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Indian Laws - Case Laws
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2023 (10) TMI 1372
Seeking grant of bail - Unnatural death of a lady - proceeding has been started under Sections 304-B/34 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code - Charges have been framed and trial has been commenced without the husband being arrested and it is submitted on behalf of the State that he is absconding - HELD THAT:- The question of grant of bail to a co-accused person cannot made dependent upon surrender of another accused who is described as the main accused person in this case.
The imposition and subsequent adhering to the condition of surrender of the husband of the deceased would not be necessary for grant of bail to the appellant - the impugned order modified and it is directed that the appellant may be released on bail in terms of the order(s) of the High Court but the condition which requires prior surrender of husband of the deceased should not be insisted upon for enlarging the appellant on bail.
Appeal allowed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1371
Murder - Death due to poisoning - onus to prove - Failure on the part of the appellant-convict in offering any plausible explanation in his further statement recorded u/s 313 of CrPC - shifting the burden on the accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the date his wife died - whether the High Court committed any error in passing the impugned judgment and order? - HELD THAT:- What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions.
A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with counter-vailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one - although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the prosecution
Prima facie in the context of section 106 of Evidence Act - HELD THAT:- Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death - The presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved - In the case on hand it has been established or rather proved to the satisfaction of the court that the deceased was in company of her husband i.e., the appellant-convict at a point of time when something went wrong with her health and therefore, in such circumstances the appellant-convict alone knew what happened to her until she was with him.
Failure on the part of the appellant-convict in offering ant plausible explanation in his further statement recorded u/s 313 of CrPC - HELD THAT:- The appellant-convict was expected to lead some evidence as to what had transpired at the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital. He has maintained a complete silence. It is only the appellant-convict who could have explained in what circumstances and in what manner he had taken his wife to the Sanjay Gandhi Hospital and who attended his wife at the hospital. If it is his case, that his wife was declared dead on being brought at the hospital then it is difficult to believe that the hospital authorities allowed the appellant to carry the dead body back home without completing the legal formalities.
Even where there are facts especially within the knowledge of the accused, which could throw a light upon his guilt or innocence, as the case may be, the accused is not bound to allege them or to prove them. But it is not as if the section is automatically inapplicable to the criminal trials, for, if that had been the case, the Legislature would certainly have so enacted - more than a prima facie case to enable the prosecution to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shift the burden on the accused husband to explain what had actually happened on the date his wife died.
These appeals reminds of what this Court observed in the case of Dharam Das Wadhwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1974 (3) TMI 124 - SUPREME COURT] “The rule of benefit of reasonable doubt does not imply a frail willow bending to every whiff of hesitancy. Judges are made of sterner stuff and must take a practical view of legitimate inferences flowing from evidence, circumstantial or direct.” The role of courts in such circumstances assumes greater importance and it is expected that the courts would deal with such cases in a more realistic manner and not allow the criminals to escape on account of procedural technicalities, perfunctory investigation or insignificant lacunas in the evidence as otherwise the criminals would receive encouragement and the victims of crime would be totally discouraged by the crime going unpunished. The courts are expected to be sensitive in cases involving crime against women.
Both the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1370
Seeking grant of bail - opening bank account in the name of the villagers by using documents given by the villagers and forging their signatures - money deposited in such bank accounts was channelized as share capital in M/s. Prime Ispat Limited through shell companies - application is a lady suffering from various ailments - twin requirement of Section 45 of PMLA satisfied or not - HELD THAT:- It is not in dispute that the FIR was registered on 19.02.2010 whereas the respondent filed a complaint arraying the applicant as accused in ECIR on 04.01.2021 i.e. after 10 years. From the summons issued to the applicant, it is quite vivid that she was permitted to appear through an authorized person and it cannot be said that she did not cooperate in the investigation. According to the proviso appended to Section 45 of the PMLA Act, a woman suffering from certain ailments may be granted anticipatory bail.
The decision cited by learned counsel for the respondent states the twin conditions of Section 45 of the PMLA Act are to be satisfied but at the same time, the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of SATENDER KUMAR ANTIL VERSUS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR. [2022 (8) TMI 152 - SUPREME COURT] cannot be lost sight of as the applicant is a lady suffering from various ailments and she cooperated in the investigation of the matter and other co-accused persons against whom similar allegations were made, have already been granted anticipatory bail by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and by this Court, therefore, in opinion of this Court, the present is a fit case to extend the benefit under Section 438 of Cr.P.C. to the applicant.
It is directed that in the event of arrest of the applicant in connection with the aforesaid offence, she shall be released on anticipatory bail on her furnishing a personal bond for a sum of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the arresting officer and she shall abide by the conditions imposed - bail application allowed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1367
Seeking cancellation of Regular Bail granted - gross misuse of concession of bail - sufficient material gathered by the prosecution to indicate the involvement of Respondent No. 1 in a criminal conspiracy hatched for killing his wife or not - HELD THAT:- The unusual and surprising events that have happened post the grant of bail to Respondent No.1, do make out a case for recalling the witnesses for an effective, fair, and free adjudication of the trial. This Court is vested with vast and ample powers to have such recourse not only under Article 142 of the Constitution but also under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, be it on the request of the prosecution or suo moto. Such Constitutional or statutory power is not limited by any barriers like the stage of inquiry, trial, or other proceeding. A person can be called and examined though not summoned as a witness, or can be recalled, or reexamined so as to throw light upon the imputations. Section 311 CrPC, of course, does not intend to fill the lacunae in the prosecution’s case and cause any serious prejudice to the rights of an accused. The exercise of power under this provision is intended to meet the ends of justice and to gather overwhelming evidence to scoop out the truth.
In the case at hand, the family members of the Deceased are the most crucial witnesses to test the veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecution. Their stand in the examinationinchief is diametrically opposite to the one in the cross- examination. The fact that the parents and sister of the Deceased have resiled from their earlier standpoint where they had been found to be agitating vigorously before different forums since the year 2019, implores us to invoke our Constitutional powers under Article 142 read with Section 311 CrPC and direct their recalling for a fresh crossexamination after ensuring a congenial environment, free from any kind of threat, psychological fear, or any inducement.
This is a case fit for recalling the witnesses (PW1, PW4 and PW5) for their further crossexamination to reach an effective decision in the subject trial.
The impugned order dated 12.08.2020 is set aside and the bail granted to Respondent No. 1 is hereby cancelled - Appeal allowed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1364
Maintainability of an intra-Court appeal against an order passed in a criminal matter by Hon'ble Single Judge of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India - HELD THAT:- An intra-Court writ appeal does not lie against an order/ judgment passed by the learned Single Bench in exercise of the criminal writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. As the Gauhati High Court Rules are silent on this issue, the anomaly shall forthwith be clarified with appropriate insertion in the Rules clarifying the position that no intra- Court appeal lies against an order/judgment passed by the learned Single Bench in exercise of the criminal writ jurisdiction.
The intra-Court writ appeal preferred by the appellant herein against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby dismissed as being not maintainable.
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2023 (10) TMI 1356
Dishonour of Cheque - It is the case of the present petitioner that when the impugned cheque is produced before learned trial court the petitioner denied signature on that cheque - HELD THAT:- The criminal appeal was filed in the year 2019 against the judgment of conviction made in Criminal Case No.2005 of 2018. The petitioner came out with an application on 6.3.2023 for seeking relief for the opinion of the forensic expert about signature on the disputed cheque. It is important to note that an application Exh.38 was unsuccessfully moved by the petitioner before the learned trial Court. The order was never carried to challenge before higher Court. Moreover, the learned Session Judge has noted that no questions are raised to the complainant nor to the defence witness about signature on the disputed cheque. Thus, what appears that the petitioner by way of filing application Exh.35 aimed to prolong the proceedings of the criminal appeal. The petitioner remained silent for three years for moving such application even in the proceedings of the criminal appeal. Thus, it appears that the petitioner was thoroughly careless and negligent and now, under the pretext of one or another application, is trying to prolong the proceedings of the criminal appeal.
Reply to statutory notice u/s 138(B) of the NI Act is first stage of prosecution where the accused can raise his defence. In the present case, learned advocate for the petitioner has failed to point out that the accused has raised defence at the relevant point of time when the opportunity was available and disputed that he has not signed the cheque.
Thus, no case is made out to interfere with the impugned order under supervisory jurisdiction. Hence, present petition fails and stands dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1346
Seeking discharge from detention - accused possessed assets disproportionate to his known source of income - failure to consider the written explanation offered - non-application of mind - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- It is settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged.
The power and jurisdiction of Higher Court under Section 397 Cr.P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistency in the statement of witnesses and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.
The plea or the defence when requiring to be proved during course of trial is itself sufficient for framing the charge. In the instant case, the learned Trial Judge has noticed that explanation provided by the respondent accused pertaining to purchase of shop No.7 of Suman City Complex of plot No.19, Sector-11 from the loan borrowed and paid by the respondent was outside the check period and hence the explanation provided by respondent is a mere eye wash. This is an issue which has to be thrashed out during the course of the trial and at the stage of framing the charge mini trial cannot be held. That apart the explanation offered by the respondent accused with regard to buying of Maruti Wagon-R car, Activa scooter, purchase of house etc., according to the prosecution are all the subject matter of trial or it is in the nature of defence which will have to be evaluated after trial.
The High Court had committed a serious error in interfering with the well-reasoned order passed by the trial court - the impugned judgment dated 11.01.2018 passed in Criminal Revision Application No.387 of 2016 setting aside the trial court order dated 13.04.2016 requires to be set aside - appeal allowed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1342
Maintainability of second petition - Is a second petition maintainable Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure on grounds that were available for challenge even at the time of filing of the first petition thereunder?
HELD THAT:- Though it is clear that there can be no blanket Rule that a second petition Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure would not lie in any situation and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other, by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance. Permitting the filing of successive petitions Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious Accused to effectively stall the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by filing one petition after another Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, irrespective of when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be permitted.
In the case on hand, the filing of the charge sheet and the cognizance thereof by the Court concerned were well before the filing of the first petition Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure, wherein challenge was made only to the sanction order. That being so, the Petitioner was not at liberty to again invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the charge sheet and the cognizance order at a later point of time.
The impugned order passed by the Allahabad High Court holding to this effect is, therefore, incontrovertible on all counts and does not warrant interference - SLP dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1295
Seeking grant of Default bail - chargesheet or a prosecution complaint be filed in piecemeal without first completing the investigation of the case or not? - filing of such a chargesheet without completing the investigation will extinguish the right of an accused for grant of default bail or not - remand of an accused can be continued by the trial court during the pendency of investigation beyond the stipulated time as prescribed by the CrPC - HELD THAT:- It pertinent to mention that in the present case, this Court is not dealing with the merits of the case and as such is not inclined to make any observations regarding the same. Every court, when invoked to exercise its powers, must be mindful of the relief sought, and must act as a forum confined to such relief. In the present case at hand, this Court is not a court of appeal, but a court of writ, and therefore is inclined to limit its jurisdiction only to the personal liberty of the writ petitioner’s husband and the impugned points of law.
Under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, which was the Act that governed criminal procedure before the enactment of CrPC presently in force, an accused, either under judicial or police custody, could be remanded only for a maximum period of 15 days.
Reliance placed in SATENDER KUMAR ANTIL VERSUS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION & ANR. [2021 (10) TMI 1296 - SUPREME COURT], wherein it was held that Section 167(2) of the Cr.P.C. is a limb of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, and as such, the investigating authority is under a constitutional duty to expedite the process of investigation within the stipulated time, failing which, the accused is entitled to be released on default bail.
It is also to be noted that as per the scheme of Cr.PC, an investigation of a cognizable case commences with the recording of an FIR under Section 154 Cr.PC. If a person is arrested and the investigation of the case cannot be completed within 24 hours, he has to be produced before the magistrate to seek his remand under Section 167(2) of the Cr.PC during continued investigation. There is a statutory time frame then prescribed for remand of the accused for the purposes of investigation, however, the same cannot extend beyond 90 days, as provided under Section 167(2)(a) (i) in cases where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than 10 years and 60 days, as provided under Section 167(2)(a)(ii), where the investigation relates to any other offence.
Without completing the investigation of a case, a chargesheet or prosecution complaint cannot be filed by an investigating agency only to deprive an arrested accused of his right to default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC - Such a chargesheet, if filed by an investigating authority without first completing the investigation, would not extinguish the right to default bail under Section 167(2) CrPC.
In the instant case, it is clear from the facts that during the pendency of the investigation, supplementary chargesheets were filed by the Investigation Agency just before the expiry of 60 days, with the purpose of scuttling the right to default bail accrued in favour the accused - The Investigating Agency and the trial Court, thus, failed to observe the mandate of law, and acted in a manner which was manifestly arbitrary and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the accused.
It is pertinent to mention that the right of default bail under Section 167(2) of the CrPC is not merely a statutory right, but a fundamental right that flows from Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The reason for such importance being given to a seemingly insignificant procedural formality is to ensure that no accused person is subject to unfettered and arbitrary power of the state - it becomes essential to place certain checks and balances upon the Investigation Agency in order to prevent the harassment of accused persons at their hands.
The interim order of bail passed in favour of the accused is made absolute, and the present writ petition is, accordingly, disposed of.
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2023 (10) TMI 1294
Professional Misconduct - Chartered Accountant (CA) - Delay of 19 years for completion of Proceeding on the part of ICAI - fabrication of bogus payment challans by putting forged stamp of Dena Bank, Vile Parle (W) Branch - allegation to have collected account payee cheques for making payment of sales tax dues which he misappropriated by depositing in his own bank account - HELD THAT:- The sequence of events clearly indicate that firstly the complaint itself was made after 10-12 years of the incident having taken place. Thereafter, it took the Council as many as 14 years to complete the procedure prescribed under the Act and reach a finding of guilt of Respondent. Another almost two years were spent in the process of filing the Reference and finally, about four more years were spent in removing office objections to get the Reference registered. Thus, the Council has prolonged the procedure for as many as 19 years and kept Respondent in the dock for the entire period.
Considering the nature of accusation against Respondent, the finding of guilt by the Committee and the Council and the consequent penal recommendation of such grave ramification, it is surprising that the Institute took such a long time to complete the procedure of indictment. The attitude of the Institute appears to be completely casual and negligent - Respondent is presently 77 years of age and save and except a period of five years for which he himself had surrendered his certificate of practice, he has been professionally active and no other complaint is found to have been made against him. The Institute has offered no explanation whatsoever for the inordinate delay in initiating and concluding the disciplinary action against Respondent.
The Supreme Court in its decision in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh v Bani Singh [1990 (4) TMI 286 - SUPREME COURT] has quashed the charge memo and the departmental enquiry against an officer of the SAF, Gwalior on the ground of inordinate delay of 12 years to initiate departmental proceedings with reference to an incident that took place in 1975-76 and held that since there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay, it will be unfair to permit departmental enquiry against the officer to continue.
In the present case no explanation is offered by the Institute for the inordinate delay of as many as 19 years. Respondent has inasmuch suffered the agony of the sword of Damocles hanging over his head for so many years. In any case, we do not find that the Committee has found any substantial justification in the form of unrebutted evidence against Respondent as much as to hold him guilty to the extent that his name should be removed for a period of one year and Respondent be compelled to face an ignominy of the tag of ‘other misconduct’ at this stage in his professional career and at an age of 77 years - even the Council has merely reproduced the report of the Committee without giving its own independent findings. There is neither any analysis by the Council nor any justification recorded to explain the quantum of punishment recommended to this Court.
The view of Council is wholly untenable and the recommendation of the Council as prayed cannot be accepted. In view thereof, there is no need to take any further action against Respondent - Reference disposed off.
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2023 (10) TMI 1293
Murder - Scope of exception Under Section 84 of Indian Penal Code or not - issue of insanity - reversal of order of acquittal - HELD THAT:- The fact that the Appellant had committed murder of the deceased have been found established concurrently by the Trial Court as well as the High Court, therefore, we would discuss the evidence in this regard very briefly - Basing upon the evidence of PW-1 and PW-13 and the medical evidence adduced, it is fully proved that the Appellant-Accused had attacked the deceased with sharp-edged weapon causing his death.
Issue of insanity - HELD THAT:- It is settled that the standard of proof to prove the lunacy or insanity is only 'reasonable doubt' - In Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand [2011 (1) TMI 1586 - SUPREME COURT] , HARI SINGH GOND VERSUS STATE OF M.P. [2008 (8) TMI 1012 - SUPREME COURT] and Bapu v. State of Rajasthan [2007 (6) TMI 557 - SUPREME COURT] this Court has held that an Accused who seeks exoneration from liability of an act Under Section 84 of Indian Penal Code has to prove legal insanity and not medical insanity. Since the term insanity or unsoundness of mind has not been defined in the Penal Code, it carries different meaning in different contexts and describes varying degrees of mental disorder. A distinction is to be made between legal insanity and medical insanity. The court is concerned with legal insanity and not with medical insanity.
It is settled that the judgment of acquittal can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when there is perversity and not by taking a different view on reappreciation of evidence. If the conclusion of the Trial Court is plausible one, merely because another view is possible on reappreciation of evidence, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal and substitute its own findings to convict the Accused - In the case at hand, the High Court had reversed the finding of acquittal and convicted the Appellant mainly on reappreciation of evidence by holding that the Trial Court erred in extending the benefit of Section 84 of Indian Penal Code, without even recording a finding that the Trial Court's finding is perverse.
In the light of the evidence discussed by the Trial Court including the medical evidence about the mental illness of the Appellant-Accused and his abnormal behaviour at the time of occurrence, it does not appear that the view taken by the Trial Court was perverse or that it was based on without any evidence - the High Court erred in setting aside the judgment of acquittal rendered by the Trial Court.
The Appellant-Accused of the charge Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code acquitted - appeal allowed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1249
Dishonour of Cheque - insufficient funds - existence of legally enforceable debt or not - Presumption of innocence in favour of accused - acquittal of accused under Sec 255 (1) of Code of Criminal Procedure - HELD THAT:- This Court reminds itself of its scope and powers in deciding an appeal against an order of acquittal. It is well-settled in a host of judicial pronouncements that the Appellate Court should be slow and watchful in interfering with an order of acquittal. It is only when the conclusions arrived at by the Trial Court is manifestly erroneous and palpably perverse, the Appellate Court should take a contrary view. It is more because an order of acquittal has the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused.
In the instant case, the complainant has alleged that the accused had issued Ext P6 cheque in his favour in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. The cheque, on presentation to the bank for encashment, got dishonoured due to ‘insufficient funds’ and despite receipt of the demand notice, the accused failed to pay the cheque amount. Hence, the accused committed the above offence - Indisputably, the complaint has been filed by the complainant ( Mathew K.Cherian represented by his power of attorney holder PW1) in his individual capacity. PW1 has not testified that the accused had any business transaction with the complainant in his individual capacity. Therefore, the learned Magistrate, on an appreciation of the oral testimonies of PW1 and DW1 and the materials on record, came to the legitimate conclusion that Ext P6 cheque was not issued towards a legally enforceable debt in favour of the complainant.
In the case on hand, in addition to the finding that there was no business transaction between the complainant and the accused as alleged in the complaint, there is also no specific assertion as to the competence and knowledge of PW1 as regards the alleged transaction between the complainant and the accused. Thus, the learned Magistrate has rightly concluded that Ext P6 cheque was not issued towards a legally enforceable debt.
On a re-appreciation of the materials on record, this Court is of the definite view that there is no error or illegality in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Magistrate holding the accused not guilty for the offence under Sec.138 of the N.I Act - appeal dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1248
Dishonour of Cheque - existence of legally enforceable debt - benefit of doubt to accused or not - presumption of consideration under Secs.118(a) and 139 of the N.I Act - HELD THAT:- In the case on hand, the complainant’s case is that, Ext.P8 cheque was issued by the accused in discharge of a legally enforceable debt and the cheque got dishonoured when presented for collection and the accused failed to pay the demanded amount, despite receipt of the statutory lawyer notice - The accused denied the allegation and has raised a defence that he has no business transaction with the complainant. Instead, Ext.P8 cheque was issued by him to DW1 to purchase computers. It was misutilising the cheque, the complainant filed the false complaint.
The courts below, after a threadbare analysis of the materials placed on record, have concurrently concluded that the accused had failed to shift the reverse onus of proof cast on his shoulders under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. Accordingly, the courts below found the accused guilty, and convicted and sentenced him for the above offence - There are no error, illegality or irregularity in the conclusion arrived at by the courts below. Thus, the conviction imposed by the courts below is confirmed.
In DAMODAR S. PRABHU VERSUS SAYED BABALAL H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unlike other forms of crime, the punishment under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is not a means for seeking retribution, but is a means to ensure payment of money. Complainant's interest lies primarily in recovering the money rather than seeing the drawer getting incarcerated. In an offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the compensatory aspect of the remedy should be given priority over the punitive aspect.
Thus lenient view as regards substantive sentence can be taken, by sentencing the revision petitioner to undergo imprisonment for one day(till the rising of the Court) and pay compensation for the cheque amount, which would do complete justice to both sides - revision petition is dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1247
Dishonour of Cheque - validity of convicting and sentencing the revision petitioner - insufficiency of funds - discharge of onus to prove existence of debt - It is submitted that, prosecution has miserably failed to establish the ingredients of Section 138 of the N.I.Act - HELD THAT:- It is trite that the revisional powers of this Court under Sections 397 to 401 of the Cr.P.C. is to be sparingly exercised and in cases of exceptional rarity. Unless there is manifest error, illegality or an apparent misreading of the records, this Court shall not interfere with the findings of fact rendered by the fact finding courts. Merely because a different view is possible, the revisional Court shall not substitute the views of the Trial/Appellate Courts.
The law has crystallized that once the complainant establishes the concoction of the five ingredients under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, then the reverse onus of proof shifts to the accused to set up a probable defence. If he discharges the onus of proof and casts a doubt about the existence of a debt, then the prosecution has to fail.
Thus, both Courts have failed to advert and discuss the oral testimonies of PW1 and DW1. Instead, the Courts have only discussed about Exts.P1 to P10 documents and concluded that the revision petitioner has not discharged the reverse onus of proof under Section 139 of the N.I. Act - there is no discussion regarding Ext.D1 reply notice, the statement of the revision petitioner u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and the testimonies of the defense witnesses and documents.
The courts below have misread the materials on record and have perfunctorily concluded that the revision petitioner has committed the offence u/s 138 of N.I. Act, which is improper, irregular and illegal, and warrants interference by this Court - revision petition is allowed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1211
Validity of sentence for murder - Murder of a person with criminal history / history-sheeter - Assaulting the deceased by lathis and tabbal - Inordinate delay in filing of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) - possibility of improvements thereby casting doubt on the version of the prosecution - testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution being contradictory - accused persons present at the scene of the crime or not - plea of alibi.
Inordinate delay in filing of the First Information Report (F.I.R.) - HELD THAT:- The document itself records the time of incident as being 8.15 a.m. and the time of report as being 11.00 a.m. The testimony of PW-3 at whose instance the FIR was recorded, shows that out of fear and having sustained numerous injuries, he ran from the place of occurrence and hid in the house of Baisakhu Kewat and only emerged therefrom two hours later - In such a situation, delay in filing of the FIR cannot be said to be fatal to the case of the prosecution more so in view of the injuries sustained by him; the place of occurrence being a remote village area and that the version of events was dictated to the police by this witness only upon their reaching his place of shelter. To us it does not appear to be a case of prior consultation; discussion; deliberation or improvements.
There are nothing emanating which would credibly suggest that the time gap between the occurrence of incidence and registration of the FIR is unjustified - Resultantly, the first contention of the convict appellants must necessarily be answered in the negative.
Plea of alibi - HELD THAT:- Both the defence witnesses do not conclusively establish the plea of alibi, based on the principle of preponderance of probability as their statements stand unsupported by any other corroborative evidence. Not only that, no reason stands explained in such testimony for A-9 having travelled from Bhalesur to Sundri in order to go to Sandi Bazar. It is a matter of record that A-9 is a resident of Bhalesur where he resided with his family. He owned farms in Sundri. The family of A-9 was not examined to substantiate the claim of such travel. For those reasons, we cannot believe the version testified to by DW-1 and DW-2 - for the plea of alibi to be established, something other than a mere ocular statement ought to have been present. After all, the prosecution has relied on the statement of eyewitnesses to establish its case against the convict-appellants leading to the unrefuted conclusion that convict-appellants were present on the spot of the crime and had indeed caused injuries unto the deceased as also PW-3 with Lathis and Tabbal on various and vital parts of their bodies.
The prosecution case relies primarily on 3 witnesses whom, the Courts below have believed without exception. It is next urged that there are contradictions in the testimonies of three witnesses, hence, it would neither be appropriate nor safe to place reliance thereon. Having perused the same, we find them to be coherent on material facts such as the presence of the accused on the spot of the crime; the death of Chetram; a blast having taken place; and the accused being the assailants - there are no force in the contention that the testimonies relied on by the prosecution are inherently contradictory.
It may be true that the deceased Chetram was a history-sheeter and had scores of criminal cases pending against him or cases in which he was involved. However, such fact is unsubstantiated on record for no detail whatsoever stands provided in respect of such cases involving the deceased - simply because the deceased had a chequered past which constituted several run-ins with the law, Courts cannot give benefit thereof, particularly when such claims are bald assertions, to those accused of committing such a person’s murder. And in any event, such a plea is merely presumptuous.
Thus, the charges levied against the accused, i.e., under Sections 148, 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, IPC, and Sections 4/5 of the Explosive Substance Act, 1908, and the sentence corresponding thereto as awarded by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court, do not warrant interference of this Court. It may also be observed that the sentences awarded are in no manner excessive or disproportionate to the crimes for which the convict-appellants stand convicted.
Appeal dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1210
Dishonour of Cheque - insufficient funds - right of the petitioner to cross-examine the complainant is closed - HELD THAT:- Admittedly, the petitioner has already paid the cost imposed by the learned Trial Court for the purpose of conducting cross-examination of the complainant, and as clear from the contents of present petition and the arguments addressed before this Court, the petitioner has sought setting aside of the impugned order dated 11.04.2023 only on the ground that in the said order, learned Sessions Court had failed to consider the contentions raised by the petitioner/revisionist therein regarding the maintainability of the complaint case under Section 219 of Cr.P.C. and had not passed any order qua the same.
As clear from the bare perusal of the records, the order dated 20.03.2023, which was impugned before the learned Sessions Court, did not record any observations on the maintainability of the complaint under Section 219 of Cr.P.C., rather only pertained to the right of accused to cross-examine the complainant - It is also not in dispute that the petitioner/accused has till date not challenged the order dated 16.04.2022 passed by the learned Trial Court vide which his application under Section 219 of Cr.P.C. was dismissed and though he had made references to the said order in his criminal revision petition filed before the learned Sessions Court and had taken a ground that the proceedings in the present complaint case were bad in law due to bar under Section 219 of Cr.P.C., the petitioner had still not assailed the order dated 16.04.2022 but had only challenged the order dated 20.03.2023 by virtue of which the learned Trial Court had closed his right to cross-examine the complainant.
There was no occasion for the learned Sessions Court to have recorded any findings on the issue of whether the complaint was maintainable or not since the same was not an issue before the learned Sessions Court. Thus, there are no grounds to set aside the order dated 11.04.2023 passed by the learned Sessions Court.
Petition dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1209
Dishonour of Cheque - amicable settlement of dispute - acquittal of the accused - HELD THAT:- Since the parties are entering into compromise at the stage of revision, therefore, law laid down by the apex Court in the case of DAMODAR S. PRABHU VERSUS SAYED BABALAL H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT] will be applicable in this case where it was held that If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Court deems fit.
Thus, considering the fact that the parties have amicably settled their dispute and have entered into compromise before this Court in the revision and decided to avoid further litigation, hence, the applicant is liable to pay 2% of the cheque amount i.e. Rs.8,480/- by way of cost to be deposited with the “State Legal Services Authority” Indore - Subject to payment of cost at the rate of 2% of the cheque amount with the “State Legal Services Authority” Indore, within a period of 15 days from today, the applicant be released from the jail. Sentence awarded to the applicant is hereby modified by reducing the sentence to the period already undergone.
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2023 (10) TMI 1154
Dishonour of Cheque - legally recoverable debt - actual amount due and payable on the part of petitioner/accused towards the complainant/respondent - whether the amount due as on date of presentation of cheque for encashment and its subsequent dishonoring was less than the amount of cheque in question?
HELD THAT:- The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued in the discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused moves Court for quashing even before trial has commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough to not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint.
The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued in the discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused moves Court for quashing even before trial has commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough to not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint.
This Court is of the opinion that the issues raised before this Court can only be decided by the learned Trial Court at appropriate stage, on their own merits. Since a prima facie case exists against the petitioner under Section 138 of NI Act, there are no reasons to quash the summoning order dated 25.09.2019.
Petition dismissed.
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2023 (10) TMI 1101
Professional Misconduct - allegation of assisting various companies in availing credit facilities of huge amounts from various banks by issuing false documents certifying valuation of work undertaken and completed by the accused companies - allegation of also certifying the sales registers and list of supply bills of the accused companies without verifying facts and figures to facilitate loans being sanctioned to the said companies.
HELD THAT:- The stipulated procedure under Regulation 13, 14 and 15 of Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1964 required the Committee report to contain a statement of allegations, the defense entered by the delinquent Chartered Accountant, the recorded evidence and the conclusions of Committee. The Council is to apply its mind to the report of Committee and is empowered to conclude regarding the guilt of its member or otherwise. It appears from the reports of Committee that the working papers of Respondent revealed nothing of substance pertaining to the basis of material on which the certificates were issued by him. The certificates simply stated that the certificates were issued on the specific request of the firm. On being asked to produce documents regarding statements of expenditure incurred by the accused firms, invoices/vouchers for purchase of plant and machinery for civil work and land development etc., Respondent was unable to produce any document.
The Committee has recorded its findings on the basis of the inability of Respondent to provide any material on the basis of which he satisfied himself as to the genuineness of accused firms and the valuation of their properties sufficient enough to justify issuing as many as 11 certificates used by the accused firms to avail credit facilities. The Committee has also recorded its view that Respondent failed to perform due diligence before issuing certificate and he was unable to co-relate any document/papers with the certification/valuation done by him. The Committee thus held Respondent guilty of professional misconduct on the basis of issuance of a large number of certificates at regular intervals, issued as and when asked for by his clients and most importantly in the absence of any papers to indicate due diligence employed by him.
It is true that the employees of the banks were not available for cross-examination by Respondent. Respondent had absented himself at the final hearing of the Committee. Respondent has relied on the absence of witnesses for cross-examination and has contested the finding of Committee at the same time admitting omissions committed by him and his failure to comply with the due diligence, which he ought to have done while issuing the certificates. On perusal of the committee report and the deposition of Respondent himself, we have no hesitation in accepting that Respondent has been found guilty of certain degree of negligence amounting to misconduct justifying some action against him - Refusing to accept the recommendation of Council will be deleterious to the maintenance of discipline or the professional conduct on the part of members of a professional institute or association.
In this case, Respondent was completely aware that accused companies were seeking specific verification and certification from a chartered accountant to complete the documentation required by Banks to sanction credit facilities to them. Thus he was naturally aware that issuing such certificates in the absence of proper valuation was a fraud on the Banks as such public and financial institutions rely upon certificates of professionals as part of its due diligence. Hence a contrary view would easily defeat the purpose of the Act and the object behind regulatory measures envisaged in Section 21 of the Act.
The view of Council is correct - Respondent is thus reprimanded in accordance with Section 21(6)(b) of the Act.
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2023 (10) TMI 1100
Dishonour of Cheque - insufficient funds - settlement of matter between parties - compounding of offences - HELD THAT:- Having taken note of the fact that the petitioner-accused and the complainant-respondent have settled the matter and the complainant has no objection in compounding the offence, therefore, this Court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made on behalf of the accused-petitioner for compounding of offence while exercising power under Section 147 of the Act as well as in terms of guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Apex Court in DAMODAR S. PRABHU VERSUS SAYED BABALAL H. [2010 (5) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT], wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is in the nature of an enabling provision which provides for the compounding of offences prescribed under the same Act, thereby serving as an exception to the general rule incorporated in sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the CrPC which states that 'No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section'. A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also cannot be compounded. However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non obstante clause.
In K. SUBRAMANIAN VERSUS R. RAJATHI REP. BY P.O.A.P. KALIAPPAN [2009 (11) TMI 1013 - SUPREME COURT], it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that in view of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.P.C., compromise arrived at can be accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction.
Since, in the instant case, the petitioner-accused after being convicted under Section 138 of the Act, has compromised the matter with the complainant, prayer for compounding the offence can be accepted in terms of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.
The present matter is ordered to be compounded and the impugned judgment of conviction, dated 12.06.2018, and order of sentence dated 11.09.2018, passed by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No. 1, Kangra, H.P., is quashed and set-aside - the petitioner-accused is acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 138 of the Act. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged.
Petition disposed off.
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