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Issues Involved:
1. Authority of agents to sell property. 2. Abandonment of specific performance rights by the plaintiff. 3. Limitation period for filing the suit for specific performance. Issue-wise Detailed Analysis: 1. Authority of Agents to Sell Property: The appellant contended that the contract (Exhibit Q) was beyond the powers of Natesa Iyer and Seetharama Iyer, who were authorized to sell the property by resolutions Exhibits IA and IB. The argument was that the sale should have been for ready cash, but Exhibit Q involved deferred payment. The court analyzed the resolutions and found that the authority to sell did not restrict the sale to immediate cash payment. The definition of sale under the Transfer of Property Act includes sales for a price paid or promised. The court concluded that the agents acted within their authority, and the deferred payment did not invalidate the contract. 2. Abandonment of Specific Performance Rights by the Plaintiff: The appellant argued that the plaintiff abandoned his right to specific performance by his conduct, particularly through the notice (Exhibit X) where he demanded the return of the advance payment and damages. However, the court noted that Exhibit X also mentioned the plaintiff's willingness to proceed with the sale if a clean title was provided. The court found that the plaintiff did not abandon his rights but rather sought to ensure a clean title. The plaintiff's actions, including the subsequent application to restore the company to the register, indicated his continued interest in specific performance. 3. Limitation Period for Filing the Suit for Specific Performance: The appellant contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff sought to exclude the period of pendency of Company Petition No. 16/1114 under section 14 of the Limitation Act. The court agreed with the plaintiff, noting that he was diligently prosecuting his claim in the petition, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court also found that the contract became one without a fixed time for performance due to the peculiar circumstances, and there was no evidence of refusal of performance by the company. Thus, the suit was within the limitation period. Separate Judgments: The court dismissed A.S. 286/22, affirming the decree for specific performance in favor of the plaintiff and awarding costs. The court allowed the memorandum of objections regarding costs in the court below, finding no reason to deprive the successful plaintiff of his costs. In A.S. 285/1122, the court found the second suit unnecessary as the rights of the parties could be adjusted in the first suit. The court allowed the appeal, dismissed the second suit, and directed the company to pay costs to the appellant and both defendants. The court also directed the appellant to pay the court fee due to the State and dismissed the memorandum of cross-objection filed by the 1st respondent company.
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