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2021 (6) TMI 1183
The judgment from the Appellate Tribunal CESTAT Bangalore involves the case where the appellants, represented by Shri Rajesh Chander Kumar, Advocate, have availed the Sabka Vishwas (Legacy Dispute Resolution) Scheme, 2019. The Department accepted the scheme, and a discharge certificate was issued by the Designated Committee, which was presented in the proceedings. Consequently, the appeal is "dismissed as deemed to be withdrawn." The order was pronounced in open court on June 25, 2021, by the bench comprising HON'BLE MR. S.S GARG, JUDICIAL MEMBER, and HON'BLE MR. P. ANJANI KUMAR, TECHNICAL MEMBER.
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2021 (6) TMI 1182
Corporate Debtor’s right to file reply has been closed - no opportunity of hearing was provided to him - violation of principles of natural justice - It was held by CESTAT that 'Granting the Appellant's request for further delay would contravene the legal mandate and the objectives of the I&B Code, particularly the timely completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP).'
HELD THAT:- It is not required to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The civil appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
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2021 (6) TMI 1181
Seeking a direction to the Respondents to supply a copy of the ECIR registered under Section 3 & 4 under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - HELD THAT:- Issue Notice. Mr. Mahajan appears and seeks and is granted 2 weeks to file the Reply.
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2021 (6) TMI 1180
Seeking to declare the action of the State Consumer Redressal Commission, Hyderabad (State Commission) - institution of another round of proceedings by the respondent No. 4/Developer before the District Forum, by invoking Section 151 of the CPC, for acquitting him - entertainment of an appeal by State Commission purportedly filed u/s 73 of the Act of 2019 against the order of the District Forum, dismissing the application filed by the respondent No. 4/Developer.
HELD THAT:- Ordinarily, this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, may not entertain a petition for issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari, if there is an alternate remedy available under the statute. However, when administrative authorities, judicial forums or quasi-judicial authorities act in excess of the jurisdiction vested in them or act without any jurisdiction, this Court is not precluded from exercising its discretion in favour of an aggrieved party to prevent abuse of the process of law, undo patent illegality, intervene where the proceeding are wholly without jurisdiction or the orders passed are grossly arbitrary.
The self imposed restriction of the High Court in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy, is founded on the principles of propriety, equity, consistency and for enforcing rule of law. However, such a restriction shall not deter this Court from invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction to advance the cause of justice and to do substantial justice to the parties concerned.
In the instant case, the petitioner has approached this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with a grievance that by entertaining the appeal preferred by the respondent No. 4/Developer, the State Commission has acted wholly without jurisdiction. The Consumer Protection Act is a special statute and a self contained code - It is thus evident that not every appeal filed against any order of the District Forum can be entertained for the asking and a stay order granted mechanically. When it is a question of jurisdiction, the appellate authority, should have first satisfied itself as to whether it is vested with the jurisdiction to entertain the said appeal at all, more so, when the District Forum has clearly held that an application moved by the respondent No. 4 under Section 151 CPC, is not maintainable.
The facts of this case remind the court of the oft quoted legal maxim "Justice delayed is Justice denied" which is not a cosmetic statement. All the stake holders have a role to play in ensuring that justice is not delayed. There are several factors that contribute to inordinate delays in the disposal of cases, including the abuse of the legal process, adoption of dilatory tactics and cumbersome procedures. The case at hand is a classic example of abuse of the legal process - The reason being that the respondent No. 4/opposite party before the District Forum has left no stone unturned to deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the orders to the point of filing an appeal against an order passed by the District Forum, where no such appeal is maintainable in law, wherein the State Commission has proceeded to grant a stay order in his favour.
The present petition is allowed and it is held that application filed by the respondent No. 4/Developer before the State Commission is not maintainable in law.
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2021 (6) TMI 1179
Applicability of Section 140(1) of the Companies Act, 2013 to the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) - Appointment of Chartered Accountant firm as the statutory Auditor of a Public Sector Undertaking owned by the State Government - removal of applicant as a statutory Auditor appointed under Section 139 of the Act, 2013 without giving any opportunity of hearing or without any show cause notice - HELD THAT:- The Supreme Court in Gurugobinda Basu vs. Sankari Prasad Ghosal and others [1963 (8) TMI 76 - SUPREME COURT] had held in the context of a Government company that the statutory Auditor is removable by the Central Government and the Comptroller and Auditor-General of India would exercise full control over him.
If the Tribunal is approached either by the Central Government or by any person concerned which includes the C&AG, then the NCLT has to decide such an application within 15 days as prescribed under the first proviso to sub-section (5) of Section 140 of the Act, 2013.
It appears that when the CAG appoints a statutory auditor, it does so in accordance with the policy/guideline/conditions of appointment which is titled the "Appointment of auditors of Government Company/Government controlled other company under Section 139 (5) & (7) of the Companies Act, 2013” - in case of violation of any of the aforesaid conditions by the appointed Auditor, the C&AG has the right to remove the Auditor at any point of time after following the due administrative process. What is this administrative process is not clear. Even while following the due administrative process, the opportunity of hearing has to be given to the concerned Auditor before his removal. The principles of natural justice are implicit in clause 11 referred to and highlighted. However, in the case on hand, it is not the stance of the C&AG that action against the writ applicant has been taken.
Where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity of being heard, then having regard to the nature of the statutory duty imposed the decision maker itself implies an obligation to hear before deciding. Whenever an action of a public body results in civil consequences for the person against whom the action is directed, the duty to act fairly can be presumed and in such a case, the administrative authority must give an appropriate opportunity of hearing to the affected person - If there is a power to decide and decide detrimentally to the prejudice of a person, the duty to act judicially is implicit in exercise of such a power and the rule of natural justice operates in areas not covered by any law validly made. The criteria for an adequate notice is that the Court's conscience must be satisfied that the concerned person had a fair chance to know the details of the case against him and of the action proposed to be taken against him.
It goes without saying that any order or any decision which has civil consequences must be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing. There could be just one overriding reason to exclude the application of the principles of natural justice and that is in the case of national security. Such is not the stance of any of the respondents in the present case.
The writ applicants are entitled to get themselves once again uploaded on the portal. The removal of the writ applicant No.1, as the statutory authority, is hereby quashed and set aside - application disposed off.
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2021 (6) TMI 1178
Disallowance u/s 35(2AB) - expenditure incurred on inhouse R&D facility as weighted deduction - CIT(A) deleted addition holding that before. tenth Amendment Rule, 2016, the Department of Scientific & Industrial Research (DSIR) was having no such power to quantify the expenditure incurred on in-house R & D facility - HELD THAT:- CIT(Appeals) provided relief to the assessee relying on the decision of the Pune Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Cummins India Limited [2018 (5) TMI 1314 - ITAT PUNE] held that for deduction u/s 35(2AB) of the Act, first step was the recognition of facility by the prescribed authority and entering an agreement between the facility and the prescribed authority. Once such an agreement has been executed, under which recognition has been given to the facility, then thereafter the role of AO is to look into and allow the expenditure incurred on inhouse R&D facility as weighted deduction under section 35(2AB) of the Act. Accordingly, we hold so. Thus, we reverse the order of Assessing Officer in curtailing the deduction claimed u/s 35(2AB) - Ground No.1 raised in appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.
Disallowance u/s.14A r.w.r.8D - CIT(A) deleted addition - assessee had made suo-moto disallowance - HELD THAT:- AO in the case before us has made detailed analysis in the assessment order regarding the applicability of Section 14A r.w.r.8D of the Rules with the facts of the assessee's case and further that why such disallowance was required that has also been explained by the AO - This findings sans satisfaction is not the case here. That further, he has made disallowance only one half percent of the average value of investment i.e. 0.50% of ₹ 406,47,45,829/- i.e. ₹ 2,03,23,729/-. Therefore, it becomes essential to verify whether the assessee had actually made suo-moto disallowance of ₹ 16.8 lakhs and whether the same had been analyzed by the AO while making disallowance of 0.50% at the time of assessment. For this exercise, in the interest of justice, the issue needs to be remanded back to the file of Assessing Officer for adjudication after detailed verification as indicated hereinabove while complying with the principles of natural justice and as per law. Ground raised in appeal by the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
Disallowance u/s.10AA(9) r.w.s.80IA(10) - assessee showed higher profits due to close business connections with associated enterprises, warranting disallowance - CIT(A) deleted addition - HELD THAT:- CIT(Appeals) has recorded his findings on the issue and therein, he observed that the TPO has not drawn any adverse inference in view of healthy margins of 35.04%. AO on the other hand had proceeded to disallow a part of deduction u/s.10AA of the Act on the total sales of ₹ 44,08,91,258/- from Pune SEZ and Hyderabad SEZ to the AEs. This was done without any cogent basis and that further, the Ld. CIT(Appeals) also relied on the decision of his predecessor deleting this addition which was further upheld by the Pune Bench of the Tribunal [2020 (3) TMI 222 - ITAT PUNE] for the assessment year 2013-14.
Mere existence of the close connection and earning more than ordinary profits are not enough to assume an arrangement as contemplated u/s.80IA(10) of the Act. The Assessing Officer is also required to prove any such arrangement existing which resulted in more than ordinary profits. In the entire assessment order, the Assessing Officer has not specifically spelled out what exact arrangement existed between the parties in the present case which resulted in more than ordinary profits. Therefore, we do not find any infirmity with the findings of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) and relief provided to the assessee is hereby sustained. Thus, Ground No.4 raised in appeal by the Revenue is dismissed.
Additional grounds on the issue of education cess and secondary & higher education cess - HELD THAT:- We observe that the Ld. CIT(Appeals) of his order relying on the decision in assessee's own case for the assessment year 2013-14 (2020 (3) TMI 222 - ITAT PUNE] has decided the issue in favour of the assessee. We agree on principle that the amount involved in “education cess" is an allowable expenditure and it is in favour of the assessee. However, assessee submitted that the amount involved in “education cess‟ needs to be verified by the Assessing Officer. Therefore, as per aforesaid observation, we set aside the order of the Ld. CIT(Appeals) on this issue and remand the same to the file of the Assessing Officer for verification of the amount of expenditure on education cess and re-adjudicate while complying with the principles of natural justice and as per law. Thus, additional grounds raised by the Revenue are allowed for statistical purposes.
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2021 (6) TMI 1177
Reopening of assessment - whether the objections filed by the petitioner against the impugned notice have been dealt with by the concerned respondents or not? - HELD THAT:- All the proceedings are being conducted through the National Faceless Assessment Centre, petitioner seeks permission to join the National Faceless Assessment Centre as party respondent No.2 in the petition.
Permission as sought for is granted. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Tushar Hemani is directed to furnish the amended copy of the cause title by tomorrow. Let the learned Senior Standing Counsel Mrs. Bhatt appear for the respondent No.2.
Put up on JULY 13, 2021. Interim relief to continue till then.
Respondent shall take specific instructions as to whether the objections filed by the petitioner against the impugned notice have been dealt with by the concerned respondents or not? It is also clarified that since the Court [2021 (4) TMI 1391 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] had directed that the respondent shall not proceed further with the assessment proceedings without dealing with the objections filed by the petitioner, the concerned respondent shall be at liberty to deal with the objections filed by the petitioner in accordance with law, pending this petition.
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2021 (6) TMI 1176
Condonation of delay of 331 days in filing the appeal - no satisfactory explanation, even on merits - HELD THAT:- Besides the delay of 331 days in filing the appeal, for which there is no satisfactory explanation, even on merits, it is found that the order of the CESTAT dated 24 May, 2019 to be unexceptionable. The view which has been taken does not suffer from any error of law.
The appeal is, therefore dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
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2021 (6) TMI 1175
Seeking grant of anticipatory bail - Sections 419/420/120-B/34 IPC and Section 66-C/66-D of the Information Technology Act, 2000 - it is contended that the petitioner is the king pin of the fake centre being run by virtue of which several victims in USA were cheated by way of VOIP calls - HELD THAT:- Undoubtedly, the offences alleged against the petitioner are punishable upto 7 years imprisonment, however the magnitude of offence is enormous. In Arnesh Kumar [2014 (7) TMI 1143 - SUPREME COURT] relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, Supreme Court dealt with Section 41 Cr.P.C. and emphasising on Section 41(1)(b) Cr.P.C. it was observed that when a person is accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment for less than 7 years or which may extend to 7 years with or without fine, not only has the Police officer to be satisfied that the accused has committed the said offence, but he is also required to be satisfied that the arrest of the accused is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence, or for proper investigation of the offence or to prevent such person from exploiting the evidence of the offence to disappear or tamper such evidence in any manner or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police Officer, or unless such person is arrested his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured, and the Police Officer shall record his reasons in writing while making such arrest.
The law does not mandate a blanket ban on arrest of accused against whom there is a reasonable suspicion of commission of a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of less than 7 years or which may extend to 7 years but requires that the Police officer should be satisfied about the necessity of arrest on the conditions as noted in the sub-clauses (a) to (e) and should record reasons for the same. Even the High Powered Committee of this Court constituted under the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued direction to scrupulously follow the directions in the decision in Arnesh Kumar.
The petitioner has vehemently relied on the fact that the petitioner is working with M/s. Deans Infratech Pvt. Ltd. with its offices at Delhi and Mumbai and the company is engaged in the road construction business. Though this fact has been verified form the Managing Director of the company who stated that the petitioner was appointed in his company on 8th September, 2017 as Business Development Manager and his work profile was to develop new business opportunities throughout India without being physically based in any particular office location, however, the petitioner's employment as Business Development Manager with M/s. Deans Infratech Pvt. Ltd. does not lead to an inference that the petitioner is not running a centre from which 15 employees and two other co-accused have already been arrested - The prescription dated 23rd May, 2021 suggests tenderness in L-5 region and X-Ray and MRI of lumbar spine has been prescribed which reports have not been placed on record. The other ailments relied upon are relating to the eye, which prescription date back to the year 2013 and the recent prescription is of 17th February, 2020 when two eye-drops were prescribed. Thus, even on the medical condition this Court finds that there is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner is suffering from any co-morbidity which is likely to affect him due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
This Court finds no ground to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner - Petition is dismissed.
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2021 (6) TMI 1174
Capital gain computation - determination rate of the land for working out the sale consideration for the purpose of capital gain - CIT-A directing the AO to adopt the rate of ₹ 618 per square meter with respect to the sale of property against the rate adopted by the AO at Rs. 1,670 per square meter - HELD THAT:- The issue on hand does not require any further consideration for the simple reason that the ITAT in the own case of the assessee in the appeal preferred by the assessee ASHOK VADILAL PATEL VERSUS ITO, WARD-3 (3) (1) AHMEDABAD. [2021 (1) TMI 1085 - ITAT AHMEDABAD] has directed the AO to adopt the rate for the sale of land at Rs. 200 per square meter.
Admittedly, the decision rendered by the ITAT in the own case of the assessee as discussed above is binding on us. Therefore we have no other alternate except to follow the order as discussed aforesaid. - Decided against revenue.
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2021 (6) TMI 1173
Conviction by the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I - judgments are challenged mainly on the ground that the procedure adopted by the trial court in finding the accused to have pleaded guilty was patently illegal - HELD THAT:- On scrutiny of the diary extract and records received from the lower court, it is seen that the court charge in the cases was framed and read over to the accused on 09.03.2017. Thereafter, the accused were asked whether they had committed the offences and they answered in the negative. This plea of not guilty was recorded and the cases posted for prosecution evidence. After a few adjournments, the cases were taken up on 24.04.2018, on which day, the question whether the accused had committed the offences was repeated. This time the accused answered 'yes'. This answer was treated as pleading of guilt and the accused were convicted. Surprisingly, in the questionnaire containing the replies given by the accused, the answer of the first accused to the question whether he had committed the offences, is not seen entered.
In JUPUDI ANAND GUPTA VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND ORS. [2017 (10) TMI 1654 - SUPREME COURT], the decision in Mahant Kaushalya Das was followed and the conviction of the appellant, based on his alleged plea of guilty, which the trial court had failed to record, was set aside. The proposition laid down by the above decisions is that the plea of guilty should not only be recorded, but such recording should, to the extent possible, be in the words spoken by the accused.
As far as the instant case is concerned, the petitioner having pleaded not guilty at the first instance, recording of the monosyllabic answer 'yes' in the questionnaire prepared at the stage of framing charge, cannot, under any circumstance, be termed as pleading of guilt by the petitioner, based on which the court could have convicted him. As such, the judgments convicting the petitioner are liable to be set aside.
The criminal revision petitions are allowed by setting aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner. Matters remitted to the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Parappanangadi for retrial in accordance with law.
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2021 (6) TMI 1172
Inclusion of name in the draft gradation list - determination of seniority - HELD THAT:- Though the petitioner was deputed to Samal Barrage UP School, he had never been permanently absorbed in the said school and his lien had been continuing with Angul District Education Cadre. But fact remains, after filing the original application, the Block Education Officer cancelled the deputation of the petitioner on 09.09.2014, pursuant to which he was relieved w.e.f. 15.10.2015 from Samal Barrage UP School by the Executive Engineer, Samal Barrage, by virtue of the office order dated 12.09.2015. Accordingly, the petitioner joined in Chhendipada Primary School under Block Education Officer, Angul on 16.09.2014. Thereby, it is made clear that his lien with parent education district was continuing, pursuant to which he had been allowed to join in Chhendipada Primary School, wherefrom he was placed on deputation to Samal Barrage UP School. Therefore, the petitioner's name should have been included in the draft gradation list prepared by opposite party no. 3 with all consequential benefits.
In TRIVENI SHANKAR SAXENA VERSUS STATE OF U.P. AND OTHERS [1991 (12) TMI 285 - SUPREME COURT], the apex Court held that the word "lien" originally means "binding" from the latin "ligament" and its lexical meaning was "right to retain".
It is apt to refer here the legal maxim "Expressio Unius est exclusion alterius" i.e. if a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner and any other manner are barred.
The opposite parties no. 2 and 3 are directed to fix seniority of the petitioner, as per Explanation-I to Rule-15 of Rules, 1997, in the draft gradation list dated 01.09.2012 published by opposite party no. 3, taking into account his date of appointment as 22.09.1981, and extend all consequential benefits, as due and admissible to him in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of communication of this judgment.
The writ petition is allowed.
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2021 (6) TMI 1171
Seeking directions for conducting a fresh inquiry under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - whether an award passed by a Lok-Adalat can be considered an award of the court under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act for the purposes of Section 28A of that Act? - HELD THAT:- The referring court or the court for which such Lok Adalat is organised does not come into the picture so far as such determination is concerned. In fact, in the case of a reference under clause (ii) of Section 19(5) of the LSA Act, it is the authority or committee organising the Lok Adalat, which itself refers the case or matter to the Lok Adalat. The court, for which such Lok Adalat is organised, is not concerned even at the stage of the reference. The award made by the Lok Adalat does not have to go back to that court to enable it to make it a part of its decree. The award itself is final and binding (and not appealable) as between the parties. It is deemed to be a decree of a civil court and executable as such. There is nothing in this scheme of things for treating an award passed by a Lok Adalat as a deemed decree of that court which made the reference to the Lok Adalat or for which the Lok Adalat was organised.
There is nothing to suggest that if the award is in a compensation dispute in a land acquisition matter, any third party should thereby be entitled to apply for re-determination of its compensation under Section 28A of the LA Act. As a matter of principle, it is not possible to say that that eventuality (i.e. entitlement of a third party to apply for re-determination of its own compensation after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat) inevitably follows as a corollary or consequence from such award.
The award of Lok Adalat having to be treated as an award of the reference court under Part III, does not follow as an inevitable sequitur, to come to such consequence the legal fiction contained in Section 21 of the LSA Act will have to be actually extended to import two other fictions, namely, that the award of Lok Adalat should be deemed (i) "a decree of the court which has referred the matter to the Lok Adalat", and (ii) "a decree passed under Part III of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894" - It would be an artificial extension of the legal fiction and not a necessary corollary of the original statutory fiction; it would be extending the original fiction beyond its statutory purpose.
Karnataka High Court in Vasudave [2007 (8) TMI 825 - KARNATAKA HIGH COURT] has, relying on the provisions of the LA Act, CPC and LSA Act, and in particular, the amendment to the CPC by introduction of Section 89, held that the award of a Lok Adalat made on a reference brought before it falls within the expression 'award of the court' under Section 28A of the LA Act. So also, Gujarat High Court in ALL GUJARAT JAHER BHANDHKAM MAJOOR MANDAL VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT [2014 (12) TMI 1427 - GUJARAT HIGH COURT] has taken a view that as per Section 21 of the LSA Act, not only is an award in a land acquisition matter made by Lok Adalat a decree of a Civil Court but an executable award of the Reference Court and could be relied on for the purpose of Section 28A of the LA Act.
The case of RAMBHAU MAHADEORAO TEMBHURKAR AND ORS VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS [2015 (8) TMI 1578 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] cited by Mr. Tajane is on an altogether different point. It holds, on a principle of equality before law, that it was impermissible to accord different treatments to owners of similar lands based on two different acquisition statutes (namely, the LA Act and the Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, in that case). Relying inter alia on the statement of law in Girnar Traders (3) vs. State of Maharashtra [2011 (1) TMI 1343 - SUPREME COURT], the Division Bench of court in that case held that the provisions of Section 28A of the LA Act would apply to acquisitions under the MID Act. The ratio of this judgment has no application to the facts of present case.
There are no infirmity with the impugned order of the Sub-Divisional Officer by which he refused to entertain the Petitioner's application under Section 28A of the LA Act based on the award of Lok Adalat in LAR No. 18 of 2011. The award of Lok Adalat in that LAR cannot be construed as an award of the court made under Part III of the LA Act - petition dismissed.
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2021 (6) TMI 1170
Recovery of VAT dues - removal of first charge of Government - priority over the movable and immovable properties of borrower of petitioner bank as secured creditor - bank can proceed further to auction the properties to recover its dues or not - HELD THAT:- The position prevailing on record is that the properties in question have been mortgaged with the petitioner bank undisputedly by registered mortgage deed and encumbrance certificate has also been issued to the petitioner bank incorporating the charge of the bank over the property. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner has taken all steps strictly under the provisions of the Act to realize the dues of the mortgaged property and it is only at that stage, the respondent No.4 has come out with a plea that they have got first charge over the property to realize their dues.
This Court is of the opinion that a case is made out by the petitioner to call for an interference. Accordingly, the impugned communication dated 21.4.2020 issued by the respondent No.4 is hereby quashed and set aside and consequently, it is held that since the petitioner bank is having a clear charge over the property by virtue of the aforesaid circumstance, it has got first priority over the secured assets and not the State Government by virtue of the provisions of the VAT Act, 2003.
The petition stands allowed.
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2021 (6) TMI 1169
Seeking grant of Interim bail - petitioner has already spent more than two years as an under-trial prisoner - charge sheet against the petitioner already stands filed - HELD THAT:- Even the case of an under-trial or a convict falls within the categories set out by the HPC, and he does not have any indivisible right to claim that he ought to be granted interim suspension/bail, as the case may be. Each case is required to be considered on its own merits by taking into consideration the guidelines laid down by the HPC.
In the present case, the petitioner is a young man of 27 years of age, whose conduct in jail has been certified to be good and he is not alleged to be previously involved in any case.
In these circumstances, merely because that the other co-accused are absconding, cannot be a ground to deny the petitioner the benefit available under the recommendations made by the HPC. There are no reason to believe the bald statement of the respondent that in case the petitioner is released on interim bail, he will tamper with the investigation.
Petition allowed by granting interim bail to the petitioner for a period of 45 days, subject to his furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with a surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Jail Superintendent.
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2021 (6) TMI 1168
Benefit of Vivad se Vishwas Scheme denied - Forms 1 and 2 rejected as petitioner’s revision application filed u/s 264 was not pending as on the specified date, i.e., 31.01.2020 - as contended by the petitioner, that the limitation for filing a revision application stood extended by the Central Board of Direct Taxes (‘CBDT’) Circular till 31.03.2021 - whether period spanning between 15.03.2020 and 14.03.2021 stood excluded for the purposes of limitation?
HELD THAT:- To our minds, the matter requires examination.
Accordingly, issue notice. Counter-affidavit will be filed within the next four weeks. Rejoinder thereto, if any, will be filed before the next date of hearing.
Revenue will accept Forms 1 & 2 filed by the petitioner, on 23.03.2021, along with 100% of the disputed tax. Mr. Aggarwal says that, according to the petitioner, ₹ 16,81,546/- is payable towards “100% of the disputed tax”.
The respondent, therefore, pending the adjudication of the petition, without prejudice to its rights and contentions, will accept Forms 1 & 2 with 100% of the disputed tax. In case, according to the respondent/revenue, 100% of the disputed tax figure, is at variance with the aforementioned amount, the same will be indicated to the petitioner and necessary corrective action will be taken by the petitioner.
Revenue will also take next steps in the matter which will be, as indicated above, subject to the final outcome of the writ petition and will bear in mind, while taking next steps in the matter, the deadline, which presently, we are told, expires on 30.06.2021.
Given the aforesaid directions that have been issued in the matter, Mr. Aggarwal says, he does not wish to press the interim application any further. CM is, thus, closed.
List this matter on 22.09.2021.
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2021 (6) TMI 1167
Seeking waiver of the requirement of pre-deposit of 30% of tax as required under Section 62(4)(c)(i) of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 - HELD THAT:- Taking note of the order in STA Nos. 749 & 750/2016, which remains in force and not having been stayed, taking note the peculiar facts of the case including that the petitioner is a Public Sector Undertaking, that for the same products in the assessment proceedings for the year April, 2014 to March, 2015 the Tribunal had ruled that the products are leviable with tax at 5.5.%, it would be appropriate that the deposit for the purpose of consideration of his application for stay under Section 62(4)(c)(i) be waived considering the order in STA Nos. 749 & 750/2016. However, it is clarified that in the event the order in STA Nos. 749 & 750/2016, is set aside in S.T.R.P.No.102/2018, the petitioner would be relegated to the same stage of his interim relief being subject to deposit as contemplated under Section 62(4)(c)(i) of the Act.
Accordingly, petition is disposed off while clarifying that the petition is being disposed off only as regards to the limited aspect of deposit to be made for seeking stay under Section 62(4)(c)(i) of the Act.
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2021 (6) TMI 1166
Non-consideration of the entitlement of the petitioner for refund of 25% amount already deposited - error apparent on the face of the record - HELD THAT:- A perusal of the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court dated 22.10.2020 indicates that neither the argument that an interim order was passed by the DRT in favour of the borrower on the same date was made nor any argument was made that the remaining 25% amount was deposited by the petitioner at the time of e-auction should be refunded. On a pointed quarry by the Court, learned counsel for the petitioner could not deny that in fact no prayer to that effect was made in the prayer clause of the memo of writ petition. The order dated 22.10.2020 passed by the Division Bench of this Court therefore cannot be faulted for something which was not argued before it. Rehearing under the garb of review is not permissible.
The review petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
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2021 (6) TMI 1165
Validity of assessment completed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s 153C - non appearance by assessee - HELD THAT:- At the time of hearing None appeared before us on behalf of the assessee. The assessee has also not filed any written submissions or furnished evidence to justify his stand.
In this situation, we are of view that the assessee is not interested to pursue his appeals. Further from the order sheet, it is apparent that the appeals were posted for hearing on several occasions. However, none appeared on behalf of the assessee on the earlier occasions. Moreover, the appeals are also time barred by one day and the assessee has not filed delay condonation petition. For the above stated reasons,hereby hold that the appeals of the assessee are devoid of merits and accordingly disposed off.
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2021 (6) TMI 1164
TP Adjustment - comparable selection - HELD THAT:- Rejection of comparables on application of turnover filter following the ratio laid down in the case of Genisys Integrating [2011 (8) TMI 952 - ITAT BANGALORE]
Companies functionally dissimilar cannot be used as comparables to determined the ALP of risk mitigated contract service provider like that of assessee before us.
Helios & Matheson Information Technology Ltd - Application software segment of the said concern is not comparable to the assessee's segment of IT services.
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