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Benami Property - Case Laws
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2008 (8) TMI 976 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... qually efficacious relief of protecting the estate of the deceased by applying to the probate court under Part VII, chapter XXIII of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. It has been held in Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank 1983 3SCR962 that the relief of permanent injunction is barred by the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief act. 11. In view of the findings aforesaid, the plaint is rejected/dismissed for the reason of not disclosing any cause of action and/or for the reason of the relief of declaration being premature and/or the plaintiff being not entitled to the same on the date of the institution of the suit and further on the ground of the relief of declaration claimed in the plaint being barred by law i.e., Section 16 of the CPC and the relief of permanent injunction claimed in the plaint being barred by the provisions of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. However, in the facts of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.
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2008 (8) TMI 914 - ITAT JAIPUR
Benamidar and commission income in bogus billing - introducer/facilitator for bogus billing and the owners of the primary and secondary concerns were not benamidars - search and seizure operations - statements recorded of the benamidars u/s 131 - trading additions - books of account not produced for verification of the results shown in the final accounts - Unexplained investment and commission earned in share transactions - Addition made by the AO on account of Jewellery - Unexplained cash - Advertisement expenses.
HELD THAT:- We find that the learned CIT(A) has made elaborate findings in his order for asst. yr. 1998-99, after discussing and considering all the facts of the case and statements of alleged benamidar recorded during the course of search and after the search, statements recorded by the customs authorities, returns filed by alleged benamidars, assets owned by the alleged benamidars, operations in bank account/demat account by the alleged benamidar before and after the search and filing of the returns before and after the search by alleged benamidar and various case laws and we fully agree with these and uphold the findings of learned CIT(A) that the contemporary evidence which are in the form of statement recorded by search party u/s 132(4)/131 and statements recorded under the customs authorities clearly speak that the alleged benamidars were acting for themselves. No corroborative evidence was brought on record to prove that the business concerns belonging to these alleged benamidars were funded, managed and controlled by the assessee or his associates and they are the beneficial owner of these concerns.
Thus, we are of the view that there was no sufficient material or evidence before the AO to come to the conclusion that Shri Umesh Saboo, Shri O.P. Ghiya, Shri Mahesh Sharma, Shri Mohan Prakash Sharma, Naman Gems (P) Ltd., Shri Gauri Shanker Pareek, Shri Mahesh Khandelwal, and Shri Raghuvar Dayal Pareek were benamidar of the assessee and his partners, Manmohan Krishna Bagla and Shri Ramesh Chand Maheshwari and the assessee and his partners cannot be held as involved in any manner in the business of these persons.
Therefore, the AO was not justified in making addition on account of commission from issue of bogus purchase bills by holding that the above named persons/concerns were benamidar of assessee and his partners. We thus, while setting aside adverse findings of the lower authorities in this regard, direct the AO to delete the addition of ₹ 51,649 in asst. yr. 1998-99, ₹ 86,832 in asst. yr. 1999-2000, ₹ 1,98,377 in asst. yr. 2000-01, ₹ 2,40,710 in asst. yr. 2001-02, ₹ 2,75,081 in asst. yr. 2002-03, ₹ 5,41,152 in asst. yr. 2003-04, and ₹ 2,15,807 in asst. yr. 2004-05 sustained by learned CIT(A) because there is no material to hold that the assessee and his partners, Shri Manmohan Krishna Bagla and Shri Ramesh Chand Maheshwari might have acted as introducer/facilitator for bogus billing.
In the result ground Nos. 1 to 5 of the appeal filed by the Revenue are dismissed and ground No. 2 of the appeal filed by assessee is allowed.
Trading addition - AO rejected the books of account and applied the provisions of s. 145(3) and estimated the profit - We find substance in the contention of the learned Authorised Representative. We find that the Department has carried out search operations and no material was found to show that the assessee has suppressed the profit or sales. The AO estimated the profit without having any material. The AO has not cited any comparable case. Even if the books of account are rejected, the estimation of profit should be made on some basis. Therefore, in the circumstances and facts of the case, the AO is not justified in making trading addition. The learned CIT(A) under these circumstances in our view has rightly deleted the addition of ₹ 67,353 in asst. yr. 1998-99, ₹ 20,000 in asst. yr. 1999-2000, ₹ 1,57,704 in asst. yr. 2000-01 R ₹ 49,874 in asst. yr. 2001-02 and ₹ 2,82,533 in asst. yr. 2002-03 and we uphold the findings made by learned CIT(A) in this regard.
In the result ground No. 6 of the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
Unexplained investment and commission earned in share transactions - We agree with and uphold the findings of learned CIT(A) that the share transactions in the shares of Gaytri Shakti Papers & Boards Ltd. is an accommodation entry and the real beneficiary in the share transactions is Agarwal family. We uphold the findings of learned CIT(A) that S/Shri Rakesh R. Purohit, Manmohan Krishna Bagla and Ramesh Maheshwari neither control the acquirer of the shares nor they are their agents because the Revenue has no any positive evidence to show that money received against the sale of share was transferred or given to S/Shri Rakesh R. Purohit, Manmohan Krishna Bagla and Ramesh Maheshwari and there is nothing on record to suggest that money relating to these share transaction have flowed from S/Shri Rakesh R. Purohit, Manmohan Krishna Bagla and Ramesh Maheshwari or the shares of these companies were transferred to the above named persons or any benefit has been accrued to these person.
In the result ground No. 6 of the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
Addition made by the AO on account of Jewellery - whether the jewellery found at the time of search is explained or not - AO has not led any iota of evidence to prove that Smt. Ram Janki might have given her jewellery to someone else. The AO merely disbelieved the explanation given by the assessee. Hon'ble Justice Hidayatullah of the Supreme Court in the case of Sreelekha Banerjee vs. CIT [1963 (3) TMI 47 - SUPREME COURT], observed that the IT Department cannot by merely rejecting unreasonably a good explanation, convert good "proof into no proof". Further, overall jewellery declared in the WT return should be taken into account while deciding whether the jewellery found at the time of search is explained or not. We are of the view that the jewellery disclosed in past cannot be lost sight in view of non-availability of item-wise tally.
Further the claim of the assessee for 4,000 gms. silver items as ancestral is very reasonable. Therefore, the AO was not justified in making addition on account of the jewellery and silver articles explained by the assessee as belonging to his late mother Smt. Ram Janki and learned CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition.
Jewellery of 502.160 gms. and 498.400 gms - It is undisputed fact that the jewellery weighing 335.504 gms. (net) was found from the bedroom of Smt. Sweta Purohit and jewellery of 382.00 gms. (net) was found from the locker of Smt. Sweta Purohit and the jewellery of 414.032 (net) gms. was found from the possession of Smt. Mandakani Purohit. Thus, the search party found jewellery weighing 1131.536 gms. from the possession of these two ladies. We also agree with the learned Authorised Representative that jewellery to the extent of 500 gms. should be treated as reasonable holding in the case of each married lady. Therefore, in the circumstances and facts of the case, the AO was not justified in making addition on account of the jewellery explained by the assessee as belonging to his daughters-in-law, Smt. Mandakani Purohit and Smt. Sweta Purohit and learned CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition.
In the result, ground No. 9 of the appeal filed by the Revenue is dismissed.
Unexplained cash - AO has not rejected the books of account including the cash book hence the balance shown in the cash book have been rightly treated by the learned CIT(A) as correct. Therefore, the AO was not justified in making addition on account of unexplained cash and learned CIT(A) has rightly deleted the addition.
Ground No. 10 of the appeal filed by the Revenue is thus dismissed.
Advertisement expenses - The explanation of the assessee that due to slump in the market, the assessee could not obtain the orders, the business of the assessee was not closed but he could not obtain the profit making orders and the assessee remained busy in attending the office of Dy. Director of IT and other authorities due to search during the year and the business of the assessee remained unattended and the clients shifted to other parties cannot be brushed aside without giving any adverse material against the assessee. For other expenses like car petrol, car insurance, interest on car loan, depreciation on car, we find the disallowance is at higher side. We thus, while setting aside orders of the lower authorities in this regard, direct the AO to restrict the disallowance upto 10 per cent of the total expenses as against the disallowance under these heads made by the AO.
In the result ground No. 3 of the appeal filed by the assessee and ground Nos. 6, 7 and 8 of the appeal filed by the Revenue are dismissed.
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2008 (1) TMI 984 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the time begins to to run for seeking the appropriate relief. The plaintiffs had categorically averred that their rights and title was admitted by the defendant no. 1 till the publication of the notice in the Statesman on 22.07.2006, and it was only thereafter that the cause of action for seeking a declaration commenced. I find that none of the cases referred on behalf of the defendant deal with a fact situation where the property in question is alleged to be co- parcenary property and issue/relief is only for declaration of a share by a co- parcener. This matter also therefore cannot be decided without leading of evidence. The plaintiff have already filed a separate suit being CS(OS) No. 1791/2006 to challenge the title of the transferees from defendant No. 1. 32. Consequently, in my view the suit cannot be said to be barred either under the Benami Act or the Limitation Act at this stage without a trial. This application is therefore dismissed with costs of ₹ 20,000/-.
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2007 (4) TMI 757 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... hat stopping the construction of the hotel would not be appropriate and the passing of a blanket injunction restraining the Defendants from alienating or transferring the property would cause hindrance in the completion of the project since, for a project of the magnitude involved it may become necessary for the Fifth Defendant to create encumbrances on the property. The directions issued by the Learned Single Judge would adequately secure the rights of the parties during the pendency of the suit. 41. As already noted earlier, a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan and Mr.Justice S.J. Vazifdar has by orders dated 15th November 2006 and 20th December 2006 imposed sanctions on the Defendants for breach of the interim order dated 25th October 2005. The effect of the directions contained in the order of the Division Bench has to continue upon the disposal of the appeal, pending the disposal of the suit. 42. The Appeals shall accordingly stand dismissed.
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2007 (4) TMI 752 - SUPREME COURT
Benami Transactions or not - Suit for Partition - Claiming 3/7th share of the property - Onus of proof - family dispute - inheritance - Power-of attorney executed before a Magistrate at Rangoon - Dr. Ghosh was an attesting witness therein - Interestingly, Suprovabala described herself as daughter of Babu Rangalal Ghosh and not the wife of Dr. Ghosh therein - registered indenture was executed by the Administrator General of Bengal to the estate of Edwin St. Clair Vallentine in favour of Suprovabala for a sum - during the life time of Dr. Ghosh, the name of Suprovabala was mutated - The learned trial Judge that, it is not to be a case of benami transaction.
HELD THAT:- The fact that Amal allowed the order of mutation to attain finality, thus, would also be a pointer to suggest that despite such bitter relationship between the parties he accepted the same ; more so, when mutation of one's name in the Municipal Corporation confers upon him a variety of rights and obligations. He had rights and obligations in relation thereto because, according to him, in relation to the said property vis-a-vis Calcutta Municipal Corporation, he was residing with his wife, he allegedly inducted tenants and had been realizing rent from them.
We have seen hereinbefore that the Appellant examined herself as a witness. The wife of Amal even did not do so. An adverse inference should be drawn against her.
Daughter of Respondent No. 1 (Respondent No. 2) who was born in 1954 examined herself as DW-1. She evidently had no knowledge about the transaction. She could not have any. At least it was expected that Respondent No. 1 might have gathered some knowledge keeping in view the conduct of her husband vis-a-vis the sisters in relation to the property. Even otherwise, she was a party to the suit. No evidence, worth the name, therefore, had been adduced on behalf of Respondent No. 1.
Interestingly, Amal pleaded ouster. If ouster is to be pleaded, the title has to be acknowledged. Once such a plea is taken, irrespective of the fact that as to whether any other plea is raised or not, conduct of the parties would be material. If, therefore, plea of ouster is not established, a' fortiori the title of other co-sharers must be held to have been accepted.
P.W. 4 Chandi Charan Ghosh is a common relation. According to him, Dr. Ghosh acknowledged the title of his wife before him. We may not rely on his evidence in its entirety but we intend to emphasise that at least some evidence has been adduced on behalf of the Appellant whereas no evidence, worth the name, has been adduced on behalf of the Defendants-Respondents. D.W. 1, as noticed hereinbefore, having born in 1954, could not have any personal knowledge either in regard to the transaction or in regard to the management of the property by Suprovabala whatsoever. She was even only four years old when the name of all co-sharers was mutated in the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation. She, however, admitted that there are two other houses standing in the name of Dr. Ghosh. She even could not say anything about the power-of-attorney. She accepted that the suit house was in the name of Suprovabala till 1958. She accepted that her father objected to the mutation but the same was granted and no further step had been taken. Although she claimed that she had been looking after the affairs, she could not give any details about the purported litigations as against the tenants initiated by her father.
Burden of proof as regards the benami nature of transaction was also on the Respondent. This aspect of the matter has been considered by this Court in Valliammal (D.) by L.Rs. v. Subramaniam and Ors.[2004 (8) TMI 725 - SUPREME COURT].
It is well-settled that intention of the parties is the essence of the benami transaction and the money must have been provided by the party invoking the doctrine of benami. The evidence shows clearly that the original Plaintiff did not have any justification for purchasing the property in the name of Ramayee Ammal. The reason given by him is not at all acceptable. The source of money is not at all traceable to the Plaintiff. No person named in the plaint or anyone else was examined as a witness. The failure of the Plaintiff to examine the relevant witnesses completely demolishes his case.
Thus, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. The judgment of the trial court is restored. The appeal is allowed.
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2006 (1) TMI 663 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... y fatal to the relief of partition. In my view, absolutely no question of law, nevertheless a substantial question of law, is involved in the matter and the judgment of the first Appellate Court in coming to a conclusion as if it is not proved that the plaintiff has taken a "Kasu Malai" from the first defendant and therefore, non-inclusion of "Kasu Malai" in the schedule will not affect the relief claimed in the suit is not sustainable. What is important is whether such a property should be included for partition when once it has come to the knowledge of the parties that the said property is available and it is not material as to whether the same is in possession of the plaintiff or the defendant. Therefore, the judgment and decree of the first Appellate Court is liable to be set aside and the decree and judgment of the trial court is confirmed. Consequently, the second appeal is dismissed as absolutely no question of law involved in this matter. No costs.
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2005 (9) TMI 684 - PATNA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... the evidence adduced by the parties at the time of final hearing of the suit and these are not matters which can be decided at the initial stage either under Order VII Rule 11 or under Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code. In any view of the matter, it is yet to be proved in the instant case by valid evidence that whether the ingredients of benami transactions were present and the property in question was purchased benami and that at the time of the said purchase in 1956 and 1965 what was the intention of the buyers actual or name-lender. These issues can be decided only after considering the merits of the respective claims of the parties on the basis of their evidence and specific provisions of law. Hence, only on the basis of Section 4 of the Act the entire suit can not be allowed to fall at this preliminary stage. 20. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I do not find any jurisdictional error in the impugned order and accordingly this Civil Revision is dismissed.
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2004 (9) TMI 383 - SUPREME COURT
Appointment and functions of custodian - Transfers - Held that:- Appeal allowed. We are concerned with a right of a party to possess the property over which it has a lawful title. In such a situation, Benami Transactions Act will have no application in allocation of shares as the same would not come within the purview of transaction relating to a transfer of property. Transfer of CANCIGO in favour of the Appellant was, thus, valid and legal as by reason of the transfer of possession of the CANCIGOs by respondent No. 2 in favour of the Appellant, a valid right has been created therein, the same could not have been attached in terms of section 3(3) of the said Act.
The Custodian thought it expedient not to invoke the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the said Act. He was at liberty to do so. Even now he is free to do so, if so advised.
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2003 (4) TMI 587 - PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... n 100A of 2002 Act would become operational. In other words, Section 100A of 2002 Act would not affect the accrued right of appeal vested in a suitor who has actually filed the appeal before 1.7.2002 but those who are yet to file the appeal on or after 1.7.2002 would not be entitled to maintain the same. 19. In view of the above discussion, our answer to question No. 1 is in the negative and it is held that no letters patent appeal would lie against the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge arising from an original, appellate decree or an order. Our answer to the second question is that the letters patent appeals filed before 1.7.2002 would not be dealt with and decided by applying the provisions of Section 100A of 2002 Act. Having answered the reference on two significant questions, the case be listed before the Letters Patent Bench for deciding the same on merits because the instant letters patent appeal has been held to be maintainable. Order accordingly.
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2002 (11) TMI 802 - CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... find anything to rebut the statutory presumption. Therefore, even if we find that the purchase was funded by her husband or the construction was made out of the sources received from the husband, still by reason of section 3(2) of 1988 Act, it is to be presumed that it was done by the husband for the benefit of the wife, the defendant No. 1. Conclusion 6. For all these reasons, we are unable to agree with the conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Court. In our view, the plaintiff has not been able to prove his case that the transaction was a benami one. Therefore, he is not entitled to any relief in this suit. ORDER 7. In the result, the appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and decree dated 6th January, 1993 passed by the learned Judge, City Civil Court, 6th Bench in Title Suit No. 2358 of 1981 is hereby set aside. The Title Suit No. 2358 of 1981 is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. J. Banerjee, J. - I agree. Appeal succeeds.
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2002 (8) TMI 878 - DELHI HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... d/ or that it was the son (Defendant No. 3) who by transgressing directions purchased the property in his own name. 20. Thus the contention of learned counsel for the defendant, that on the averments as made by the plaintiff/applicant himself in his application seeking amendment, the transaction is clearly a "benami" transaction, and therefore legal proceedings are prohibited in relation to such a transaction, are clearly hit by the prohibition of the Benami Act. 21. Resultantly, the amendment as proposed, cannot be allowed on account of the legal bar arising from the provisions of the Benami Transactions Act 1988, when applied to the averments of the plaintiff in the amendment application in question. 22. The same view as of the Himachal Pradesh High Court, is also reflected in AIR 71 J & K 81 reported as Sant Ram v. Abdul Haq; 1976 (78) PLR 424 reported as Sohan Lal Mehta v. Shiv Das Mehta. 23. The application for amendment is accordingly dismissed with costs.
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2002 (8) TMI 35 - RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Benami Assessment - Business Run By Minor Son Of Assessee - "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Tribunal was right in holding that the business in the name and style of Rawat Electricals at Ramganjmandi belonged to Shri Gulzarilal Rawat and not to Shri Suresh Kumar Rawat? - Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the learned Tribunal was right in holding that the amount of ₹ 8,000 was not an investment made by Shri Suresh Kumar Rawat in the concern of Rawat Electricals at Ramganjmandi and was made by his father Gulzarilal?" - Normally, in the reference, this court does not interfere in the finding of the Tribunal but the finding of the Tribunal as to whether Rawat Electricals, Ramganjmandi, is independent or benami property of Shri Gulzari Lal Rawat appears to be perverse. In such circumstances, this court should interfere. In our view with the above admitted facts, it cannot be said that the business of Rawat Electricals, Ramganjmandi, is the business of the assessee, Shri Gulzari Lal Rawat. The Tribunal has committed error - we answer both the questions in the negative, i.e., in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
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2001 (8) TMI 1443 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... iled by the petitioners to notice Annexure-G after giving an opportunity to the petitioners. (iii) The petitioners are reserved liberty to file additional statement, if any, and also produce such documents which they may intend to rely upon in support of their claim. (iv) The Appellate Authority is directed to reconsider the matter and take fresh decision in the matter as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 12. Since there has been an interim order operating in favour of the petitioners granted in these petitions and also in the earlier writ petition, I am of the view that it is just and proper to direct the respondents not to take any coercive steps to recover the amount assessed in terms of notice Annexure-A, dated 6th March, 2000, till the matter is reconsidered by the Appellate Authority, as directed above. 13. In terms stated above, this petition is allowed and disposed of.
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2000 (7) TMI 983 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... ly restoring the possession was not only consequential order to the order without contest, so any claim if at all stood satisfied prior to the Act coming into force. In any case it cannot be construed to be a claim or action taken after Act came into force. Passing an order under Order 21, Rule 35 is an act of the court, it is not an act by way of action or claim made by the appellant What is barred in making claim or action by the original owner. The appellant is the owner and he has not made any such claim. The claim if at all was making application under Section 144 which was prior to the Act, which would be deemed to be pending when Act came into force. Hence all these reasons the submissions on behalf of the respondents, have no force. No bar to these proceedings would be said by virtue of Section 4 of the Act. o p /o p Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned revisional order dated 12th October, 1988 of the High Court. Costs on the parties. o p /o p
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2000 (7) TMI 66 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the provisions of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recover Property) Ordinance, 1988, which has been replaced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988, will apply to execution proceedings arising out of the proceeding under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, initiated by the transferee from the heiress of the real owner against the benamidar?
Held that:- High Court fell into error in interpreting section 4 to be retrospective in operation. In fact the word "claim" means something on which a right is sought to be enforced for which there is a denial. In the present case, we find, when possession was ordered, allowing the application under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code, on March 4, 1988, there was no contest by the respondent. Thus, when the order is passed under Order 21, rule 35, formally restoring the possession it was not only consequential order to the order without contest, so any claim if at all stood satisfied prior to the Act coming into force. In any case it cannot be construed to be a claim or action taken after the Act came into force. Passing an order under Order 21, rule 35, is an act of the court, it is not an act by way of action or claim made by the appellant. What is barred is the making of a claim or action by the original owner. The appellant is the owner and he has not made any such claim. The claim if at all was making application under section 144 which was prior to the Act, which would be deemed to be pending when the Act came into force. Hence, all these reasons and submissions on behalf of the respondents, have no force. No bar to these proceedings would be said by virtue of section 4 of the Act. Appeal allowed.
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2000 (5) TMI 1042 - SUPREME COURT
Whether the suit of the appellant was rightly decreed by the First Appellate Court or not?
Held that:- Having perused the order of the High Court dated 20th April, 1994 and the record of the case we find no infirmity in the view expressed by the High Court. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has re- appreciated the evidence as if it was deciding the first appeal. Though the High Court has observed that findings arrived at by the First Appellate Court are not based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record and the same are set aside but for all intents and purposes and in substance the conclusion of the High Court is that the decision of the First Appellate Court is based on no evidence and is perverse. We are in complete agreement with the conclusions of the High Court. The High Court has rightly drawn adverse inference on account of nonexamination of respondent no.4 as a witness by the appellant. On the facts and circumstances of the case that was vital and was rather the heart of the entire matter going to the root of the whole case. There was no explanation for non-examination of respondent no.4. Clearly, the decree of the First Appellate Court is based on no evidence and is perverse.
The appellant had admittedly knowledge of the eviction petition filed by respondent no.1 against his brother respondent no.1. On the facts of the case, it was over simplification for the First Appellate Court to observe that what transpired between the appellant and his brother was of no consequence in so far as the appellant is concerned. It is evident that the appellant was set-up by his brother after having lost in the eviction petition upto High Court and the suit was filed in the year 1976 during the pendency of the execution proceedings of the eviction order. We fail to understand what appellant was doing from 1968 upto 1976. The net result of all this has been that despite lapse of nearly 30 years since filing of the eviction petition, respondent no.1 was unable to recover the possession and that is despite the respondent no.1 having succeeded up to High Court in the eviction case nearly a quarter century ago. For the aforesaid reasons we dismiss the appeal with costs.
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1999 (4) TMI 647 - SUPREME COURT
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... ... ..... two fact finding courts. Shri S.S. Khanduja, learned counsel for the respondent lastly pleaded that if ultimately the respondent is found to be the transferee under the Ext. P.11-sale deed the case may be remitted to the High Court for considering the question whether appellant's claim for eviction on the ground that he needs the building for his own use in bona fide. Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned senior counsel pointed out that there is concurrent finding by two courts on that aspect. We have noticed that the High Court which admitted the second appeal had formulated certain questions of law, and none of such questions pertained to the finding regarding the bona fides of appellant's claim for eviction. Hence no purpose would be served by remanding the case to High Court. In the result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment. The decree passed by the trial court as confirmed by the first appellate court will stand restored. We pass no order as to costs.
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1998 (9) TMI 144 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Deemed Wealth
... ... ... ... ..... retrospective operation of section 40A(11) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 w.e.f. 1-4-1980 affects the liability of the assessee-trust to Wealth-tax? 3. The learned Third Member, speaking through the Hon ble President, agreed with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Judicial Member and allowed the amount of Rs. 19 lakh or Rs. 14 lakh, as the case may be, as liability in the hands of the donee-trust for all the three assessment years in question for the various reasons detailed by him in his elaborate order dated 13-7-1998. Thus, the learned Accountant Member s dissenting order was not agreed to by the learned Third Member. 4. Thus these appeals were directed by the learned Third Member to go back to the Division Bench to decide the point according to the opinion of the majority of the Members of the Tribunal who have heard the case including those who first heard it. 5. Consequently in accordance with the majority opinion, the appeals of the assessee are allowed accordingly.
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1998 (4) TMI 177 - ITAT MADRAS-C
Reassessment, Time Limit For Completion of, Assessment
... ... ... ... ..... this Tribunal s order dated 29-12-1995 in the aforesaid R.A. arising out of the order of the Tribunal dated 30th June 94 stating these questions to be questions of law to the Hon ble High Court of Madras. 2. While dealing with these questions the Judicial Member was of the opinion that none of these Questions were fit for reference to the High Court of Madras whereas the Accountant Member was of the view that except question No. 9 all other questions are fit for reference as mixed questions of law and facts. Since there was difference of opinions between the Members, the questions were referred to the Third Member who has opined. vide order dated 27-4-1998 that none of the questions sought for reference by the assessee are referable question as these are all based on findings of fact. 3. Under these circumstances, we dismiss all the questions sought for reference, as they are questions of facts and not questions of law. 4. In the result the Reference Application is rejected.
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1998 (3) TMI 709 - MADRAS HIGH COURT
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... ... ..... rovisions of the Act and non-application of the settled principles regarding the nature of family arrangement with reference to whether such document requires registration under the Indian Registration Act. Thus, the findings of the respondents are unsustainable in law. Consequently, the circumstances of the instant case justifies the conclusion that the Pre-Act-Partition in the form of family arrangement though not registered under (Section 17(1)(b) of the Indian Registration Act is still valid in law and the authority while determining the excess vacant land under the Act cannot ignore such a partition effected by way of family arrangement. The question for consideration is answered accordingly in the affirmative. 21. For reasons aforestated, the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be quashed and accordingly quashed. The rule is made absolute. Parties to bear their own costs. Consequently, no order is necessary on the W.M.P. and is accordingly dismissed.
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