters Patent and rules framed thereunder do not constitute a "special law" under Section 29, Limitation Act. The court disagreed, stating that the Letters Patent and the rules are statutory rules with the same binding force as legislative enactments. They constitute a "special law" within the meaning of Section 29, making Section 12 applicable to appeals under Clause 10, Letters Patent. Consequently, the time requisite for obtaining copies must be excluded. The court concluded that the decision in Jog Dhian v. Hussain was incorrect and answered both questions in the affirmative, returning the case to the Division Bench for further consideration. Separate Judgments: All judges (Dalip Singh, Bhide, Blacker, and Sale, JJ.) concurred with the judgment delivered by Tek Chand, J.
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