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2002 (12) TMI 624
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Will under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act.
2. Proof of the Will under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act.
3. Applicability of Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Summary:
1. Validity of the Will under Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act:
The respondent claimed possession of the suit properties based on a Will executed by Honaji Dama Kadam. The trial court accepted the Will and decreed the suit. However, the District Judge, upon appeal, found that the respondent failed to prove the execution of the Will as required by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, which mandates attestation by two or more witnesses. The High Court reversed this decision, but the Supreme Court found that the High Court erred in its judgment.
2. Proof of the Will under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act:
The appellant contended that the Will was not proved as required by law, specifically under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, which necessitates the examination of at least one attesting witness. The respondent examined only one attesting witness, Prabhakar Sinkar, who failed to confirm the attestation by the other witness, Ramkrishna Wagle. The Supreme Court emphasized that the execution of the Will must be proved by at least one attesting witness who can confirm the attestation by the other witness as per Section 68.
3. Applicability of Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act:
The respondent argued that the Will could be proved by other evidence under Section 71 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the Supreme Court clarified that Section 71 is a safeguard for situations where attesting witnesses deny or do not recollect the execution of the document. It does not apply when an attesting witness fails to prove the due execution of the Will, and other available attesting witnesses are not examined. The Supreme Court held that the High Court wrongly relied on the scribe, Raikar, as an attesting witness, and the evidence did not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 68.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and decree, restoring the judgment of the first appellate court, which dismissed the suit filed by the respondent. The High Court's decision was found to be erroneous due to the improper application of legal provisions and failure to establish the Will's execution as required by law.
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2002 (12) TMI 623
Issues Involved:
1. Whether the Central Government is bound by the doctrine of promissory estoppel to continue excise exemption for 10 years.
2. Whether the Ministry of Finance has the authority to unilaterally withdraw the concessions given under the Industrial Policy.
3. Whether the withdrawal of the excise exemption was justified by overriding public interest.
Detailed Analysis:
Issue 1: Doctrine of Promissory Estoppel
The appellants, manufacturers of Pan Masala containing Tobacco, challenged the withdrawal of excise exemption by the Central Government, arguing that the government is bound by the principles of promissory estoppel. The government had initially promised, through the Industrial Policy dated 24.12.1997 and subsequent Notification No. 32/1999-CE dated 8.7.1999, to exempt new industrial units in the North Eastern Region from excise duty for 10 years. The appellants had relied on this promise and made significant investments in setting up their units.
The court held that the government is indeed bound by the principles of promissory estoppel. The Industrial Policy and the notification issued were clear promises that induced the appellants to set up their industries. The appellants had altered their position based on these promises, and the government had acted on the policy by granting excise refunds until the issuance of the impugned notification.
Issue 2: Authority of the Ministry of Finance
The appellants argued that the Ministry of Finance was incompetent to unilaterally withdraw the concessions given in pursuance of the Industrial Policy, as the policy decision was taken by the Central Government and remained unchanged. The court referred to the Supreme Court's decision in State of Bihar v. Suprabhat Steel Ltd., which held that notifications issued by the government to carry out policy decisions must not be repugnant to the policy itself.
The court found that the Industrial Policy of 24.12.1997, which declared the North Eastern Region a total tax-free zone for 10 years, remained in force. The withdrawal of excise exemption by the Ministry of Finance through Notification No. 6/2001 dated 1.3.2001 was contrary to this policy and thus invalid.
Issue 3: Overriding Public Interest
The government contended that the withdrawal of the excise exemption was justified by overriding public interest, arguing that the benefits to manufacturers of tobacco products were disproportionate to the fiscal revenue foregone and that the units did not generate the anticipated employment. The court emphasized that the government must provide adequate material to prove such overriding public interest, and mere fiscal considerations are insufficient.
The court found that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the public interest in withdrawing the exemption outweighed the interests of the appellants. The reasons provided by the government were not supported by concrete data or documents, and the court was not persuaded that the withdrawal was necessary for any overriding public interest.
Conclusion:
The court quashed Notification No. 6/2001-CE dated 1.3.2001, restoring the excise exemption granted under Notification No. 32/1999-CE dated 8.7.1999. The appeals were allowed, and the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside. The court directed that the excise duty paid by the appellants from 7.5.2001 onwards be credited to their respective accounts, to be adjusted against future excise duty liabilities. From the date of the judgment, the appellants were entitled to excise duty exemption as per the notification dated 8th July 1999.
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2002 (12) TMI 622
Issues Involved:
1. Declaration of title and recovery of possession
2. Validity of marriage between Gopali and Gendilal
3. Validity of adoption of Jagannath by Gendilal
4. Plea of res judicata
5. Admissibility and probative value of evidence
Detailed Analysis:
Declaration of Title and Recovery of Possession
The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession of a house property, claiming ownership through a gift deed executed by her mother, Gopali. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but a Single Judge of the High Court decreed in favor of the plaintiff. However, the Division Bench reversed this decision and dismissed the suit, leading to the present appeal.
Validity of Marriage Between Gopali and Gendilal
The plaintiff claimed that Gopali was married to Gendilal, making her the legitimate heir. The Trial Court found that Gopali was not legally married to Gendilal and thus could not transfer any property rights to the plaintiff. The Single Judge of the High Court, however, accepted the marriage based on certain statements and documents. The Division Bench, upon further appeal, held that there was no valid marriage between Gopali and Gendilal, thereby nullifying the plaintiff's claim.
Validity of Adoption of Jagannath by Gendilal
Jagannath claimed to be the adopted son of Gendilal. The Trial Court found in favor of Jagannath, stating that he and his heirs were in possession of the property. The Single Judge of the High Court disagreed, finding insufficient proof of adoption. The Division Bench upheld the Trial Court's finding, stating that there was no legal adoption of Jagannath by Gendilal.
Plea of Res Judicata
The plaintiff raised the plea of res judicata for the first time during the final hearing, arguing that previous mutation proceedings should preclude the current dispute. The Court rejected this plea, stating that it was a mixed question of fact and law that should have been raised earlier. The Court also clarified that mutation proceedings do not have the status of judicial proceedings and cannot be used to assert res judicata in a subsequent civil suit.
Admissibility and Probative Value of Evidence
The plaintiff relied on various documents and statements from mutation proceedings to prove her claims. The Court analyzed the admissibility of these documents under Sections 32 and 33 of the Evidence Act. The Court found that these statements were self-serving and made after disputes had arisen, thus lacking independent corroboration. The Court also considered the probative value of school records describing Jagannath as Gendilal's son, which were made long before any dispute. The Trial Court and Division Bench found these records more credible, while the Single Judge had erred in treating the plaintiff's evidence as conclusive.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court upheld the Division Bench's judgment, dismissing the plaintiff's suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The Court found no valid marriage between Gopali and Gendilal, no legal adoption of Jagannath by Gendilal, and rejected the plea of res judicata. The Court also emphasized the importance of the probative value of evidence, supporting the findings of the Trial Court and Division Bench. The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.
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2002 (12) TMI 621
Applicability of Limitation Act 1963 - It is well-settled that by virtue of sub-Section (2) of Section 29 of the Limitation Act the provisions of Section 12 are applicable for computing the period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law.
So far as the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned the power of the Court to extend the prescribed period of limitation on the ground of availability of sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, stands circumscribed by the limitation imposed on the power of the High Court by the proviso to sub-Section (2) of Section 25 of the Act.
Appeal dismissed.
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2002 (12) TMI 620
Issues:
Challenge to order of Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal regarding shifting levy of tax under Section 7-A of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act for purchases made by a registered dealer from three selling dealers.
Analysis:
The petitioner, a registered dealer, challenged an order by the Tamil Nadu Taxation Special Tribunal regarding the shifting levy of tax under Section 7-A of the Act for purchases made from three registered dealers for manufacturing Potassium Chlorate. Initially, the Assessing Officer granted exemption on these purchases. However, after inspection, the order was revised, holding the petitioner liable for tax as the selling dealers had not paid tax. The petitioner appealed, and the Joint Commissioner revised the assessment, sharing the liability 50:50. The Special Tribunal confirmed this order, leading to the writ petition.
The petitioner argued that as the purchases were from registered dealers with valid bills, the revenue should collect tax from the selling dealers, not shift the liability. They contended that since the purchases were made with cheques, the Department should collect tax from the selling dealers. Conversely, the Government Pleader stated that the selling dealers were non-existent, and the bills produced were from bogus dealers who did not conduct business. The burden was on the petitioner to prove the selling dealers' genuineness, which they failed to do.
The Court examined the arguments and precedents cited by the petitioner, emphasizing that the selling dealers were found to be non-existent and their addresses bogus. The revenue proved the bills were fake, aligning with previous judgments. The Court dismissed the petitioner's reliance on a specific case, as the facts of the present case contradicted it. The Court upheld the findings of the revenue authorities and Special Tribunal, concluding there was no error in their order.
The petitioner also contested a finding regarding another dealer, Raja Agency, which was deemed unnecessary by the Court. Despite this, the Court found no grounds to interfere with the Special Tribunal's order and dismissed the writ petition without costs.
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2002 (12) TMI 619
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in the case with citation 2002 (12) TMI 619 - SC. The judges were Mrs. Ruma Pal and B.N. Srikrishna.
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2002 (12) TMI 618
The High Court of Madras ruled that chit investment/gifts to chit subscribers constitute sales promotion expenses subject to the ceiling under section 37(3A) of the Income-tax Act. The decision was in favor of the Revenue and against the assessee.
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2002 (12) TMI 617
The High Court of Madras held that the income of the trust should not be assessed as an Association of Persons. The decision was based on specific beneficiaries' shares being known. The judgment was in favor of the assessee for the assessment years 1985-86 to 1989-90.
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2002 (12) TMI 616
Issues Involved:
1. Inclusion of provision for doubtful debts/advances in computation under section 115JA.
2. Inclusion of income tax of earlier years in computation under section 115JA.
3. Disallowance of assessee's claim of bad debt under section 36(1)(vii).
4. Levy of interest under sections 234B and 234C.
Detailed Analysis:
1. Inclusion of Provision for Doubtful Debts/Advances in Computation under Section 115JA:
The assessee challenged the inclusion of Rs. 2,50,80,539 in the computation under section 115JA, which included a provision for doubtful debts/advances of Rs. 2,49,73,218. The assessee argued that this provision was based on a suit filed against a debtor and was in line with the Foreign Exchange Manual issued by the Reserve Bank of India. The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction under section 36(1)(vii) on the grounds that the debt had not been written off as irrecoverable in the accounts and the assessee had not established that the debt had become bad. The CIT(A) upheld this disallowance, noting that the provision was premature and the debts had not become irrecoverable during the relevant year. The CIT(A) also held that the provision should be treated as a reserve under clause (b) of Explanation to section 115JA(2), thus justifying the increase in book profit. The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)'s decision, agreeing that the provision was unnecessary and should be treated as a reserve, not a provision.
2. Inclusion of Income Tax of Earlier Years in Computation under Section 115JA:
The assessee claimed a deduction of Rs. 1,07,321 for income tax of earlier years, arguing that it represented short recovery of income due to the non-receipt of a tax deduction certificate from a debtor. The CIT(A) rejected this claim on the ground that the amount had not been written off in the ledger account. The Tribunal, however, directed the Assessing Officer to allow the deduction, emphasizing that the assessee was justified in claiming the deduction if the amount had become irrecoverable despite diligent efforts.
3. Disallowance of Assessee's Claim of Bad Debt under Section 36(1)(vii):
The assessee's claim for bad debt under section 36(1)(vii) was disallowed by the CIT(A) and this disallowance was upheld by the Tribunal. The Tribunal noted that the claim could not be accepted in light of the amendment to section 36(1)(vii) by the Finance Act, 2001, which was retrospective from 1-4-1989.
4. Levy of Interest under Sections 234B and 234C:
The assessee contested the levy of interest under sections 234B and 234C, arguing that it was not liable to make any payment of advance tax under section 115JA. The Tribunal rejected this contention, siding with the Revenue and citing various High Court judgments that supported the levy of interest under these sections.
Conclusion:
The appeal was partly allowed, with the Tribunal directing the allowance of the deduction for income tax of earlier years while upholding the disallowance of the provision for doubtful debts/advances, the claim of bad debt under section 36(1)(vii), and the levy of interest under sections 234B and 234C.
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2002 (12) TMI 615
Issues:
Valuation of property in sale agreement seized under section 132 - Discrepancy in sale price - Validity of Tribunal's decision to disregard sale price in agreement and accept Inspector's valuation - Legal basis for valuation - Acceptance of Inspector's valuation by assessee - Circumstances affecting property value - Admissibility of inflated sale consideration - Proof of payment of sale consideration - Comparison of sale agreement and sale deed prices - Legal sustainability of Tribunal's decision.
Analysis:
The case involved a dispute over the valuation of a property based on a sale agreement seized under section 132. The assessee entered into an agreement to purchase land with an incomplete cinema theatre structure for Rs. 2,07,000, but the sale deed was registered for only Rs. 40,000. The assessing authority added Rs. 1,67,000 to the income, which was later reduced to Rs. 36,000 by the Tribunal, based on an Inspector's valuation of Rs. 76,000 accepted by the assessee.
The Revenue contended that the Tribunal erred in accepting the Inspector's valuation without a legal basis and disregarding the agreed sale price in the agreement. They argued that the circumstances, including the vendor's financial difficulties, did not justify the inflated sale price. The Revenue highlighted discrepancies between the sale agreement and the sale deed prices, questioning the acceptance of a value between the two.
The assessee defended the Inspector's valuation, stating that the acceptance was to resolve the issue. They argued that the incomplete structure's sentimental value could justify a lower sale price. The assessee claimed that the circumstances of the vendor compelled the lower sale price, and no evidence discrediting the sale agreement's price was presented.
The Court analyzed the evidence, emphasizing the lack of proof regarding the inflated sale consideration and the payment of the sale price. The Court found the Inspector's valuation lacked a legal basis and that the Tribunal erred in accepting it. The Court concluded that the sale agreement price was the correct value paid by the assessee, setting aside the Tribunal's decision and restoring the Assessing Officer's order.
The Court distinguished previous judgments cited by the assessee, stating that the present case lacked evidence of inflated sale consideration for obtaining a loan. Ultimately, the Court ruled in favor of the Revenue, rejecting the assessee's arguments and setting aside the Tribunal's decision.
In conclusion, the Court held that the Tribunal's decision was not legally sustainable, ruling against the assessee and in favor of the Revenue.
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2002 (12) TMI 614
... ...
... ... ..... is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2002 (12) TMI 613
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT MUMBAI allowed the appeal by remanding the case back to the proper officer for fresh decision. The order rejecting the remission claim was set aside due to lack of notice, hearing, and reasons provided. The appellants, manufacturers of plastic moulded furniture, had claimed remission of duty of Rs. 60,34,989 due to a fire in their factory.
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2002 (12) TMI 612
Issues:
- Interpretation of Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 regarding exemption for premises belonging to religious institutions.
- Impact of subsequent amendment on jurisdiction of the Court.
- Claim of ownership by the respondent affecting the eviction petition.
- Definition of 'landlord' under Section 3(h) of the Act.
Interpretation of Karnataka Rent Control Act:
The judgment dealt with the interpretation of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 in a case involving premises owned by a temple, a religious institution. The Court analyzed the effect of an amendment brought about by Karnataka Act No.32 of 1994, which expanded the exemption for premises belonging to religious institutions from the Act's application. The Court emphasized that the amendment, which removed the requirement of premises being under the management of the State Government, did not have retrospective effect. The Court held that the amendment did not impact the jurisdiction of the Court where proceedings had already concluded before the amendment came into force.
Impact of Subsequent Amendment on Court's Jurisdiction:
The judgment addressed the impact of a subsequent amendment on the jurisdiction of the Court. It was argued that the amendment deprived the Court of jurisdiction to hear eviction proceedings over the suit premises. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that a change in forum does not affect pending actions unless expressly provided for in the law. The Court noted that the proceedings had concluded before the amendment, and objections to the forum's competence were not raised in a timely manner. Therefore, the Court held that the amendment did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case.
Claim of Ownership and Eviction Petition:
The judgment also discussed the respondent's claim of ownership over the premises and its impact on the eviction petition. The appellant argued that the respondent's claim of ownership was inconsistent with being a mere rent collector for the temple, thus rendering the eviction claim invalid. However, the Court rejected this argument, stating that the respondent, as a rent collector, fell within the definition of a 'landlord' under the Act. The Court clarified that the respondent's claim of ownership did not disentitle him from seeking eviction as long as he met the requirements under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act.
Definition of 'Landlord' under Section 3(h) of the Act:
The judgment delved into the definition of 'landlord' under Section 3(h) of the Act. It was emphasized that the respondent, as a rent collector entitled to receive rent on behalf of the temple, qualified as a 'landlord' under the Act. The Court clarified that even if the appellant claimed ownership, as long as he was found to be a landlord, he could maintain an action for eviction under the relevant section. The Court highlighted that a petitioner could claim a higher right but still succeed based on a smaller right recognized by law.
In conclusion, the Court found the appeal to be devoid of merit and dismissed it with costs. The decree for execution was stayed for four months, subject to conditions related to rent clearance and possession delivery.
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2002 (12) TMI 611
Issues Involved:
1. Validity of the Government of India's order dated 9th August 2002 canceling all allotments made since 1st January 2000.
2. Examination of whether en masse cancellation of allotments was justified.
3. Consideration of the impact of the cancellation on various categories of allottees.
4. Examination of the role of political connections in the allotments.
Summary:
Validity of the Government Order:
The Supreme Court examined the validity of the Government of India's order dated 9th August 2002, which canceled all allotments of retail outlets, LPG distributorships, and SKO-LDO dealerships made since 1st January 2000 on the recommendations of the Dealer Selection Boards (DSBs). The Court noted that the order was issued following media reports alleging political patronage in the allotments.
Justification for En Masse Cancellation:
The Court found that the en masse cancellation of allotments was arbitrary and lacked justification. It was noted that the Government did not examine individual cases before issuing the cancellation order. The Court emphasized that the mere existence of a controversy did not justify such a drastic action affecting a large number of people. The decision was deemed a "panic reaction" and not based on a thorough examination of facts and figures.
Impact on Various Categories of Allottees:
The Court highlighted that the cancellation order did not consider the impact on various categories of allottees, including Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes, war widows, and those affected by terrorist activities. The guidelines provided for reservations for these categories, and the en masse cancellation was found to be unjustified and arbitrary, violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Role of Political Connections:
The Court acknowledged the media reports alleging political connections in the allotments but noted that only a small percentage of the total allotments were implicated. The Court held that the Government should have ordered an independent probe into the alleged tainted allotments rather than canceling all allotments en masse. The Court constituted a Committee to examine the 413 cases exposed by the media to determine if the allotments were made on merits or due to political connections.
Conclusion:
The Supreme Court quashed the impugned order dated 9th August 2002, except for the cases referred to the Committee. The Committee, comprising retired judges, was tasked with examining the 413 cases to determine the validity of the allotments. The Court directed the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas and the oil companies to provide full assistance to the Committee. The interim order dated 28th August 2002 was extended to cases where the select panel had been published but letters of intent had not been issued. The judgment emphasized the need for fair play, justice, and transparency in governance.
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2002 (12) TMI 610
Issues involved:
- Whether the Appellant No. 1 rightly took Modvat credit of duty paid on inputs supplied by Appellant No. 2.
Analysis:
Issue 1: Modvat Credit Claim by Appellant No. 1
- Submission by Shri B.L. Narsimhan: Appellant No. 1, a manufacturer of Cold Rolled Strips, availed Modvat Credit under Rule 57A for H.R. Coils purchased from Appellant No. 2 and others. The practice in the Steel Industry involved price negotiation post-clearance, with price adjustments made through debit/credit notes. Appellant No. 1 claimed Modvat Credit based on duty payment indicated in invoices, with no reassessment by Appellant No. 2 for price reductions.
- Legal Position: Advocate argued that once duty is paid on goods, it remains attached regardless of subsequent price changes. Citing precedents, it was contended that only authorities over the manufacturer's jurisdiction can adjust duty. Reference was made to various decisions highlighting the impermissibility of reassessing goods at the hands of the buyer.
Issue 2: Response by Appellant No. 2
- Submission by Ms. Reena Khair: Appellant No. 2 contended that there was no evidence of intentional overpayment to facilitate Modvat Credit for Appellant No. 1. The duty was paid based on Depot selling prices, not earmarked for Appellant No. 1. Reference was made to a Board's Circular clarifying assessment procedures post-amendment.
- Commercial Aspect: Appellant No. 2 argued that there was no commercial accommodation, as goods were purchased at prevailing market prices, which could fluctuate due to the volatile ferrous metal market. Duty payment was made through PLA, indicating no accommodation.
Issue 3: Revenue's Counter-Arguments
- Submission by Shri Rajeev Tondon: Revenue argued that despite subsequent price corrections, Modvat Credit adjustments were not made. Claiming commercial accommodation, Revenue cited decisions emphasizing the need for refund claims for excess duty paid.
Judgment and Conclusion:
- The Tribunal acknowledged that Appellant No. 2 cleared goods with duty paid, and Appellant No. 1 availed Modvat Credit based on actual duty paid. Notably, excess duty paid due to price finalization was not refunded by Appellant No. 2. Precedents were cited to establish that the authority over the input manufacturer must address any duty discrepancies. The Tribunal set aside the demand, emphasizing that Appellant No. 1 was entitled to credit based on duty paying documents. The decision highlighted the inapplicability of reassessment at the buyer's end and upheld the Modvat Credit claim by Appellant No. 1, ultimately allowing both appeals.
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2002 (12) TMI 609
Issues:
1. Conviction under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC based on circumstantial evidence.
2. Re-appraisal of evidence by High Court leading to acquittal.
3. Reliability of circumstantial evidence.
4. Credibility of witnesses and extra-judicial confession.
5. Alleged ill-treatment and motive for murder.
6. Stand of the accused and lack of motive.
Analysis:
1. The initial conviction of the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC was based on circumstantial evidence. The trial court found the chain of circumstances complete, including the manner in which the body was recovered and the medical evidence indicating death by asphyxia due to strangulation. The trial court relied on witness testimonies, such as PW5 who saw the deceased with the accused and heard a cry before finding the body. The trial court also considered an alleged extra-judicial confession by the accused as a basis for conviction.
2. The High Court re-appraised the evidence and overturned the conviction. The High Court questioned the reliability of the medical evidence and witness testimonies. It found discrepancies in the deposition of witnesses, such as PW5, whose credibility was impeached due to the location of his work and the circumstances of the alleged sighting. The High Court also dismissed the alleged extra-judicial confession as a concocted piece of evidence and raised doubts about the motive for the murder.
3. The Supreme Court focused on the reliability of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. It analyzed the credibility of witnesses, particularly emphasizing the doubts raised regarding witness testimonies and the alleged extra-judicial confession. The Court agreed with the High Court's findings on the unreliability of crucial aspects of the prosecution's case, leading to the acquittal of the accused.
4. The Court further examined the alleged ill-treatment of the deceased and the motive for the murder. It concluded that these aspects were not sufficiently proved and appeared to be a fabricated narrative. The Court also rejected the alleged extra-judicial confession due to inconsistencies in witness testimonies and the absence of crucial details in official reports.
5. Regarding the stand of the accused and their lack of motive for the murder, the Court found their version consistent with the evidence on record. The Court highlighted that the accused claimed they had no motive to harm the deceased and were actually searching for her, aligning with the material presented during the trial.
6. Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to acquit the accused, emphasizing the lack of interference required in the case. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the acquittal of the accused based on the unreliability of the prosecution's evidence and the inconsistencies in witness testimonies and alleged confession.
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2002 (12) TMI 608
The Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Mumbai allowed the appeal, setting aside a duty demand and penalty imposed on the appellants for cooling units manufactured and cleared during a specific period. The tribunal ruled that no proceedings could be initiated against the appellants as the sole proprietary concern had ceased to exist following the proprietor's death.
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2002 (12) TMI 607
Issues Involved:
1. Substitution and Condonation of Delay
2. Claims and Compensation under the Land Acquisition Act
3. Abatement of Appeals
4. Nature of Decree: Joint and Inseverable vs. Joint and Severable
Summary:
1. Substitution and Condonation of Delay:
Special leave was granted in S.L.P. [C) Nos.11914-11915 of 1991. The Court allowed applications for substitution and condonation of delay in filing the applications for substitution for some respondents who died during the pendency of the appeals. The heirs of one Late Sultan Singh alias Ishwar Singh, who was not a party at any stage of the proceedings, filed applications to be impleaded as necessary parties, which were rejected.
2. Claims and Compensation under the Land Acquisition Act:
The Government acquired about 5500 bighas of land for the planned development of Delhi. Notifications were issued u/s 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Claims were filed before the Land Acquisition Collector by three categories of claimants:
(i) Union of India and Gaon Sabha claiming the lands as 'waste land' vested with the Gaon Sabha u/s 7 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954.
(ii) Proprietors/Co-owners claiming the land was used for non-agricultural purposes and did not vest in the Gaon Sabha.
(iii) Smt. Gulab Sundari and her transferees claiming Bhumidari rights over the land.
The Additional District Judge held that the lands were 'land' within the meaning of Section 3(13) of the Land Reforms Act, the Bhumidari Certificate in favor of Smt. Gulab Sundari was valid, and the claims of the Union of India and Gaon Sabha were barred by res judicata. Compensation was awarded to the Bhumidar and her transferees.
3. Abatement of Appeals:
During the pendency of appeals, some appellants died, and no steps were taken to bring their legal representatives on record in time. The High Court dismissed the appeals in toto, holding that the appeals were incompetent and not validly constituted due to the abatement of some appellants. The appeals filed by the Gaon Sabha and Union of India were dismissed as barred by res judicata.
4. Nature of Decree: Joint and Inseverable vs. Joint and Severable:
The Supreme Court held that the claims of the appellants were distinct, separate, and independent, and the decree was not joint and inseverable. The High Court should have allowed the applications for impleadment and condonation of delay, facilitating an effective adjudication on merits. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and remitted the appeals to the High Court for fresh disposal on merits.
The Supreme Court emphasized that procedural laws should be liberally construed to serve the ends of justice and not to deny substantial rights due to procedural lapses. The appeals were allowed, and the High Court was directed to restore the appeals to their original files for fresh disposal on merits.
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2002 (12) TMI 606
Issues:
Challenge to criminal prosecution under FEMA and FERA, Jurisdiction of Special Judge, Legality of taking cognizance under FEMA.
Analysis:
1. The petitioner sought to quash the criminal prosecution under FEMA and FERA initiated against him. The allegations involved defrauding government money and violating foreign exchange regulations. The petitioner admitted involvement in opening bank accounts and handling foreign exchange transactions for the main accused.
2. The petitioner's counsel challenged the order on three grounds. Firstly, prosecution should only follow adjudication proceedings, which had not been initiated. Secondly, FERA offenses are triable by lower courts, not a Special Judge. Lastly, the Special Judge lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance under FERA, as the case was registered as a FEMA case.
3. The respondents argued that the Special Judge was duly notified to try cases under FEMA, and criminal prosecution can proceed independently of adjudication. They highlighted the authority of the Enforcement Officer to institute the prosecution and cited Section 460 of the CrPC to support the legality of the order.
4. The Court noted the petitioner's admission of involvement and the absence of denial regarding the allegations. It emphasized the separate nature of adjudication and criminal trial, allowing for prosecution even if adjudication is pending. The Court also referenced the notification empowering the Special Judge to try cases under FEMA.
5. Section 49 of FEMA was analyzed, indicating that post-FEMA enactment, no court should take cognizance under the repealed FERA. However, the Special Judge, authorized to try FEMA cases, was deemed to have jurisdiction to take cognizance under FEMA.
6. The Court concluded that there was no bar to criminal trial without completed adjudication and upheld the jurisdiction of the Special Judge. The application to quash the prosecution was dismissed, finding no merit in the petitioner's contentions.
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2002 (12) TMI 605
Issues Involved:
1. Whether an employee can withdraw their application for voluntary retirement under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) before acceptance by the Competent Authority.
2. Whether the employer bank can unilaterally determine the jural relationship of master and servant upon an employee's application under VRS.
Summary:
Issue 1: Withdrawal of Application for Voluntary Retirement
The Supreme Court examined whether an employee could withdraw their application for voluntary retirement before it was accepted by the Competent Authority, despite the scheme's stipulation that the application is irrevocable. The Court held that the Voluntary Retirement Scheme (VRS) constituted an "invitation to treat" rather than an offer. The applications submitted by employees were considered offers, which could be accepted or rejected by the bank. The Court emphasized that the Indian Contract Act, 1872, applies to such schemes, allowing employees to withdraw their offers before acceptance, as per Section 5 of the Act. The Court cited various precedents, including Union of India & Ors. v. Gopal Chandra Misra & Ors., Balram Gupta v. Union of India & Anr., and Shambhu Murari Sinha v. Project & Development India Ltd. & Anr., to support this view.
Issue 2: Employer's Authority to Determine Jural Relationship
The Court also addressed whether the employer bank could unilaterally determine the jural relationship of master and servant upon an employee's application under VRS. The Court found that the banks had secured an unfettered right to deal with the jural relationship between themselves and their employees, which was not permissible. The Court held that the scheme was contractual in nature and did not have statutory backing, thus making the provisions of the Indian Contract Act applicable. The Court concluded that the banks' discretion to accept or reject the applications and the ability to amend or rescind the scheme indicated that the scheme was not an offer but an invitation to treat.
Additional Points:
- The Court noted that the State Bank of India (SBI) had a slightly different scheme, which allowed for withdrawal of applications until a specified date, creating an enforceable right.
- The Court rejected the argument that the scheme was ultra vires for not being laid before Parliament, stating that the laying down rule was directory, not mandatory.
- The Court held that employees who accepted ex gratia payments under the scheme could not subsequently withdraw their applications, as they had waived their rights and could not approbate and reprobate.
Conclusion:
1. The appeals by the Nationalised Banks were dismissed except for cases where employees had accepted part of the benefits under the scheme.
2. The appeals by the State Bank of India were allowed.
3. The appeals from the judgments of the Uttaranchal High Court were allowed, and the judgments were set aside.
4. The appeals relating to ten writ petitions from the Punjab and Haryana High Court were remitted for fresh consideration on merits.
The Court directed that the parties bear their own costs.
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